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DRAFT ONLY: NOT FOR CITING IN THIS FORM 
 
But even with this and every other danger, I would have no qualms about 
confessing loudly and publicly what I swear to you here: that I consider 
the Critique of Reason to be the greatest among all the masterworks of 
philosophical spirit known to me, that through it I have been put in a 
position to answer all of my philosophical doubts in a way that fully 
satisfies my mind and heart … The fully new and wholly complete 
development of the faculty of cognition that is contained in it unifies the 
acclaimed but contradictory viewpoints from which Locke and Leibniz 
investigated the human spirit, and it fulfills — indeed surpasses — even 
the strict demands that David Hume has made on philosophy in respect of 
its principles. … On this view not only could a new universally valid 
metaphysics — that is, a genuine science consisting partly of universal 
and necessary predicates of objects that can be conceived and cognized, 
and partly of the necessary features of objects that cannot be conceived 
but can only be thought through reason — be derived with certainty and 
with ease and in a sense that, while previously misunderstood, would 
satisfy the demands of all factions; but on this view one could also derive 
the highest viewpoint of all history, the most fundamental rule of taste, 
the principle of all philosophy of religion, the first principle of natural 
right, and the fundamental law of morality. And, consequently, at 
precisely that point in time when the need for a complete reformation of 
philosophy has risen to its most extreme on account of a universal 
shaking in the fields of the philosophical sciences, we would also have 
obtained the only possible and fully sufficient means for such a 
reformation; and we might look forward with joyful expectation to one of 
the most universal, remarkable, and beneficent revolutions that has ever 
occurred in the human spirit. 
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By presenting it in a manner that was both true to Kant’s central intentions and yet 
attuned to the philosophical, moral, and religious concerns of the Protestant 
Bildungsbürgertum — university-educated urbanites — Reinhold’s Letters on the 
Kantian Philosophy played a key role in broadening the cultural reception of the 
otherwise intensely recondite Critique of Pure Reason. In addition to being an astute 
reader of Kant, Reinhold was a lapsed Jesuit whose conversion to Kantianism 
followed his conversions to Leibnizianism, Protestantism, and Freemasonry, in whose 
lodges he had engaged with Leibniz’s philosophy as a spiritual wisdom reserved for 
initiates dedicated to inner self-transformation and the outer renewal of society.2 
Despite its apparent absence from modern academic philosophy, the notion that one 
might turn to philosophy in pursuit of inner illumination and transformation, similar 
to that found the church and the lodge, was taken for granted in Kant’s milieu and 
formed a key part of the reception of his philosophy.3 
Reinhold indeed thought that Kant had solved a crucial philosophical problem — 
the problem of how apparently independent objects of outer experience could be 
viewed as projections of the inner a priori operations of the mind — but regarded this 
reformation of philosophy as beneficent for the human spirit because it was designed 
to resolve pressing spiritual and cultural problems. Reinhold diagnosed the crisis that 
was ‘shaking’ the philosophical sciences in terms of the twin problems posed by a 
metaphysics whose intellectualism divorced it from scientific advances and the 
                                                
1  Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, ed. K. Ameriks, 
trans. J. Hebbler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 175-76.  
2  On the use of Leibnizian philosophy as a form of spiritual cultivation within 
masonic lodges and illumination societies, see Martin Mulsow, Monadenlehre, 
Hermetik und Deismus: Georg Schades geheime Aufklärungsgesellschaft, 1747-1760 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998); and Mulsow, ‘Vernünftige Metempsychosis. Ueber 
Monadenlehre, Esoterik und geheime Aufklärungsgesellschaften im 18. Jahrhundert’, 
in M. Neugebauer-Wölk (ed.), Aufklärung und Esoterik (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 
1999), pp. 211-73.  
3  See the important discussion of this milieu in George di Giovanni, Freedom 
and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind 
1774-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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impact of natural sciences that were incapable of grasping the presence of the spiritual 
in nature.4 Like Kant himself, Reinhold regarded this dual development as having 
resulted in the division of philosophical culture and the human mind itself into an 
enthusiast spiritualism associated with Leibnizian and Swedenborgian metaphysics, 
and a soulless empiricism and materialism associated with Lockean ‘sensualism’ and 
Newtonian cosmology and experimental method. 
Kant’s ‘discovery’ of the a priori grounds of empirical cognition was praised in 
part because it showed how a spiritualist metaphysics could be confined to the limits 
of empirical experience. It was acclaimed much more, though, for showing that 
beyond these limits in which Locke and Newton threatened to immure reason, the 
mind encountered ‘objects that cannot be conceived but can only be thought through 
reason’. These transcendental objects or ideas made it possible to defend the presence 
of a self-acting moral being within the empirical world and a supreme intelligence as 
the ground of its intelligibility. For both its supporters and opponents, then, the initial 
reception of Kant’s critical philosophy in Protestant German was dominated by the 
view of it as a renovation of metaphysics designed to defend the presence of spiritual 
autonomy and divine intellection within the scientific view of the world, which would 
otherwise be populated by self-subsistent empirical objects linked by experimentally 
derived laws of motion and causation.5 
Without completely losing touch with Kant’s original concerns and initial 
reception, the main tendency of twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Anglo-
American commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason has been to downplay Kant’s 
metaphysical commitments, particularly his conception of the noumena (‘things in 
themselves’) as objects of a divine ‘intellectual intuition’ whose unavailability to 
human beings defines the limits of human understanding. For the most part, Anglo-
American commentary has viewed the Critique as a critique of metaphysics written in 
defence of empirical knowledge, rather than as a renovation of metaphysics designed 
to tether the empirical sciences to transcendental principles of intelligibility and 
morality. Such commentary has typically sought to confine Kant’s own philosophy 
within the limits of empirical experience, treating the transcendental intelligences or 
noumena as an abyss from which the eyes of philosophical understanding must be 
                                                
4  Reinhold, Letters, pp. 125-46. 
5  di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion, pp. 1-30. 
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averted at all costs.6 From this winnowing reception has emerged a Kant for whom 
there are not two worlds — the sensible and the intelligible — only ‘two viewpoints’ 
on a single spatio-temporal world, as if the noumenon were simply a particular kind 
of conceptual abstraction applied to empirical things.7 This is a Kant for whom the 
last vestige of the noumenal — the power of empirically unconditioned moral choice 
— is viewed not as testimony to a self-acting intelligible or rational being within us, 
but only as a viewpoint that ordinary phenomenal agents should adopt for the 
purposes of acting autonomously.8 
It is true that this deflationary reading has recently been challenged by an 
interpretation of Kant that affirms the presence of a ‘metaphysical’ power of action 
that is non-empirical in the sense of being spontaneous (self-causing) and non-
temporal.9 This interpretation, however, remains tied to a view of Kant’s metaphysics 
as a ‘modest’ philosophy grounded in a ‘commonsense’ empirical experience shared 
by everyone, whose underlying a priori principles Kant merely ‘exhibits’.10 As we 
will see, it takes considerable hermeneutic skill, verging on plastic surgery, to 
maintain the appearance of this modest commonsense Kant in the face of central 
formulations by the historical Kant, such as the following on the ‘pure rational 
concept of our thinking self’: 
For so far is this concept from leaving us with any fear that if we removed 
matter then all thinking and even the existence of thinking beings would 
                                                
6  Jonathon Bennett, Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1966); and Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1974).  
7  Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and 
Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Allison, ‘Transcendental 
Idealism: The ‘Two Aspect’ View’, in B. den Ouden and M. Moen (eds.), New Essays 
on Kant (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 155-78; Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine 
of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 90.  
8  Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); pp. 71-6, 136-45, 221-29. Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating 
the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 173-76, 
200-05. 
9  Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Karl Ameriks, ‘Kant on the Good Will’, in O. Höffe (ed.), Grundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1989), pp. 45-65.  
10  Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation 
of the Critical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 37-
77; and Ameriks, ‘On Being Neither Post- Nor Anti-Kantian: A Reply to Breazeale 
and Larmore Concerning The Fate of Autonomy’, Inquiry 46 (2003), 272-92.  
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thereby be annulled, that is shows — rather — that if I removed the 
thinking subject then the whole corporeal world would have to go away, 
since this world is nothing but the appearance in sensibility of, and a kind 
of presentations of, ourselves as subject.11 
If the deflationary ‘two viewpoints’ reading underestimates the extent of the self-
transformation required to adopt the noumenal as a viewpoint, then the latter 
‘metaphysical’ interpretation presumes to universalise this transformation by treating 
it as the presupposition of a commonsense experience that turns out to be anything but 
commonsense. 
Clothed in a persona that is part analytic philosophy professor and part liberal 
Protestant, the Anglo-American Kant stands in stark contrast to the full-blooded 
metaphysician championed by such early twentieth-century German commentators as 
Max Wundt. In viewing transcendental conditions of intelligibility and morality as 
critical for defending a noumenal presence in the physical world, Wundt was much 
closer to Kant’s original intentions and reception, even if he had come to identify this 
defence with the preservation of German national spiritualism against soulless 
‘Western’ empiricism.12 Heidegger’s reception of Kant has much in common with 
Wundt’s in this regard, although Heidegger’s reading is shaped by his Husserlian 
program of superseding Kant’s subjectivist construction of cognition through an 
ontological reworking of the noumenon.13 In claiming that Kant had failed to realise 
the potential of the transcendental subject, by denying its capacity for direct 
phenomenal experience of noumena (‘Being’), Heidegger’s reading is of course 
tendentiously informed by his commitment to the post-Kantian metaphysics of 
transcendental phenomenology. Nonetheless, his claim that Kant’s metaphysics 
contains the (stifled) presence of an intelligible or spiritual subject or ‘self’ capable of 
pure intellection gives symptomatic expression to a key feature of German 
                                                
11  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1996), p. A 383. All future references to the Critique will be given in text, 
citing the standard ‘A’ and ‘B’ paginations of the first (1781) and second (1787) 
editions, in accordance with Akademie edition: Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: 
Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften/de Gruyters, 1902-). 
12  Max Wundt, Kant als Metaphysiker: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
deutschen Philosophie im 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1924).  
13  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. J. 
Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 25-5, 295-96; 
and Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. R. Taft, 5th ed. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 112-20.  
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metaphysical readings of Kant. This much can be seen from the surfacing of this 
conception of the subject in the later Kant reception of Dieter Henrich and Manfred 
Frank, also indebted to transcendental phenomenology.14 
The modest empirically chastened Kant presented to American university 
students is also quite unlike the early modern metaphysician whom we encounter in 
the historical studies of the mid-twentieth-century German historian of philosophy 
Heinz Heimsoeth.15 Despite his authorship of an array of studies making a plausible 
claim to be the most important body of twentieth-century Kant commentary, in 
characterising the conditions of moral autonomy (the categorical imperative) 
Heimsoeth refuses to restrict the noumenal to the status of a viewpoint adopted by a 
commonsense moral individual, treating it rather as a grounded in a community of 
spiritually constituted rational beings: 
Every interpretation of the categorical imperative (which commands me 
always to behave in such a way that the maxim of my will could serve as 
the principle of a universal law) in an individualistic sense changes its 
meaning and essentially misinterprets Kant’s intent. For Kant, too, 
everything comes down to a community of rational beings, which is made 
possible by the fact that all of them will essentially the same thing and 
that in the spiritual-rational core of their being they are totally alike. Only 
‘empirical’ self is individual in the sense of something unique; the special 
                                                
14  Dieter Henrich, ‘The Origins of the Theory of the Subject’, in A. Honneth, et 
al. (eds.), Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment 
(Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), pp. ??; Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays 
on Kant’s Philosophy, ed. R. L. Velkley (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1994); Henrich, ‘What is Metaphysics — What is Modernity? Twelve Theses against 
Jürgen Habermas’, in P. Dews (ed.), Habermas: A Critical Reader (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999), pp. 291-319; and Manfred Frank, ‘Philosophical Foundations of 
Early Romanticism’, in K. Ameriks and D. Sturma (eds.), The Modern Subject 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 65-85.  
15  On Heimsoeth’s metaphysical reading of Kant, see Gerhard Funke, ‘Der Weg 
zur ontologischen Kantinterpretation’, Kant-Studien 62 (1971), 446-66. See also 
Heimsoeth’s own overview of this: Heinz Heimsoeth, ‘Metaphysical Motives in the 
Development of Critical Idealism’, in M. S. Gram (ed.), Kant: Disputed Questions 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1967), pp. 158-99, originally published in 1924.  
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character of the individual is merely a fact; it is not itself something of 
importance and value.16 
If we were to ask what it is in the Critique of Pure Reason that permitted 
Reinhold to behold the promise of profound inner illumination and cultural 
reformation; what allowed Wundt to reaffirm the role of Kant’s philosophy in 
defending the presence of moral freedom and divine intellection in an otherwise 
soulless Newtonian universe; what is reduced to a vestigial presence in Anglo-
American scholarship when it treats Reinhold’s transcendental ‘objects that cannot be 
conceived but can only be thought through reason’ as if they were nothing more than 
a heuristic viewpoint adopted by a commonsense subject of experience; and finally 
what is recovered in Heimsoeth’s historical treatment of Kant as a metaphysician 
committed to the doctrine of a community of pure intelligences underlying the 
experience of commonsense subjects and making it possible — if we were to follow 
the path formed by this series of questions then we could find ourselves confronted by 
what can be called the dimension of spirituality in Kant’s philosophy. It is the highly 
distinctive spirituality of Kant’s philosophy that provides its transformative force, its 
cultural gravity, and its historical specificity. At least that is what I shall argue in the 
following entirely provisional and experimental outline of the forms of spirituality 
present in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
We can find a convenient initial characterisation of Western philosophical 
spirituality in Michel Foucault’s lectures on The Hermeneutics of the Subject.17 In the 
                                                
16  Heinz Heimsoeth, The Six Great Themes of Western Metaphysics and the End 
of the Middle Ages, trans. R. J. Betanzos (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1994, orig., 1922), p. 216.  
17  Foucault’s conception of Western philosophical spirituality is indebted to 
Peter Brown’s historical investigations of this phenomenon. For some recent studies, 
see Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian 
Empire (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Brown, The Body and 
Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988); and Brown, Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of 
the Christianisation of the Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995). Pierre Hadot has also written extensively on this theme, although with less 
historical detachment than Brown. See, for example, Pierre Hadot, ‘Neoplatonist 
Spirituality 1: Plotinus and Porphyry’, in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), Classical 
Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman (London: SCM Press, 1986), pp. 
230-49; Hadot, Plotinus, or The Simplicity of Vision, trans. M. Chase (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1993); and, more generally, Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of 
Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, trans. M. Chase (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995). 
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course of discussing the relation between the imperatives of ‘know thyself (gnōthi 
seauton) and ‘care for thyself’ (epimeleia heautou) in classical Greek philosophy, 
Foucault distinguishes between the dimensions of philosophy and spirituality co-
present in the Greek texts. Philosophy comprises discourses dedicated to the 
delineation of truth, its separation from falsity or illusion, and the forms of the 
subject’s access to truth: ‘We will call “philosophy” the form of thought that asks 
what it is that enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to 
determine the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth’.18 Spirituality, 
on the other hand, comprises the discursively mediated acts, practices, and exercises 
through which certain individuals seek to transform themselves into the kind of 
subject or self that is capable of acceding to philosophical truth: 
… I think we could call “spirituality” the search, practice, and experience 
through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on 
himself in order to have access to the truth. We will call ‘spirituality’ then 
the set of these researches, practices, and experiences, which may be 
purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, 
modifications of existence, etc., which are, not for knowledge but for the 
subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the 
truth.19 
The decisive distinguishing feature of Western philosophical spirituality is that it 
does not regard the truth as something to which the subject has access by right, 
universally, simply by virtue of the kind of cognitive being that the human subject is. 
Rather, it views the truth as something to which the subject may accede only through 
some act of inner self-transformation, some act of attending to the self with a view to 
determining its present incapacity, thence to transform it into the kind of self that is 
spiritually qualified to accede to a truth that is by definition not open to the 
unqualified subject. This conversion takes place through definite means or forms, of 
which Foucault identifies two broad kinds. Through the forms of philosophical ēros 
the subject is removed from its present condition through ascent to a transformative 
truth or the descent of this truth to the subject. Through the forms of askēsis, the 
subject undertakes self-transformation through a protracted labor on the self, 
                                                
18  Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de 
France 1981-1982, ed. F. Gros, trans. G. Burchell (New York: Picador, 2006), p. 15.  
19  Ibid. 
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characterised by Foucault as a ‘work of the self on the self, an elaboration of the self 
by the self, a progressive transformation of the self by the self for which one takes 
responsibility in a long labor of ascesis’.20 Finally, Foucault identifies a rebound 
effect of truth on the subject once it has been acceded to: an effect that illuminates or 
ennobles the soul or mind, that brings joy, freedom from care, inner tranquility, and 
thus completes or transfigures the subject. 
Despite Foucault’s assertion (on this occasion at least) that Western 
philosophical spirituality did not pass into modern philosophy — finding its terminus 
in Descartes’ declaration of the subject’s unqualified self-evidence to itself as subject 
of truth — there are strong prima facie indicators that what engaged Reinhold in the 
Critique of Pure Reason are the forms of a distinctively Kantian philosophical 
spirituality.21 In the Critique Reinhold found not just a new philosophical account of 
truth and cognition but — much more importantly and as a condition of this — a 
means to transform himself into the kind of subject capable of acceding to truth in this 
new way. The Critique offered Reinhold the means of fashioning a philosophical self 
or persona capable of overcoming the impediments that had prevented the great 
geniuses of Leibniz and Locke from acceding to truth: the twin spiritual pathologies 
of intellectualism and empiricism, spiritualism and sensualism. It thereby permitted 
him to achieve inner tranquility — ‘through it I have been put in a position to answer 
all of my philosophical doubts in a way that fully satisfies my mind and heart’ — and 
thus to find the enlightenment and transfiguration that he had sought in the Leibnizian 
illuminationist lodges, and that he would continue to seek through the development of 
his own idealist philosophy.  
Seen in this historical light, the ‘modest’ Anglo-American interpretation of the 
Critique may be regarded as a program for relegating the dimension of Kantian 
spirituality in favour of the dimension of Kantian philosophy. In treating the domain 
                                                
20  Ibid., p. 16. 
21  Elsewhere, Foucault treats the very meditative exercises through which 
Descartes puports to arrive at the unqualified subject of cognition as themselves 
instances of transformative work on the self. See Michel Foucault, ‘My Body, this 
Paper, this Fire’, in J. Faubion (ed.), Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology (London: 
Penguin, 2000), pp.??. If The Hermeneutics of the Subject wrongly identifies 
Descartes as the symbol of the exclusion of spirituality from modern philosophy, this 
might be due to the influence of Pierre Hadot, whose macro-history treats Christianity 
as the inheritor of classical philosophical spirituality, leaving ‘secular’ philosophy in a 
purely theoretical condition.  
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of possible empirical experience as that which is given to a ‘commonsense’ human 
subject, and in treating the (transcendental idealist) procedure for recovering the inner 
a priori grounds of experience as something of which all subjects are (in principle) 
capable — without having to transform themselves through special inner exercises — 
this interpretation programmatically elides all of the work that the philosopher must 
perform on himself in order to accede to truth in this way: that is, as something to be 
grasped via reflexive attention to the inner a priori acts of the mind that accompany 
empirical experience. 
The claim being made in the ‘modest’ reading of Kant is thus that his (inner 
reflexive) way of acceding to truth is itself grounded in philosophical truth or valid 
argument, centrally in the famous ‘transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of 
reason’. In what follows, however, I argue that to achieve a proper historical 
understanding of the Critique of Pure Reason we must invert the terms of this 
reading. We must learn to see Kant’s ostensibly true arguments as transpositions into 
the philosophical register of self-transformative exercises responsible for forming a 
particular way of acceding to truth: exercises that are themselves neither true nor 
false. The transcendental deduction — which has long been suspected of harbouring 
acts of reflection far in excess of demonstrative argumentation22 — may itself be seen 
in this way: as the philosophical transposition of an exercise in attending to the mind 
on the ‘occasion’ of experience, with a view to ‘recollecting’ the a priori acts that 
make experience possible. 
A good deal of our attention will thus be devoted to tracking Kant’s 
philosophical arguments back to the metaphysical doctrines and acts of self-
transformation that they transpose. More specifically, it will be argued that 
philosophical reflection on human cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason is 
embedded in four main self-transformative exercises whose role is to effect the 
spiritual qualification of the subject of this philosophical reflection. These are: 
The conversion of outlook. This is what Kant refers to as the ‘transformation of 
outlook’ or ‘Copernican revolution’ in philosophy that is effected by the 
Critique. By this he means the repudiation of the view that understanding 
                                                
22  Dieter Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological 
Background of the First Critique’, in E. Förster (ed.), Kant’s Transcendental 
Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989), pp. 29-46.  
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conforms itself to external objects of experience and the embrace of a ‘way of 
looking’ in which such objects are regarded as conforming themselves to our 
way of understanding. This conversion of one’s way of looking at the relation 
between outer world and inner understanding forms the spiritual threshold that 
readers of the Critique must cross in order to have any kind of engagement with 
Kant’s critical or transcendental philosophy. It is elaborated and operationalised 
in three further self-transformative exercises which in turn support Kant’s 
repudiation of rival philosophical systems. These are: 
The internalisation (subjectivisation) of the sensory world. Here the reader or 
philosopher is required to fundamentally recast his perception of things in space 
and time. He is required to view space and time not as realities in which he is 
placed as a body in relation to other bodies, but as the twin forms of his own 
sensorium or sensibility: the ‘outer sense’ and the ‘inner sense’. Spatio-temporal 
objects are thus to be viewed not as realities existing outside the human mind and 
sensibility. Rather, they are to be seen as artefacts of space and time as forms of 
human sensing that give sensory presentations to the mind by spatialising and 
temporalising them as sensible intuitions. Spatio-temporal objects must thus be 
seen as ‘appearances’ internal to a mind and sensibility of the human kind — and 
in this sense as subjective — to be distinguished from ‘things in themselves’ 
which would be objects for a different kind of mind. This latter suprahuman 
mind is one that is not attached to space and time as the forms of sensing, and is 
thus capable of intelligising objects directly, through ‘intellectual intuition’. 
The externalisation (schematisation) of the intellect. Having reduced the spatio-
temporal world to a congeries of subjective appearances or ‘blind’ intuitions, the 
philosopher is then required to treat the ordering of this ‘rhapsody’ into objects 
of experience, as the synthetic projection of a spontaneous or self-acting capacity 
for pure intellection. Kant’s exposition of cognition thus requires the reader of 
the Critique to view himself qua cognitive subject as the locus in which a 
spontaneous power for the pure intellectual synthesis of possible objects of 
experience is realised in and limited by a receptive power of sensible intuition 
that determines the empirical possibility of the intelligised objects. This 
extraordinary act of cognitive re-engineering, which constitutes the 
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epistemological heart of the Critique, is executed through three linked 
transformative exercises. First, by engaging in the act of transcendental 
anamnesis, the philosopher treats experience as the ‘occasion’ on which he 
‘recollects’ the forgotten a priori intellection that make this experience possible, 
which is the act that Kant presents as the transcendental deduction of the 
categories. Second, through the doctrine of the schematisation of the intellect, the 
philosopher comes to envisage phenomenal experience as figuralised by the 
schematic power of the ‘transcendental imagination’: a power whose 
figuralisations (‘monograms’) are viewed as both phenomenal realisations of a 
priori intellection and as limitations of pure intellection by the spatio-temporal 
forms of human sensibility. Finally, this gives rise to the analogisation of 
experience, as now the philosopher is required to engage in a ‘hermeneutic’ 
interpretation of empirical experience, treating ‘Newtonian’ spatio-temporal 
experience not as an experimentally accessible reality, but as an analogue to be 
deciphered for the transcendental syntheses of experience performed by a pure 
intellect. 
The therapeutic unification of divided reason. By constructing a two-fold use of 
the intellect — the empirical use of the understanding restricted to sensibly 
conditioned objects of experience, and the transcendental use of reason oriented 
to the unconditioned intellection of things in themselves — Kant develops the 
theme of a reason divided against itself, thereby setting the scene for the exercise 
of its inner unification. This is performed by envisaging reason as beset by 
unavoidable illusions — the product of dialectical attempts to treat subjectively 
conditioned objects of understanding as if they were transcendental objects or 
things in themselves — from which arise a series of conflicting ‘transcendental 
ideas’ regarding the nature of the soul, the cosmos, and the supreme being. The 
therapeutic purging of these dogmatically opposed transcendental ideas then 
takes place through a dual inner exercise. On the one hand, the philosopher is 
required to submit the transcendental ideas of rational psychology, cosmology, 
and theology to the limits imposed on speculation by possible empirical 
experience, thereby denying them the significance of cognisable concepts. On 
the other hand, three transcendental ideas — of the spiritual soul, the infinite 
cosmos, and the supreme intelligence — are treated as permissible ‘thoughts’, 
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justified by their role in extending and unifying the use of reason itself. This 
rejection of the cognitive aspirations of the central ideas of rationalist 
psychology, cosmology, and theology, followed by their restitution as ‘ideas of 
reason’ to be acceded to ‘as if’ they were true, is the act of self-transformation 
responsible for forming the comportment of the critical philosopher. 
In what follows I shall discuss each of these exercises in turn. The aim of this 
discussion is not to contribute to the formidable apparatus of Kant scholasticism, and 
still less to argue the falsity of Kant’s philosophy of cognition in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Rather, it is to show that the ostensible truth of this philosophy rests upon 
insufficiently understood spiritual exercises whose role is to qualify the special 
philosophical self or persona required to accede to this truth. Only then will the 
original historical intention and reception of the Critique come into proper focus. 
Seen in this light, the Critique is a work of philosophical spirituality whose 
transformation of the philosophical intellect is envisaged as a means of renovating 
metaphysics and restoring a transcendental subjectivity to a universe threatened with 




The Conversion of Outlook 
 
The conversion of outlook that Kant requires his readers to undergo is laid out in 
the prefaces to the ‘A’ (1781) and ‘B’ (1787) editions of the Critique and in the 
work’s general Introduction. In the ‘B’ Preface, Kant comments that pure 
mathematics and the natural sciences were only put on their proper scientific footings 
through fundamental ‘revolutions of outlook’. In mathematics this revolution is 
identified with the acknowledgment that the science consists of synthetic a priori 
propositions — propositions that are true a priori yet give rise to experiential 
intuitions — and in the natural sciences with the adoption of experimental method; 
although Kant somewhat counter-intuitively equates the latter with the idea that 
nature only contains the laws that reason interrogates it with (B xiii). Metaphysics too 
requires a fundamental ‘transformation of outlook’ if it is to be set on the path of 
scientific progress. Yet it is in far worse shape than mathematics and the natural 
sciences owing to the fact that it is tormented by questions — regarding such things 
as whether the soul is a spiritual substance, or whether the world has a beginning in 
space and time — that it is incapable of answering, or even of determining whether 
they make sense. It is thus the task of the Critique of Pure Reason to put metaphysics 
on a scientific path by effecting a conversion of outlook in it similar to that which 
Kant regards as the ‘essential component’ of the other two scientific revolutions. 
The transformation that Kant proposes is nothing less than the inversion of the 
usually accepted view of the relations between cognition and its objects: 
Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to 
objects. On that presupposition, however, all our attempts to establish 
something about them a priori, by means of concepts through which our 
cognition would be expanded, have come to nothing. Let us, therefore, try 
to find out by experiment whether we shall not make better progress in 
the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to 
our cognition. (B xvi) 
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This is the context in which Kant compares himself to the great Copernicus, whose 
revolution consisted in imagining that the observer might rotate around the stars 
rather than vice versa. Kant thus suggests that his transformation of the metaphysical 
outlook might also be confirmable by experiment, for example by seeing whether the 
intuition of objects might not conform to forms of intuition operating in the mind in 
advance of experience, that is, a priori. 
In the ‘A’ Preface of 1781, however, Kant had already asserted that his 
revolution in metaphysics would take place entirely within the confines of the 
Socratic gnōthi seauton or ‘know thyself’, commenting that ‘I deal solely with reason 
itself and its pure thinking: and to gain comprehensive acquaintance with my reason I 
need not search far from myself. For I encounter it within myself …’ (A xiv). If, then, 
the transcendental idealist conversion of outlook is to be regarded as an experiment, it 
can only be a philosophical ‘thought experiment’. Unlike experiments in the natural 
sciences, philosophical thought experiments are known for making it difficult for the 
experimenter to keep his finger off the scales, or encounter phenomena that might 
upset his hypothesis.23 Kant’s revolution of outlook, intended to put metaphysics on a 
scientific footing, is thus better understood as an experiment that the philosopher is 
required to perform on himself: a ‘work of the self on the self’, conceived as a means 
of transforming the cognitive disposition or persona of the philosopher.  
It is true of course that Kant’s prefatory call for a conversion of philosophical 
outlook is accompanied by a preliminary sketch of the re-imagined topography of 
subjectivity — characterised as the interface between a receptive power of sensible 
intuition and a spontaneous power of intellection via concepts — that indeed lies at 
the heart of the Critique. Kant thus indicates that he will prove that space and time are 
not real but only forms of human sensing or intuition, which means that objects 
perceived in space and time are only appearances. As a result of the fact that they can 
only apply to objects of sensible intuition — that is, appearances — this also means 
that concepts cannot provide us with knowledge of ‘things in themselves’ or 
noumena, understood as objects acceded to other than via sensible intuition (B xxv-
vi). If spatio-temporal objects are indeed only appearances and hence ‘inside us’, then 
we can readily see how they might conform to our way of intuiting and 
                                                
23  For a general discussion of this problem, see Jeanne Peijnenburg and David 
Atkinson, ‘When are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?’, Journal for General 
Philosophy of Science 34 (2003), 305-22.  
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conceptualising them, as is proposed by Kant’s subjectivising conversion of 
philosophical outlook. 
At this stage of the exposition however — that is, in the two prefaces and general 
Introduction — Kant has of course attempted no philosophical proof of the subjective 
character of spatio-temporal perception or of the spontaneous or self-acting character 
of the intellect. What is it then that might motivate initial acceptance of this re-
imagined topography of subjectivity and with it the preparedness to undertake the 
conversion of outlook required to cross the threshold of Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy? It is not that this topography of the cognitive subject would have been 
unfamiliar to Kant’s philosophical readers. After all, Leibniz’s metaphysics and 
‘monadology’ had presented a similar vision of the subject as a pure spontaneous 
intellect unfolding its intellections as sensory experiences within a passive 
sensibility.24 No matter how esoteric to modern eyes — and to many eighteenth 
century ones — this metaphysical picture was entirely familiar to such spiritual 
seekers as Reinhold, who were already predisposed to accept the Kantian version of 
this picture contained in Kant’s conversion of outlook. Nonetheless, the problem 
remains of how Kant can motivate assent to this picture of the subject and the 
associated conversion of outlook at the beginning of the Critique, before he has 
presented the arguments supposed to ground assent in philosophical proof. 
It turns out that at this stage of the exposition Kant can only motivate assent to 
his version of the metaphysical subject via prognostications as to its beneficial effects 
on the reader himself — qua metaphysician — and on the intellectual culture that he 
is presumed to wish to defend. Kant thus surrounds his initial sketch of the new 
topography of subjectivity with predictions of its therapeutic effects on the dual 
scourges of philosophical culture: intellectualism (or idealism) and skepticism (or 
empiricism) (B xxvi-vii). On the one hand, Kant promises, the restriction of the 
spontaneous powers of conceptualisation to objects capable of being given to sensible 
intuition — objects of possible experience — will clip the wings of metaphysical 
fancy that has threatened to discredit the science entirely, by claiming pure conceptual 
                                                
24  For the significane of Leibniz’s monadology in this regard and its (too often 
disavowed) influence on Kant, see the fundamental study by Heinz Heimsoeth, 
‘Atom, Seele, Monade. Historische Ursprünge und Hintergründe von Kants 
Antinomie der Teilung’, in his Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II.  
Methodenbegriffe der Erfahrungswissenschaften und Gegensätzlichkeiten 
spekulativer Weltkonzeption (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1970), pp. 133-247.  
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knowledge of such things as the spiritual soul or the divine intellect as things in 
themselves. On the other hand, this same topography will function as a bulwark 
against the empiricist tendency to extend the conditions of empirical cognition to 
reason’s entire domain and thereby turn the world into a soulless mechanism. It will 
achieve this by showing that while the cognitive use of spontaneous intellection 
requires that it be restricted to possible objects of sensible intuition, there nonetheless 
remains a non-cognitive use of this power of reason. Such is the capacity for 
‘thinking’ pure concepts or ‘ideas of reason’ — those associated with moral freedom, 
immortality, and the supreme intelligence — as conceivable features of the world that 
are not confined to its empirical cognition. In other words, Kant motivates assent to 
his vision of the subject, and thence a preparedness to undertake the exercise in 
conversion of outlook, by appealing to a reader who will share the Critique’s spiritual 
interests or program. This is a reader or a philosopher who is concerned to restrict the 
claims of intellectualist metaphysics, but only as a means to erecting a new kind of 
metaphysical defence against the exhaustion of knowledge by the natural sciences, 
with all of this framed as an exercise in self-knowledge. 
As it unfolds, the B Preface shifts the emphasis of the spiritual-cultural benefits 
supposed to flow from the revolution of outlook, focusing less on its role in 
restraining intellectualist metaphysics and more on its capacity to combat the spread 
of empiricism and skepticism. The crucial virtue of a renovated metaphysics is to 
prevent the extension of empirical cognition across the entire domain of reason. 
Anticipating the arguments he will make in the third ‘antinomy of reason’, Kant thus 
comments that were causal laws to be treated as applying to real ‘things in 
themselves’ — as they too often are by the natural scientists — then the entire world 
would be governed by natural necessity. There would thus be no room left for the 
notion of moral freedom, understood as the subject’s unconditioned capacity to 
instigate natural events through a spontaneous intellectual power. With the loss of this 
power, Kant warns his readers, mankind would also forfeit all moral responsibility, as 
this presumes a capacity to resist natural causality and inclinations by exercising the 
pure freedom of the intellect. In showing that causal laws apply only to appearances, 
however — that is, that they are laws only for the ordering of presentations given to 
human sensibility and not for things in themselves — Kant’s revolutionised outlook 
leaves the intellectual freedom of the subject untrammeled for moral purposes, even if 
it suggests that the subject must exist in a supersensible realm of pure intelligences (B 
 19 
xxvii-xxx). The transformed outlook and its underpinning vision of the subject can 
preserve non-cognitive (transcendental) ideas of God and the spiritual nature of the 
soul in much the same way, says Kant (B xxix). This is the context in which he makes 
his celebrated remark that as the condition of expanding the domain of practical or 
moral reason: ‘I therefore had to annul knowledge in order to make room for faith’ (B 
xxx). 
Kant motivates the conversion of outlook through which readers cross the 
threshold of the Critique of Pure Reason not just via the negative benefit of setting 
limits to groundless speculation, but by the positive cultural benefits of freeing 
philosophy from competing dogmatisms — of idealism and empiricism — that arise 
when subjective appearances are taken for things in themselves. In the first instance, 
then, the benefits of a renovated metaphysics or transcendental idealist philosophy 
pertain to the dimension of spirituality; that is, to the ‘care for oneself’ that should be 
exercised when engaging in philosophical self-knowledge, lest one fall prey to ‘the 
acclaimed but contradictory viewpoints from which Locke and Leibniz investigated 
the human spirit’, as Reinhold has it. Kant thus advocates his conversion of outlook 
as a way to overcome the idealist and materialist dogmatisms of ‘our youth’ which 
‘encourages them quite early and strongly to reason with ease about things of which 
they understand nothing and into which, moreover, neither they nor anyone else in the 
world will ever have any insight’ (B xxxi). Above all, though, in confining material 
causality to the domain of appearances, the new metaphysical outlook will have the 
‘inestimable advantage of putting an end, for all future time, to all objections against 
morality and religion’ (B xxxi). Even though intellectualist claims affirming the 
spiritual substance of the soul and skeptical claims denying this in favour of natural 
causality are located in the universities, these competing dogmatisms eventually 
corrupt the teachings of the clergy and, through them, the ‘heads of the people’. Kant 
proclaims to the reader of his preface that only his new metaphysical outlook can 
stave off this spiritual crisis: ‘Solely by means of critique can we cut off, at the very 
root, materialism, fatalism, atheism, freethinking lack of faith, fanaticism, and 
superstition, which can become harmfully universally; and, finally, also idealism and 
skepticism, which are dangerous to the schools and cannot easily cross over to the 
public’ (B xxxiv). 
As far as the opening of the Critique of Pure Reason is concerned, then, the 
exercise in conversion of outlook associated with Kant’s renovated metaphysics is not 
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itself grounded in philosophical arguments that prove the conception of the subject of 
cognition that informs the conversion. On the contrary, it would appear that what 
motivates assent to this conception, and impels the exercise in self-transformation, 
belongs to the domain of Kantian spirituality. Entered via the spiritual imperatives to 
know and care for the self, this is the domain in which the conversion of outlook 
promises not only the inner illumination that comes with spiritual self-possession, but 
also resolution to the spiritual crisis threatening philosophical culture through the 
fracturing of reason into competing idealist and materialist dogmatisms. The 
‘experiment’ in the conversion of philosophical outlook — in which the philosopher 
inverts the dependency of cognition on external objects and treats the latter as 
products of the forms of human cognition — is thus indeed one the philosopher 
performs on himself, without prior philosophical justification, with a view to 
transforming himself into a special kind of subject. This is the subject who is capable 
of acceding to a philosophical truth that is both limited by the domain of empirical 
appearances, while remaining open to transcendental ideas that lie beyond this 
domain in the space of pure intellection. Such is the persona or comportment of the 
critical philosopher. 
It might be objected to our procedure thus far that while in the prefaces Kant 
does indeed motivate the conversion of outlook via appeals to its spiritual and cultural 
benefits, this is only a provisional strategy. After all, philosophical systems have to 
engage their readers before delivering their arguments, and surely it is that case that 
Kant soon offers philosophical justifications for the conversion that are not 
themselves dependent on it already having taken place. Standard philosophical 
readings of the Critique thus locate a prima facie justification for the new 
metaphysical outlook in the ‘B’ version of the Introduction, in the form of Kant’s 
eminently philosophical argument regarding the possibility of synthetic a priori 
propositions. 
Kant initiates this celebrated argument by observing that for the revolution in 
outlook to be justified — that is, for it to be possible to say that objects are conformed 
to our understanding of them rather than vice versa — there must be forms of 
knowledge that are both necessary and true independent of all empirical experience (a 
priori), while nonetheless permitting our cognition of possible experiential objects 
(synthetic) (B 1-4). While we cannot by definition deduce such forms of synthetic a 
priori knowledge from observable experience, Kant argues, we can nonetheless 
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‘exhibit’ their possibility prima facie by adducing examples of them. The prime 
examples that Kant offers, both here and throughout the Critique, are drawn from 
pure mathematics: arithmetic and Euclidean geometry. In discussing the mathematical 
proposition 7 + 5 = 12 Kant thus argues that while this might appear to be a purely 
analytic or a priori proposition — true by virtue of logical or formal rules — it is 
actually more than this. This is because in order to apprehend the new number that 
results from the operation we require an ‘image’ or intuition of it, something that 
allows us to instantly apprehend the operation combined into a new whole; for 
example, by imagining five dots next to the seven, or by holding up the fingers of my 
hand. This means that in addition to being necessary and a priori, the mathematical 
proposition is simultaneously synthetic or capable as being given as the sensible 
intuition that it makes possible: ‘Arithmetic propositions are therefore always 
synthetic. We become aware of this all the more distinctly if we take larger numbers. 
For then it is very evident that no matter how much we twist and turn our concepts, 
we can never find the [number of the] sum by merely dissecting our concepts, i.e., 
without availing ourselves of intuition’ (B 16). 
Kant thus adduces the synthetic a priori propositions of pure mathematics as 
offering a prima facie philosophical justification for the revolution in outlook 
proposed for metaphysics. They show, he argues, that there are indeed objects of 
cognition whose form arises from the a priori laws of the mind and the forms of 
intuition, independently of all empirical experience. Kant acknowledges that the 
synthetic a priori propositions of metaphysics lack an intuitive certainty comparable 
to mathematics that might display their possibility. Nonetheless, he argues that human 
reason possesses a ‘natural predisposition’ towards synthetic a priori knowledge in 
metaphysics too — as we can see in the predilection for questions regarding the 
spiritual nature of the soul and the beginning of the world —and this predisposition 
can itself serve to initiate reflection on the possibility of metaphysics as a science (B 
22). 
The problem with Kant’s mathematical examples, however, is that they are not 
what he presents them as: that is, presuppositionless instances of the way in which 
mathematical propositions self-evidently work. To see this, one only need take note 
of the way in which other philosophers have treated similar examples. Wittgenstein, 
for example, regards the synthetic or intuitional dimension of Kantian arithmetic — 
the notion that knowledge of the sum requires a separate apprehension of the 
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numerical operations combined into a new intuitable whole — as an unnecessary 
philosophical fiction, as this adds nothing to the results obtained simply by following 
the rules of calculation.25 Further, for Wittgenstein, the certitude or necessity of 
arithmetic and geometric propositions comes not from their supposed genesis in 
apodictic principles or operations of a pure intellect antecedent to all empirical 
experience. Rather, it arises from the fact that the rules of arithmetic and geometry are 
techniques of calculation whose employment is governed by the practice of ‘rule 
following’, rather than the practices of experimental observation that help to 
determine what we mean by ‘empirical experience’, which means that they are not a 
priori in Kant’s sense.26 Needless to say, one does not have to accept Wittgenstein’s 
(or any other philosopher’s) philosophy of mathematics to see that what Kant offers 
in his examples is not mathematical knowledge as such, but a particular philosophical 
or metaphysical interpretation of such knowledge. In other words, Kant’s 
characterisation of mathematical calculations as synthetic a priori propositions — as 
grounded in the a priori operations of a pure intellect and yet requiring ‘exhibition’ in 
synthetic sensible intuitions — is itself reliant on the conversion of metaphysical 
outlook. It is only the prior conversion to this outlook that allows arithmetic to be 
interpreted in this way — as an instance of the conformation of intuitable objects to 
our a priori understanding of them — rather than as Wittgenstein interprets it: as 
instituted rules whose following determines what we call ‘necessity’, ‘proof’, 
‘intuition’ and so on.  
What appears then to be an independent philosophical justification for the 
metaphysical conversion of outlook — that is, a justification independent of the 
spiritual and cultural incentives operating in the register of Kantian spirituality — 
turns out to be dependent on the conversion of outlook already having taken place. 
Unless — in pursuit of self-knowledge and to take care of his own spiritual welfare 
— Kant’s reader has already converted his outlook, and views himself as the 
                                                
25  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Founations of 
Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, ed. C. Diamond (Hassocks: Harvester, 1976), pp. 31-
1, 237-38.  
26  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), pp. 50-63. For an historical account of the emergence of 
algebra as an analytic technique or ‘art of thinking’ from a rhetorically conceived 
logic, see Giovanna Cifoletti, ‘From Valla to Viète: The Rhetorical Reform of Logic 
and Its use in Early Modern Algebra’, Early Science and Medicine 11 (2006), 390-
423.  
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harbinger of a pure intellection to which outer objects must conform, then he will not 
view mathematical calculations as expressions of such an intellect. Rather than 
functioning as a philosophical justification for the revolution in outlook, Kant’s 
argument for the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions will only be acceded to 
by those who have already undergone the required conversion of outlook. We can 
begin to see, then, that Kant’s philosophical analysis of the forms and limits of 
cognitive truth operates in tandem with the forms of spirituality — here the 
conversion of outlook — responsible for grooming the kind of subject or self 
qualified to accede to such a truth. We can now follow this interaction between 
spirituality and philosophy in the three main exercises in which Kant executes his 




The Internalisation (Subjectification) of the World of Space and 
Time 
 
The first substantive exercise through which Kant executes the conversion of 
outlook is the act of annulment and internalisation of the world of space and time. 
This takes place with uncharacteristic speed in the (comparatively) short 
Transcendental Aesthetic, or doctrine of the sensory. Kant’s philosophical reader has 
been prepared for this act by the spiritual topography of subjectivity introduced in the 
prefaces and Introduction. Here the human sensibility has been presented as incapable 
of apprehending (intelligible) things in themselves, thereby restricting cognition to 
‘appearances’, which can thus be thought of as conforming to our way of cognising 
them. Even so, despite the claims that Kant’s reflections begin with commonsense 
experience, the extent of the act of annulment and internalisation required in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic can only appear as a profound challenge to overcome our 
commonsense way of experiencing the world of space and time: 
The things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as 
being. Nor do their relationships in themselves have the character that 
they appear to us as having. And if we annul ourselves as subject, or even 
annul only the subjective character of the senses generally, then this entire 
character of objects and all their relations in space and time — indeed, 
even space and time themselves — would vanish; being appearances, they 
cannot exist in themselves, but can exist only in us. What may be the case 
regarding objects in themselves and apart from all this receptivity of our 
sensibility remains to us entirely unknown. All we know is the way we 
perceive them. That way is peculiar to us and does not necessarily apply 
to all beings, even though it applies necessarily to all human beings. (A 
42/B 59) 
The key to understanding the nature of the act of internalisation required of the 
reader lies in the metaphysical doctrine of the senses that sets the scene for it. 
According to this doctrine, space and time are to be viewed not as the real location of 
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human beings, this location being a mere appearance. They are to be treated, rather, 
as something like the transcendental sense organs (or sensorium) of human beings. 
These a priori forms of sensory intuition spatialise and temporalise all possible 
objects of experience, including human beings, whose (noumenal) character as 
‘things in themselves’ thus cannot be experienced by them. If human beings only 
appear to be located in time and space that is because time and space are located in 
human beings — as their forms of sensing — which means that humans are ‘not in 
themselves what we intuit them as being’. 
Kant thus refers to time as the ‘inner sense’ and space as the ‘outer sense’, and 
treats them both as a priori or independent of the outer empirical experience of space 
and time. This is because space, as our outer sense or mode of being affected by (non-
spatio-temporal) objects, is the condition of there being outer appearances, which are 
thus internal to our spatial sensibility:  
How, then, can the mind have an outer intuition which precedes the 
objects themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be 
determined a priori? Obviously, this can be so only insofar as this 
intuition resides merely in the subject, as the subject’s formal character of 
being affected by objects and of thereby acquiring from them direct 
presentation, i.e., intuition, and hence only as form of outer sense in 
general. (B 41) 
Similarly, as the ‘inner sense’, time is only our mode of being affected by, or 
temporalising, non-temporal objects of intellection, as the inner sense synthesises 
objects of experience by establishing successivity between ‘presentations’.27 
The central problem posed by Kant’s doctrine of space and time and the act of 
internalisation that it programs is the sheer difficulty of comprehending a doctrine so 
unfamiliar and so metaphysically extravagant. After all, the reader is required to 
assent to the notion that far from being real, space and time approximate a vast 
schematised organ of sensing, such that everything that appears in space and time — 
                                                
27  Following Pluhar, I use ‘presentation’ for Kant’s Vorstellung, rather than the 
more usual English term ‘representation’. This is because for Kant, Vorstellungen — 
which include ‘such objects of our direct awareness as sensations, intutitions, 
perceptions, concepts, cognitions, ideas, and schemata’ — do not represent things 
outside the intellect, but are that through which the intellect is (self-) affected, and on 
which it performs various kinds of unifying syntheses. See Pluhar’s note 73 to B xvii. 
The inner sense is thus supposed to establish temporal successivity for otherwise a-
temporal inner presentations. 
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from the starry heavens of my outer sense to the memories and feelings of my inner 
sense — are one and all appearances internal to my sensibility. Given the recondite 
(an perhaps originally esoteric) nature of this doctrine, it is perhaps not surprising that 
modern commentaries have tended to misunderstand it or to reinterpret it in 
accordance with modern sensibilities, centrally by interpreting it via doctrines drawn 
from the modern physiology and psychology of perception. It is thus argued that the 
transcendental subjectivity of space can be exemplified via the nature of optical 
perception; for example, via the observation that as the retinal image of the eye is two 
dimensional, then three-dimensional spatial perception must depend on a priori 
mental processes, and is thus merely how objects appear to us.28 
This kind of reading is quite anachronistic, however, as it imagines that real 
things might appear to us as they are were it not for the fact that physiology of 
perception interposes its own subjective filter. This distorting lens, then, must be 
corrected for by a priori processes, which shows that spatial perception is the product 
of the faculty of perception itself. Kant’s doctrine, however, is that real things (in 
themselves) are not even possible objects of perception for us. For Kant appearances 
are not appearances of spatio-temporal objects — that is, such objects as they appear 
to our visual perception — because spatio-temporal objects are themselves only 
appearances.29 It must be remembered that in Kant’s doctrine it is not the sense 
organs but space and time that constitute human sensing. This means that spatio-
temporal objects are not things that our senses allow us to see in a certain way, but are 
objects of appearance formed by our way of sensing them, and are thus internal to us: 
‘The transcendental concept of appearances in space … is a critical reminder … that 
nothing whatever that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a 
form of things, one that might belong to them as they are in themselves. Rather, what 
we call external objects are mere presentations of our sensibility’ (A 30, B 45). For 
Kant the real things that our sensibility is incapable intuiting are not objects in space 
and time that might be conceivably accurately intuited by a creature with a different 
kind of sensibility. Rather, they are objects of pure intellection that cannot be given to 
any kind of sensibility, although they might be intuitable by an intellectual being 
                                                
28  See, for example, Patricia Kitcher’s recourse to this metaphoric explication in 
her Introduction to the Pluhar translation, at pp. xxxiii-iv. 
29  This means of course that the noumenon or thing in itself cannot be a 
‘viewpoint’ for considering spatio-temporal objects, as is demanded by the ‘two 
viewpoints’ interpretation.  
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capable of intuiting things directly, without relying on the spatio-temporal forms of 
sensibility. 
While even they found it extraordinary, the university educated among Kant’s 
contemporary readers, including Reinhold, had less difficulty than modern 
philosophers in comprehending Kant’s doctrine of sensibility, as they were still in 
touch with its metaphysical source. This was the doctrine, formulated definitively in 
the metaphysics of Albertus Magnus, that space and time are God’s ‘sensorium’: that 
is, the form in which he allows the pure ‘intelligibles’ streaming timelessly from his 
intellection to be apprehended by creatures with bodily sensibilities, hence 
successively in time, and distributed quantitatively in space.30 According to this 
doctrine, the world of space and time is the ‘mirror’ in which God’s incessant 
intellectual creation is reflected in the sensibility of his creature, man. Kant’s doctrine 
of the subjectivity of space and time is a reworking of this metaphysical source-
doctrine. Kant treats space and time as man’s sensorium rather than God’s, while 
retaining a notion of divine intellection as the ultimate source of intelligible things in 
themselves that are incapable of appearing to a being whose sensibility is determined 
by the forms of space and time. Leibniz’s earlier ‘subjectivisation’ of this theistic 
metaphysical epistemology — in which space and time are viewed as the forms in 
which the ‘rational monads’ unfold the representations implanted in them by God — 
was familiar to Reinhold, who viewed Kant’s reworking of this theme as superior 
because of the greater independence it gave to the forms of sensibility.31 
What sets the scene for the act of annulment and internalisation of the world of 
space and time is thus a metaphysical doctrine in which this world is viewed as a 
projection or ‘presentation’ internal to the communio of intellectual beings possessed 
of a spatio-temporal sensorium. As it is neither more nor less than the condition for 
performing the act of annulment and internalisation itself, this doctrine belongs to the 
domain of Kantian spirituality. Kant, though, presents this act of inner self-
transformation as an act of philosophical knowledge, in fact as twin acts of 
                                                
30  Beroald Thomassen, Metaphysik als Lebensform. Untersuchungen zur 
Grundlegung der Metaphysik im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen 
(Münster: Aschendorrf, 1985), pp. ?; Jean-Luc Marion, ‘The Idea of God’, in D. 
Garber and M. Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 265-304.  
31  Reinhold, Letters, pp. 104-23. 
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philosophical knowledge, that he calls the ‘metaphysical exposition’ and the 
‘transcendental exposition’ of the concepts of space and time. 
In characterising the metaphysical exposition, Kant comments that ‘by 
exposition (expositio) I mean clear (even if not comprehensive) presentation of what 
belongs to a concept; and such exposition is metaphysical if it contains what exhibits 
the concept as given a priori’ (A 23/B 38). This means that the metaphysical 
exposition of a concept is a displaying of its constitutive features as these are revealed 
to the philosopher independently of all empirical knowledge through an act of pure 
apodictic insight. In the case of the concept of space, however, the features that are 
revealed to Kant in this manner are just those required by the act of annulment and 
internalisation and its metaphysical doctrine of sensibility. These features are that 
space is not an empirical concept abstracted from experience; is a necessary a priori 
form of sensing underlying all outer intuitions; is an intuition or synthetic 
apprehension rather than a discursive construct; and is presented to us in this intuition 
as an ‘infinite given magnitude’ (A 23-25/B 38-40). To treat these features of the 
concept as a deliverance of apodictic reason, however, is simply to expound the 
concept via the metaphysical doctrine of the subjectivity of space (and time), with a 
view to programming the act of internalising space. 
Similar comments apply to Kant’s transcendental exposition of the concept of 
space, which he characterises as: ‘the explication of a concept as a principle that 
permits insight into the possibility of other synthetic a priori cognitions. Such 
explication requires (1) that cognitions of that sort do actually flow from the given 
concept, and (2) that these cognitions are possible only on the presupposition of a 
given way of explicating that concept’ (A 25/B 40). Reactivating the Introduction’s 
account of pure mathematics as consisting of synthetic a priori propositions, Kant 
argues that geometric representations of space are both a priori (necessarily true in 
advance of experience) and synthetic (determining the form in which space can be 
experienced). He then asks in what form must space be presented to us (experienced) 
for this geometric cognition of space to be possible. The answer of course is that it 
must be a presentation in which space is an immediate intuition that reaches beyond 
merely discursive concepts, thereby anticipating experience. At the same time, 
though, this intuition must ‘be encountered in us a priori, i.e., prior to any perception 
of an object; hence this intuition must be pure rather than empirical’. This means that 
‘our explication of the concept of space is, therefore, the only one that makes 
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comprehensible the possibility of geometry as a [kind of] synthetic a priori cognition’ 
(A 25/B 41).  
We have already observed in the case of arithmetic, however, that Kant’s 
treatment of pure mathematics as synthetic a priori cognition arises not from 
mathematical calculation or construction as such, but from a particular metaphysical 
interpretation of them. In the case of geometry too we can refer to the quite different 
interpretation of calculation and construction provided by Wittgenstein, not to falsify 
Kant’s treatment, but simply to show that it is a contestable interpretation for which 
Kant offers independent justification. Wittgenstein thus argues that the necessity of 
geometric constructions and theorems does not arise is not the result of them being 
necessitated by the intuitional form of spatial experience that they supposedly make 
possible. Rather, their necessity comes from the fact that they are governed by the 
rules of a constructional ‘grammar’ (Euclid for example) and by the specific practice 
of ‘following a rule’, the results of which are treated as internal to the practice of rule-
following or calculation itself: ‘But we could say that Euclidean geometry gives rules 
for the application of the words “length” and “equal length”, etc. Not all the rules, 
because some of these depend on how the lengths are measured and compared’.32 On 
Wittgenstein’s view, then, geometric constructions are not a priori, or capable of 
determining in advance the form of spatial experience through pure intellection. He 
regards them instead as perfectly concrete constructional (‘grammatical’) practices 
that are withdrawn from experiential disconfirmation in the sense that we accept their 
outcomes no matter what. Geometric constructions are ‘applied to experience’ not 
through ‘spider-web’ of transcendental intuition, but by being attached to other 
practices: surveying, technical drawing, cartographic projection, and so on: ‘You 
could imagine a space of spider-web lines, etc., a space somewhere in heaven 
reserved for Euclidean geometry. All points would be connected by straight lines — 
but would all straight lines be bisected? All constructions be done? But you could 
imagine the shadow world to consist simply in a copy of Euclid’s Elements. There is 
no need to project the thing into a universe of its own’.33 Again, without assuming the 
truth of Wittgenstein’s interpretation, its mere possibility shows that it is not 
geometry as such that demonstrates the necessity of Kant’s transcendental-subjective 
conception of space. Rather, this is accomplished via Kant’s metaphysical 
                                                
32  Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 256. 
33  Ibid., p. 149. 
 30 
interpretation of geometry — as synthetic a priori cognition — which contains the 
transcendental-subjective conception of space that it is supposed to justify. 
Kant’s twin expositions of the concept of space thus do not provide independent 
philosophical justifications for the conception of space required by the act of 
internalisation and its metaphysical doctrine of sensibility. In fact this concept — of 
space as the a priori intuition of the form of outer appearances — is just that 
formulated in the metaphysical doctrine itself and then transposed into Kant’s 
expositions of the concept. We have shown that this understanding of space comes 
not from apodictic or transcendental insight into its pure concept but from a 
substantive metaphysical doctrine: that space is the form of sensibility in which the 
subject senses the presence of objects of pure intellection that it cannot know directly. 
The role of this doctrine is to program the act of imaginal self-transformation in 
which the philosopher comes to view the spatial world as a projection of his own 
inner intellection and pure intuition, thereby internalising it. 
The fact that, as a result of its transposition into the expositions of the concepts, 
this doctrine is ‘found’ in them apodictically, a priori, and without discursive analysis, 
gives the expositions themselves a gnostic aura. This is because the philosophical 
expositions are themselves bearers of the spiritual act of annulling and internalising 
space and time that lies at the heart of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant’s 
conceptual exposition as a mode of demonstrating truth is thus deeply embedded in an 
exercise in self-transformation designed to form the kind of subject capable of 
acceding to truth in this way: as pure insight into the operations of the intellect prior 
to all empirical experience. We shall now see that a similar transposition of spiritual 
exercise into philosophical exposition characterises the most celebrated of 
philosophical acts found in the Critique of Pure Reason: the transcendental deduction 




The Externalisation of the Intellect: Anamnesis, Schematisation, 
Analogy 
 
Before descending into the labyrinth of the transcendental deduction, it will be 
helpful to situate it in relation to the argument regarding the relation between Kantian 
spirituality and Kantian philosophy that we are developing. I will argue that the 
transcendental deduction or ‘justification’ is less a philosophical argument and more a 
hybrid of spiritual and philosophical acts, visible as a stylisation of an intellectual 
persona. It may be regarded as transposing certain inner acts — identified with the 
transcendental recollection of scarcely conscious acts of pure creative intellection — 
into the register of philosophical argument and philosophical knowledge. If this can 
be shown, then it will help to account for a good deal of the obscurity that has 
surrounded the deduction. After all, commentators have long suspected that the 
transcendental deduction is not a formal philosophical deduction in any standard 
sense, but a drawn-out justification for the notion of pure thinking. Some have argued 
that this justification requires inner acts of transcendental reflection not reducible to 
standard philosophical arguments.34 It also seems that the protracted course of the 
deduction is of such complexity — compounded by its presentation in the different A 
and B versions — that it cannot be formulated as a single coherent argument, which is 
just what we should expect if it is indeed transposing spiritual acts into the forms of 
philosophical knowledge. 
The exposition begins philosophically enough, with Kant observing that 
experience requires the co-operation of man’s two powers of cognition: his 
‘receptive’ sensible intuition whereby appearances are delivered to the understanding, 
and his ‘spontaneous’ power of understanding whereby concepts are synthesised that 
allow these otherwise multifarious and indeterminate appearances — the ‘manifold’ 
or multiplicity of sensory presentations — to be thought as distinct objects of 
experience. This leads to Kant’s much cited formula that ‘Thoughts without content 
are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind’, but also to the much less cited 
                                                
34  Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction’, pp. 41-5. 
 32 
following sentence: ‘Hence it is just as necessary that we make our concepts sensible 
(i.e., that we add the object to them in intuition) as it is necessary that we make our 
intuitions understandable (i.e., that we bring them under concepts)’ (A 51/B 75). This 
notion that experience results from the ‘sensibilising’ (Versinnlichung) or 
externalising of pure concepts already pushes the ‘modest’ Anglo-American reading 
of the Critique to its limits; for that reading begins with a notion of given 
‘commonsense’ experience and then purports to deduce the categories of thought as 
that which is presupposed by such experience. If, however, Kant regards experience 
as arising (partly at least) from the sensualising of pure intellection, then we have 
already moved a long way from its commonsense form, and the sense in which the 
concepts of pure thinking are ‘presuppositions’ of experience is much harder to grasp. 
The far more recondite picture that begins to emerge flows directly from Kant’s 
conception of the spontaneity of pure thought and understanding. By this he means 
the spontaneous power of the intellect to engage in acts of intellection, or the 
synthesising of concepts, prior to and independently of all spatio-temporal intuitions 
delivered by the receptive sensibility. Kant thus introduces the categories or ‘pure 
concepts of the understanding’ as ‘functions’ or forms of the intellect’s action. These 
are the operations by which it synthesises the forms in which ‘objects in general’ can 
be thought prior to their being encountered in empirical experience. Such is the 
intellectual setting in which Kant lists the four sets of categories: of quantity (unity, 
plurality, allness), of quality (reality, negation, limitation), of relation (accidents, 
substance, causation, and ‘community’ or reciprocal interaction), and of modality 
(possibility, existence, necessity) (A 80/B 106). Kant distinguishes the categories 
from Aristotle’s partially overlapping set by claiming that his have not been arrived at 
by induction or abstraction from empirical experience, but instead represent the a 
priori forms in which the intellect can think or synthesise objects of experience within 
the multiplicity of sensible presentations (A 81/B 107). It is just this fact about the 
categories though — their presence as pure forms of thought prior to all empirical 
experience of objects — that poses the problem of justifying them, which is to be 
resolved via their transcendental deduction. In other words, Kant does not argue that 
the categories can be deduced from their necessity for making given experience 
possible — as he now retrospectively interprets his expositions of the a priori forms 
of sensibility — because when it comes to pure concepts there are no given intuitions 
from which they might be deduced. 
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The role of the transcendental deduction is thus to show ‘how these concepts can 
refer to objects even though they do not take these objects from any experience’; it is 
to ‘explain in what way concepts can refer to objects a priori’ (A 85 /B 117). It is just 
at this point that dimension of spirituality breaks through Kant’s exposition, as he 
comments that if experience cannot be the source of the pure concepts — as it is for 
such ‘physiologists of reason’ as Locke and Leibniz — then it can nonetheless 
function as a particular kind of ‘occasion’ for him to seek them elsewhere. Experience 
is thus to be treated as providing an occasion that ‘prompts’ the philosopher who 
cannot find his concepts in it, to attend instead to the acts of his own mind and seek 
them there: ‘But even for these concepts, as for all cognition, we can locate in 
experience, if not the principle of their possibility, then at least the occasioning causes 
of their production. Thus the impressions of the senses first prompt us to open up the 
whole cognitive power in regard to them, and to bring about experience’ (A 86/B 
118). 
This act of inner attention is of course central to the conversion of outlook in 
which the philosopher is required to seek the forms of cognition in the way objects 
conform themselves to our inner understanding of them. It is striking that Kant 
motivates the deduction or ‘critical inquiry’ not in terms of its role in anchoring 
metaphysics in experience, but in terms its role in allowing metaphysicians to accede 
to the domain of pure intellection that lies beyond experience: ‘For we either must 
entirely abandon all claims to pure rational insights in the realm that we care about 
most, viz., the realm beyond the bounds of all possible experience, or else must bring 
this critical inquiry to completion’ (A 89/B 121). To push home the spiritual 
motivation for this act of self-attention, Kant reminds his readers of the consequences 
of the failure to complete it, in the form of the twin spectres of Locke and Hume. The 
errors of the two British philosophers are more than just philosophical. In attempting 
to derive the workings of the mind from the processing of sensation, Locke mistook 
merely empirical concepts for things in themselves and was thus afflicted by the 
spiritual malady of ‘enthusiasm’. In attacking Locke, by denying that experience 
could support the necessary relations presupposed by the concept of causality, Hume 
was led to deny such relations altogether. But this led him to treat experience as a 
matter of conventional associations, and thereby fall into the complementary malady 
of ‘skepticism’ (B 127-28).  
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In order to overcome the twin maladies of empiricist enthusiasm and 
conventionalist skepticism, and ‘explain in what way concepts can refer to objects a 
priori’, Kant’s philosopher will be required to adopt a highly recondite inner 
disposition in relation to outer experience. He will have to learn to treat empirical 
experience not as a source of concepts, but as the occasion prompting him to recollect 
from within himself the forgotten forms of pure intellection in relation to which 
experience is only their spatio-temporal unfolding or realisation in his sensibility. 
This transformative exercise in transcendental self-recollection and the externalisation 
of pure intellection lies at the heart of the transcendental deduction, which is neither 
more nor less than the philosophical transposition of the exercise itself. Kant executes 
it, with few concessions to elegance or succinctness, in three overlapping movements, 
each of which is a hybrid of spiritual act and philosophical argument: the 
transcendental anamnesis or self-recollection of the transcendental subject’s timeless 
acts of pure intellection; the transcendental schematising or figuralising 
(externalising) of the pure intellection; and the analogising of empirical experience, as 
the hermeneutic form in which the empirical subject accedes to the pure intellectual 
acts of its transcendental twin.  
3.1 Transcendental Anamnesis 
The extraordinary move by which Kant supplies an ‘object’ for the pure 
understanding, from which the necessity of its categories can be justified, is to treat 
this object as an ‘object of presentations’. This so-called object is internal to our own 
‘power of presentations’ — our powers of spontaneous intellection and receptive 
sensibility — and is to be understood simply as an object of thought in general. 
Despite standing for a null or unknown object (‘ = x’) of understanding in general, 
this object ‘carries with it something concerning necessity’. It is a transcendental 
reminder that if the multiplicity (‘manifold’) of our presentations or cognitions are to 
refer to an object, and are not to remain haphazard and arbitrary, then ‘they must have 
that unity in which the concept of an object exists’. Given, though, that his object is 
only an object of consciousness, then the unity that it necessitates can only be the 
unity of the consciousness that assembles the presentations or cognitions into the 
form of a concept that makes an object thinkable. In the ‘A’ version of the deduction, 
Kant draws this conclusion with the remark — beginning with an optimistic adverb 
— that: ‘Clearly, therefore, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing 
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other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold 
[multiplicity] of presentations’ (A 105). The transcendental basis of this unity of 
consciousness in the synthesising of our presentations — hence the transcendental 
basis of the concepts of objects in general, hence also of empirical objects — Kant 
identifies as ‘none other than transcendental apperception’ (A 106). 
Apperception is a technical term signifying the mind’s consciousness of itself in 
the course of its operations. The mind’s consciousness of its own synthesising 
operations, though, cannot be an empirical consciousness, of the kind achieved via 
introspection and that Kant disparagingly attributes to Descartes; for empirical 
consciousness, including consciousness of one’s thoughts given temporally to the 
‘inner sense’, is conditioned by the a priori synthesising operations themselves. The 
apperception that the mind has of its own synthetic operations is transcendental or a 
priori in that it exists prior to empirical consciousness. In this regard it might also be 
viewed as unconscious or preconscious awareness. This oblique awareness, though — 
the awareness attending all mind’s acts of presentation and synthesis that each 
belongs to ‘me’ — is the condition of the unity of (transcendental) consciousness 
through which the concepts determining empirical consciousness are formed. 
In the ‘B’ version of the deduction, Kant calls this preconscious self-awareness 
the “I think” that accompanies all of my presentations. He treats this as the key to the 
spontaneous unification of self-consciousness that marks all of the presentations 
given in intuition as mine, and that thereby effects the acts of intellectual synthesis or 
‘functions’ found in and as the categories. Once again, though, this “I think” differs 
from Descartes’ cogito, as it not a content for my empirical consciousness. Rather, it 
is a fugitive ‘metaconscious’ awareness somehow attached to the unifying a priori 
intellectual acts from which this empirical consciousness emerges. The concept or 
thinking of the unity of consciousness by the ‘transcendental subject of apperception’ 
is thus not distinct from the spontaneous act by which this subject actually unifies its 
consciousness in becoming conscious of itself. 
Given that the ‘intelligible is that whose concept is an action’,35 then it would 
seem that Kant’s transcendental subject is an ‘intelligible’ or noumenal being whose 
                                                
35  Immanuel Kant, ?? 
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thoughts are actions, making it quite distinct from ‘my’ empirical self or 
consciousness, which it makes possible:36 
The thought that these presentations given in intuition belong one and all 
to me is, accordingly, tantamount to the thought that I unite them, or at 
least can unite them, in one self-consciousness. And although that thought 
is not yet consciousness of the synthesis of the presentations, it still 
presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. … Hence synthetic unity of 
the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, is the basis itself of 
apperception, which precedes a priori my determinate thought. But this 
combination does not lie in objects, and can by no means be borrowed 
from them by perception and thus taken up only then into the 
understanding. It is, rather, solely something performed by the 
understanding; and understanding itself is nothing more that the power of 
to combine a priori and to bring the manifold of given intuitions under the 
unity of apperception — the principle of this unity being the supreme 
principle in all human cognition. (B 134-35). 
Transcendental apperception or self-consciousness is thus perhaps best thought of as 
‘metaconsciouness’: the oblique self-consciousness of the mind’s spontaneous act of 
self-unification, which both synthesises and intelligises the concepts determining the 
experience of objects in general (the categories). The transcendental deduction should 
thus be understood as the means by which the philosopher (qua empirical subject of 
consciousness) attends to the transcendental operations of his own mind on the 
‘occasion’ of experience, and brings to empirical consciousness the transcendental 
apperception or metaconsciousness on which this empirical consciousness is based. 
Now we can see just how far removed the transcendental deduction of the 
categories is from a standard philosophical argument; that is, one in which the 
empirical subject is presumed already capable of knowing the truth through the 
discursive analysis of given concepts. We can see instead how closely it resembles an 
act of spiritual transformation: one in which the empirical subject must discard its 
empirical self and consciousness and seek to conform itself to the pure subject of 
                                                
36  For a brilliant discussion of this point, see Heinz Heimsoeth, 
‘Persönlichkeitsbewußtsein und Ding an sich in der Kantischen Philosophie’, in his 
Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants: Vol 1, Metaphysische Ursprünge und 
Ontologische Grundlagen (Cologne: Cologne Unversity Press, 1956, orig. 1924), pp. 
227-57.  
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transcendental self-consciousness from which empirical subjectivity unfolds. No 
matter how hard Anglo-American commentators seek to argue against the deduction’s 
own language that it is not ‘psychological’ — that is, that the deduction is not a 
concrete act of transcendental recollection empirically performed by the philosopher 
— it seems plain that it is.37 In order to ‘explain how concepts can refer to objects a 
priori’, the transcendental deduction is an act whereby the philosopher brings to mind, 
on the occasion of experience but not from within its confines, transcendental 
apperception: that is, the metaconsciousness that informs all cognitions and in doing 
so synthesises concepts capable of thinking all possible objects of experience in 
advance of all actual experience. But that means the deduction must be the act 
whereby an empirical subject recollects the forgotten spontaneous intellection of a 
transcendental subject in which all of the possible objects of the empirical subject’s 
spatio-temporal cognitions have already been thought prefiguratively. 
In fact this act was known to the history of metaphysics via the doctrine of 
transcendental anamnesis: the doctrine that all empirical knowledge is the spatio-
temporal unfolding or remembering of the prior pure acts of intellection of a timeless 
mind. Considering the anachronistic drive to turn Kant into a modern philosophy 
professor — by interpreting the deduction as a standard argument for recovering the 
conceptual presuppositions of ‘commonsense experience’ — it is not surprising that 
few modern scholars have comprehended the exercise in transcendental anamnesis 
that gives the deduction its peculiar form. Reinhold, though, was aware that the 
Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul — its capacity for pure intellection 
prior to material incarnation — formed an historical backdrop to Kant’s account of 
the ‘self-cognition of reason’. Reinhold thus observes that, according to Plato:  
Nevertheless, rational souls could in no way lose their original nature 
even in this state of degradation. Thinking and contemplating the copies 
that were contained in the essential forms of matter itself reawakened in 
them the innate divine ideas. And abstracting from matter, combating 
sensibility, and controlling the passions secured for them again the 
                                                
37  For the argument that the deduction is not a ‘psychological’ act — or, in our 
sense, a concrete act of inner self-transformation — see Paul Guyer, ‘Psychology and 
the Transcendental Deduction’, in Förster (ed.), Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, 
pp. 47-68; and P. F. Strawson, ‘Sensibility, Understanding, and the Doctrine of 
Synthesis: Comments on Guyer’, in Ibid., pp. 69-80. 
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enjoyment of their former happiness, which approached its full extent 
again only after the separation of the soul from the body.38 
Nonetheless, despite his characterisation of a spiritual regimen that looks strikingly 
Kantian, Reinhold is concerned to argue that Kant’s recognition of the independent 
faculty of sensibility saves him from Platonic excess, by ensuring that transcendental 
ideas are grounded in sensible experience.39 Even so, it is not at all clear from 
Reinhold’s account that the Kantian ‘self-cognition of reason’ might not itself arise 
from a ‘thinking and contemplating’ prompted by the ‘occasion’ of sensible 
experience. 
A rare and honorable exception among modern commentaries is provided in 
Philip Merlan’s neglected study of the role of neo-Platonic anamnesis in the 
genealogy of modern transcendental philosophy. For our immediate purposes, the 
crucial aspect of Merlan’s study is his account of how, within the tradition of 
university metaphysics, the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis — originally the notion 
that knowledge is the recollection of experiences had by the soul prior to its 
incarnation — was rendered immanent to the human mind. This, he argues, is the 
source of the modern doctrine that the subject of knowledge contains a principle of 
unconscious or metaconscious intellection in which all of its empirical experience is 
prefigured.40 One version of this modern doctrine is Leibniz’s account of the ‘spiritual 
monads’ as containing all of their future empirical experiences in the form of 
transcendental concepts implanted in them as intelligibles by the divine intellect. A 
second version, however, is provided by Kant’s distinction between the intelligible 
(noumenal) and sensible (phenomenal) worlds as, for Kant, the intelligible world and 
its subject contains the a priori prefigurations of the objects of experience that will be 
encountered in the sensible world by its subject, unfolded in space and time.41 
In a crucial set of comments, Merlan observes that Kant’s immanent 
transformation of the transcendental concepts or intelligibles into an unconscious or 
metaconscious dimension of empirical knowledge has preserved a central feature of 
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40  Philip Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness: Problems of 
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the original doctrine: namely, that the human mind knows or recollects the principle 
of intellection by being transformed into it: 
The doctrine of the double consciousness is of considerable importance. 
One of the two ‘consciousnesses’ which man has, i.e., his empirical 
consciousness, is the one which he actually has. The other, non-empirical, 
for which some would prefer the expression ‘unconscious consciousness’ 
is the one he should have — and to a certain extent does have, but mainly 
in the form of an imperative to transform his empirical consciousness into 
that meta-empirical one. … In application to the realm of cognition, we 
could say that one has a duty to think in a meta-personal manner, as this is 
the only way to attain unto truth, just as meta-personal action is the only 
way to attain unto goodness (Rousseau, Hegel).42  
In this setting, self-knowledge is not introspection but a becoming of that which is 
self-knowledge. In Kant’s terms, in order to achieve self-consciousness of the a priori 
concepts underlying its own experience, the empirical subject of experience must 
become the transcendental subject of apperception; because self-conscious is what the 
transcendental subject becomes when it thinks (and creates) the unity of its cognitions 
which in turn form the categorial basis of empirical experience. If the transcendental 
subject of apperception is neither more nor less than the intellect whose self-
consciousness forms the a priori concepts determining empirical subjectivity, then to 
recover these concepts the philosopher must transform himself into this intellect. As 
Kant puts it: ‘But all empirical consciousness has a necessary reference to a 
transcendental consciousness (a consciousness that precedes all particular experience) 
viz., the consciousness of myself as original apperception. It is therefore absolutely 
necessary that in my cognition all consciousness belongs to one consciousness (that of 
myself)’ (A 117, n. 138). 
The transcendental deduction of the categories thus harbours an exercise in 
which, to achieve self-consciousness, the empirical subject must transform itself into 
the transcendental subject of apperception. This is the pure intellect whose thought of 
itself (as the ‘I think’) in the multiplicity of its intuitions is simultaneously the act that 
unifies or synthesises them into concepts to which all empirical experience must 
conform. The transcendental deduction is thus an act of self-transformation in the 
                                                
42  Merlan, Monopsychism, pp. 121-22. 
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form of Platonic ēros: the conversion of the subject through ‘loving’ movement 
towards a truth — that of the intelligible — that illuminates and transfigures it. This is 
the spiritual setting in which Kant regards Locke’s insistence on deriving concepts 
from empirical experience alone, and Hume’s refusal of the notion of transcendental 
concepts altogether, not just as philosophical errors but as twin spiritual dangers: 
enthusiasm and skepticism. In thinking about experience in the wrong way — in 
failing to treat it as an ‘occasion’ for recollecting transcendental self-consciousness — 
the British philosophers threaten humanity’s transfigurative ascent towards the 
intelligible or noumenal subject, thereby blocking access to ‘the realm that we care 
about most, viz., the realm by beyond the bounds of all possible experience’. 
3.2 The Schematisation of Intellection 
It should already be clear that Kant’s conception of experience is structured by a 
profound duality. On one side, Kantian experience is informed by the receptivity of 
sensibility, whose role is to provide cognitive significance for a priori intellection by 
supplying it with spatio-temporal intuitions. On the other side, empirical experience is 
treated as that which is made possible by this pure intellection, whose spontaneous 
synthesising acts are realised in it. In order to cope with this extraordinary interface 
between a receptive sensibility and a spontaneously creative intellect, Kant invents a 
new intellectual power in the Critique — the ‘transcendental imagination’ — which 
plays no role in the Critique’s prototype, the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. It is the 
task of the transcendental imagination to supply a figural ‘schematism’ that will allow 
the timeless and non-spatial intellections of the transcendental subject to be ‘realised 
in and limited by’ the spatial and temporal objects of the sensibility. 
Rather than being the philosophical transposition of a spiritual exercise, I will 
argue that Kant’s account of the schematisation of the transcendental intellect is an 
attempt to offer a philosophical exposition of a spiritual experience undergone as a 
result of the exercise in transcendental anamnesis. This experience may be 
characterised as that which the mind or soul undergoes as it negotiates the 
extraordinary passage between the transcendental recollection of itself in the act of 
timelessly intelligising the conceptual forms of all possible things, and the return to 
its phenomenal form where these things are received in the intuitions of time and 
space. Kant’s account of the transcendental imagination — envisaged as a third power 
of the soul through which pure intellection both figuralises (schematises) itself in the 
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forms of time and space, while receiving these forms from the sensibility that supplies 
it with intuitions — is the philosophical exposition that Kant improvises to cope with 
the extraordinary demands of this imaginal experience. The best prima facie evidence 
for this redescription of the transcendental schematism comes from the fact that it was 
the difficulties Kant encountered in attempting its philosophical exposition that 
caused him to produce the second or ‘B’ version of the transcendental deduction. 
More importantly, it is that these difficulties arise at precisely the crucial spiritual 
nexus we have identified: the moment at which the understanding’s timeless self-
intellection of the pure conceptual forms of things encounters the time-bound 
intuition of spatio-temporal objects presented by the sensibility. 
In the ‘A’ version of the schematism — which Kant prefaces with an understated 
apology to the reader for its intense obscurity: ‘Such obscurity is unavoidable as one 
begins to walk along a path that has never been walked upon before’ (A 98) — the 
entire nexus for pure understanding and intuitive sensibility is treated as belonging to 
the ‘inner sense’, or phenomenal self-consciousness, and hence within time: ‘No 
matter from where our presentations arise, as modifications of the mind they yet 
belong to inner sense: they belong to inner sense whether they have come about a 
priori, or empirically as appearances. And, as belonging to inner sense, all our 
cognitions are yet subject ultimately to the formal condition of inner sense, i.e., to 
time. In time they must one and all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations’ 
(A 98-9). 
This temporal condition which Kant presents as essential in the ‘A’ version of 
the deduction — and is the reason that some modern commentators have dubbed this 
the ‘subjective’ version — is quietly dropped in the so-called ‘objective’ or ‘B’ 
version. It should already be clear that the ‘A’ version’s subjection of a priori 
intellection to time conflicts with a prime characteristic of the transcendental unity of 
apperception: namely, Kant’s insistence that transcendental apperception is not an act 
of empirical consciousness introspectively accessible to the inner sense and hence 
subject to time. We have just observed that Kant rather regards apperception as the 
act of a transcendental subject or pure intellect whose spontaneous self-consciousness 
— recollection of the ‘I think’ accompanying all presentations — synthesises the pure 
concepts that make all empirical consciousness possible, including time-
consciousness. Despite this, one can see why Kant felt compelled in the ‘A’ version 
to treat the understanding’s (apperceptive) synthesis of presentations into pure 
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concepts as occurring in time. If the sensibility’s synthetic intuition of appearances 
and the intellect’s spontaneous generation of pure concepts both occur within time, 
then there would appear to be a medium in which sensibility and intellection can 
combine to make cognition possible. 
Nonetheless, the underlying conflict between the time-bound synthesis of 
sensible appearances and the timeless apperceptive synthesis of pure concepts does 
not go away. In fact it surfaces in the very power that Kant invents to mediate 
between sensibility and understanding, the imagination, which is pulled in both 
directions and hence fails to achieve stability. On the one hand, Kant stipulates that it 
is the imagination that permits the connection of diverse perceptions — the different 
parts of a triangle, the different times of a day — into a single intuitable appearance 
or ‘image’. The imagination does this by ‘reproducing’ or calling up past perceptions 
— bits of the triangle, parts of the day — thereby associating or synthesising them in 
the present moment as stable appearances or objects of experience, which would 
otherwise dissolve into a flux of dissociated perceptions. Kant calls this the 
‘reproductive imagination’ because of its role in reproducing given but temporally 
absent empirical perceptions; although he insists that, despite its temporal character, 
this power too should be regarded as one of the ‘transcendental acts of the mind’ and 
can be called the ‘transcendental power of imagination’ (A 100-102). 
On the other hand, Kant also assigns the imagination the task of supplying 
transcendental apperception with a (figural) synthesis as some kind of correlate for its 
spontaneous unification of presentations in pure self-consciousness (A 116-18). This, 
apparently, is because the transcendental unity of apperception — the mind’s 
spontaneous combination of cognitions through self-consciousness — is ‘synthetic’: 
that is, it can or must be ‘exhibited’ in intuitions which, in man, are always sensible. 
It is through these intuitions that pure intellection engages with and determines in 
advance the forms of empirical experience. It is the task of the imagination to supply 
these intuitions as sensible correlates of the pure concepts (categories) that are 
intelligised as the forms of spontaneous transcendental self-consciousness. Kant calls 
this form or use of the imagination ‘productive’ as opposed to ‘reproductive’. Unlike 
the ‘associations’ that the reproductive imagination establishes between perceptions 
in the synthesis of empirical appearances, the ‘affinity’ that the productive 
imagination establishes between cognitions in the synthesis of intuitable correlates for 
pure apperception is a priori and not subject to the ‘conditions of experience’ (A 118). 
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In short, where it touches pure intellection, the (productive) imagination is timeless; 
where it touches sensibility, the (reproductive) imagination is temporal. 
Given that time is a principal ‘condition of experience’, then it is not clear how 
the pure synthesis of the productive imagination can still be subject to time. If it is 
not, however, then it cannot combine with the temporal synthesis of sensible 
appearances by the reproductive imagination, in order to join understanding and 
sensibility in cognition. In fact it is not clear how the pure synthesis of the productive 
imagination can be distinguished from the transcendental self-unification of 
consciousness in apperception, which is itself treated as the source of the a priori 
‘affinity’ between presentations exhibited in intuitions (A 122). Were transcendental 
intellection itself to be the source of its own experiential ‘images’, though, this would 
be tantamount to annihilating sensibility and ascribing the power of intellectual 
intuition to the mind, which only God possesses. Nonetheless, there is little difference 
between the roles of transcendental apperception and the transcendental imagination 
in the following formula: ‘The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one 
consciousness (i.e., in original apperception) is, therefore, the necessary condition of 
all possible perception; and the affinity of all appearances (whether near or remote) is 
a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination that is based a priori on rules’ 
(A 123); because the a priori rules permitting synthesis of appearances in the 
imagination are in fact the ‘rules’ generated by the spontaneous unification of the 
apperceptive consciousness (A 122). In other words, if the ‘A’ version of the 
imagination’s schematisation of understanding begins by purporting to subject 
transcendental apperception to time and the inner sense; but it ends by seeming to 
absorb the imagination’s configuring of sensibility into the timeless synthesis of 
cognitions flowing from transcendental apperception. In either case, the mediation of 
understanding and sensibility promised by the introduction of the schematising 
imagination seems to oscillate unsteadily between the pure timeless self-configuring 
act of apperception and the time-bound synthesis of appearances by the forms of 
sensibility. 
In a culminating comment to the ‘A’ version of the deduction, Kant we thus find 
Kant remarking:  
Now, this apperception is what must be added to pure imagination in 
order to make its function intellectual. For the synthesis of the 
imagination, although performed a priori, is yet always in itself sensible, 
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because it combines the manifold — e.g., the shape of a triangle — only 
as it appears in intuition. But through the manifold’s relation to the unity 
of apperception, concepts — which belong to the understanding — will 
be able to come about, but only by means of imagination as referred to 
sensible intuition. (A 123-24) 
If by ‘intellectual’ Kant means apperception’s power of pure intellection of the 
concepts of things, through its spontaneous unification of the multiplicity of 
cognitions in self-consciousness, then we can still have no idea how the function of 
the sensible imagination could be rendered intellectual in this sense; for then the 
imagination would cease to be the configuration of sensible intuitions into 
appearances. Neither is it clear what it would mean to ‘add’ apperception to the 
imagination without simply assimilating one power to the other. Conversely, if 
‘concepts’ (the categories) are simply the spontaneous forms in which transcendental 
apperception unifies itself, and in so doing determines the forms of possible 
cognition, then it is not clear how their ‘coming about’ could be in any way dependent 
on a power of imagination tied to the receptivity of sensible intuition. But this 
labyrinthine ‘circularity’ in Kant’s account of the schematising imagination is just 
what we should expect were his exposition of it indeed an attempt to provide a 
philosophical rendering of what is in fact a spiritual experience: namely, the soul’s 
transfigurative passage between its ‘ascent’ to its true form as timeless apperceptive 
intellection of the pure forms of things, and its ‘return’ to the sensibility in which this 
intellection is experienced as time-bound figural (spatial) appearances. As the 
medium for this passage, we should expect the schematising imagination to be 
alternatively intellectualised and sensualised. 
In the ‘B’ exposition of the transcendental schematism, Kant places 
transcendental apperception as prior to the inner sense and its time condition, treating 
time as conditioned by apperception itself (B 140). He simultaneously excludes the 
temporal synthesis of perceptions by the reproductive imagination from the domain of 
transcendental philosophy altogether, treating it as part of empirical psychology (B 
152). It should not be surprising, then, that the problem that Kant will encounter as a 
result of this strategy is the inverse of the one the besets the ‘A’ version: not the 
assimilation of the timeless intellections of the transcendental subject to the time-
bound intuitions of the subject of empirical consciousness, but the collapse of the 
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latter into the former, with the transcendental imagination again attempting an 
impossible mediation. 
In the ‘B’ version Kant stresses that the synthesis of the multiplicity of intuitions 
into possible objects of experience must itself be ascribed to the spontaneous act of 
self-consciousness by which the transcendental subject unites its presentations into 
the categories. Thus, in a crucial formula: 
Through the synthesis of understanding, a manifold [multiplicity] 
contained in an intuition that I call mine is presented as belonging to the 
necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this presenting is done by 
means of the category. Hence the category indicates that the empirical 
consciousness of a given manifold of one intuition is just as subject to a 
pure a priori self-consciousness, as empirical intuition is subject to a pure 
sensible intuition that likewise takes place a priori. … Afterwards … I 
shall show, from the way in which the empirical intuition is given in 
sensibility, that the intuition’s unity is none other than the unity that … 
the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition as such. (B 
144-45). 
At the same time, however, Kant also insists that for cognition to take place, the 
multiplicity of intuition — through whose spontaneous synthesis the intellect ‘thinks’ 
the categories — must be given to it from somewhere else. Otherwise, human 
understanding would be like the divine understanding, supplying its own intuitions 
through intellection: ‘The categories are only rules for an understanding whose entire 
power consists in thought, i.e., in the act of bringing to the unity of apperception the 
synthesis of the manifold that has, in intuition, been given to it from elsewhere’ (B 
145). The synthesis of the multiplicity of intuition thus sits uneasily on the cusp of an 
act performed spontaneously in the apperceptive unification of the pure understanding 
in categories, and as something presented to this understanding from the ‘elsewhere’ 
of a receptive sensibility. Invoking as a brute fact the metaphysical topography of the 
human subject, as a spontaneous intelligence tied to a receptive sensibility, Kant 
proclaims that ‘no further reason can be given’ as to why the intellect executes its 
self-consciousness in just this set of categories — thereby determining the laws of all 
human cognition — or indeed why space and time happen to be the only forms of 
intuition available to humans. We need to remind ourselves, of course, that this 
metaphysical doctrine serves a spiritual purpose: it is the means of programming the 
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philosopher’s transcendental recollection of his acts of pure intellection and their 
schematised projection in the world of space and time. 
It is through the oscillation between the two conceptions of intuitional synthesis 
— as the product the understanding’s spontaneous self-consciousness and as 
something given to the understanding by sensibility — that Kant introduces the 
mediating power of the transcendental imagination in the ‘B’ version. Kant calls the 
synthesis of intuition in spontaneous categorial self-consciousness ‘intellectual 
synthesis’, while naming the synthesis of intuition in the sensible manifold ‘figurative 
synthesis’ (synthesis speciosa), marking the latter as something that can be given to 
the senses as shape or image (B 151). It is the role of the transcendental imagination 
to mediate between the spontaneity of pure intellection and the receptivity of sensible 
intuition by producing figurative syntheses, or schemata, that both belong to 
sensibility and are yet informed by the spontaneity of the understanding. 
Kant proposes that the imagination achieves this mediation by allowing the 
understanding to ‘determine inner sense in accordance with the synthetic unity of 
apperception’ (B 150). It is thus in effect the means by which spontaneous intellection 
produces the time sense, or the form of temporal intuition through which the 
understanding will be given intuitions by sensibility: 
Now, all our intuition is sensible; and hence the imagination … belongs to 
sensibility. Yet the synthesis of imagination is an exercise of spontaneity, 
which is determinative, rather than determinable as is sense; hence this 
synthesis can a priori determine sense in terms of its form in accordance 
with the unity of apperception. To this extent, therefore, the imagination 
is a power of determining sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of 
intuitions in accordance with the categories must be the transcendental 
synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is an action of the understanding 
upon sensibility, and is the understanding’s first application (and at the 
same time the basis of all its other applications) to objects of the intuition 
that is possible for us. As figurative, this synthesis is distinct from the 
intellectual synthesis, which proceeds without any imagination but merely 
through understanding. (B 151-52). 
Again, though, it is not at all clear how, if the imagination is the means by which the 
form of sensibility is determined in ‘accordance with the unity of apperception’, it can 
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simultaneously be that which brings figural intuitions to apperception and the 
understanding from the ‘elsewhere’ of sensibility. 
In the discussion of the ‘schematism of pure concepts of the understanding’ that 
opens book II of the Transcendental Analytic — which actually dates from the earlier 
‘A’ version of the Critique and was left unrevised in the ‘B’ version — Kant gives a 
more programmatic formulation of the mediating role of the imagination and its 
transcendental schematism. This is by way of introducing his discussion of how a 
priori principles of understanding can apply to empirical experience. Given that the 
spontaneity of the understanding and the receptivity of sensibility makes them quite 
heterogeneous, then how ‘can an intuition be subsumed under a category, and hence 
how can a category be applied to appearances’? (A 137/B 176). There must, says 
Kant, be a ‘third something’ that is ‘homogenous with the category, on the one hand, 
and with the appearance, on the other … This mediating presentation must be pure 
(i.e., without anything empirical), and yet be both intellectual, on the one hand, and 
sensible, on the other hand. Such a presentation is the transcendental schema’ (A 
138/B 177). The transcendental schema is thus the equivalent of the figurative 
synthesis of the imagination in the later ‘B’ version of the story, and it works in a 
similar way: namely, by characterising the a priori time determination as the schema 
that both allows appearances to be subsumed under pure concepts, and allows pure 
concepts to be given sensible appearances as their objects. 
In this earlier formulation of temporal mediation, however, Kant does not treat 
the transcendental schema as the means by which the form of sensibility (time) is 
determined ‘in accordance with the unity of apperception’. Rather, he views it as the 
means by which the latter is ‘restricted in its use’ to the formal conditions of 
sensibility, namely to time and the inner sense (A 140/B 179). The schematism is not 
itself a (spatial) image, but the condition for the sensibility intuiting in a figural or 
spatio-temporal manner. Given its extraordinary role — of ensuring that a timelessly 
spontaneous intellect only cognises its intellections via temporal intuitions — it is 
hardly surprising that Kant should say of the schematism that it is a ‘secret art 
residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly 
ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves’.43 What we can say is that: ‘A 
                                                
43  It is significant that Heidegger cites this same remark in his discussion of the 
‘obscurity’ of Kant’s schematism concept, a quality on which Heidegger might be 
regarded as well qualified to speak. He does so, of course, not in order to clarify the 
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schema of sensible concepts (such as the concepts of figures in space) is a product 
and, as it were, a monogram of the pure a priori imagination through which, and 
according to which, images become possible in the first place’ (A 141-42/B 180-81). 
We will return below to this notion of the schema as a monogram in which the pure 
concepts of the understanding (categories) receive a sensible figuration, as it shows 
how Kant turns sensible experience into a figure or analogy for the acts of pure 
transcendental apperception. For the moment, though, we can content ourselves with 
observing that this earlier formulation of the schematism encounters the 
complementary problem to the one we have identified in the later formulation. 
Whereas in the later ‘B’ version the determination of sensibility (time) by 
transcendental apperception assimilates receptive sensibility to the spontaneous 
intellect, here, in the earlier ‘A’ version, the restriction of pure understanding to the 
conditions of time threatens to collapse the spontaneous intellection into receptive 
sensibility. 
We can see what Kant wants his philosophical exposition of the schematisation 
of the intellect to deliver. He wants it show that through the imagination’s schema, 
the pure intellections (categories) of the transcendental subject of apperception are 
both unfolded in and limited by the pure forms of sensibility: time and space: ‘Yet it 
is obvious also that although the schemata of sensibility are what first realise the 
categories, they do nonetheless also restrict them, i.e., they limit them to conditions 
lying outside understanding (viz., in sensibility). Hence a schema is, properly 
speaking, only the phenomenon of an object, or the sensible concept of an object, in 
harmony with the category’ (A 146/B 185-86). The problem that he confronts, 
though, is that the subject of apperception — the ‘I’ that thinks as a spontaneous 
intelligence independently of and prior to all sensible appearances — might not be the 
same as the phenomenal subject in whose sensibility the apperceptive concepts are 
restricted to the appearances of time and space:  
But how (inasmuch as in addition to sensible intuition I can present, at 
least as possible, a different kind of intuition) can the I who thinks be 
distinct from the I that intuits itself, and yet be the same as it by being the 
                                                                                                                                      
source of this obscurity, but to replace Kant’s construction of the role of time in the 
schematisation of intellection with his own construction of the relation between 
‘being and time’. See, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und 
Zeit, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 
20-1. 
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same subject? And hence how can I say: I, as intelligence and thinking 
subject, cognise myself as an object that is thought, viz., I so cognise 
myself insofar as in addition I am also given to myself in intuition — 
except that I cognise myself, as I do other phenomena, not as I am to the 
understanding, but as I appear to myself? (B 155) 
The ‘I’ who recollects itself as the pure intelligence timelessly intelligising the a 
priori forms of things cannot be cognised in the time-bound inner sense of the 
phenomenal subject. It is this non-identity of the subject of transcendental 
apperception and the subject of empirical experience that condemns Kant’s 
philosophical exposition of the schematisation of the intellect to oscillate between the 
assimilation of the sensibility to pure understanding, and the collapsing of the latter 
into the former. Yet this non-identity of the two forms of the subject is just what we 
would expect to find as a result of the spiritual experience that underlies this 
philosophical exposition. For, according to the spiritual exercise informing this 
experience, the phenomenal subject is transfigured by its act of transcendental 
recollection into the pure intellect for whom it is ‘at least possible’ to intuit the 
‘intelligibles’ without sensibility; while the return of this pure intellect to sensibility 
means that it can no longer know itself as noumenal intelligence only as phenomenal 
appearance. We are now a very long way indeed from the ‘modest’ Kant of the 
Anglo-American commentators, who is supposed to aspire to nothing more than an 
exposition of the principles underlying ‘our’ ‘commonsense’ experience. 
3.3 The Analogisation of Experience 
In order to understand Kant’s doctrine of experience — presented in the 
sprawling second half of the Transcendental Analytic as the ‘Transcendental Doctrine 
of the Power of Judgment’ — it must be kept in mind that it takes place entirely 
within the parameters established by his account of the transcendental schematism, 
however unstable these might be. It is the transcendental schematism that constitutes 
the ‘third thing’ permitting the spontaneous categorial self-consciousness of the 
intellect to ‘meet’ — to be realised in and limited by — the perceptual intuitions of 
the receptive sensibility. The schemata achieve this mediation via the figuralisation of 
the pure ‘intellectual synthesis’ achieved in transcendental apperception. We have 
seen, though, that Kant oscillates between two different views of this figuralisation: 
as something produced by the intellectual synthesis of apperception itself (through its 
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production of time as a sensible analogue of timeless self-unifying intellection), and 
as something received from the ‘imagaic’ synthesis of appearances by the forms of 
sensibility (such that the schemata impose the temporal form of the sensibility on the 
pure intellection of apperception). Without this oscillation it would be impossible for 
the transcendental schematism to perform its mediating role — to be both 
intellectually spontaneous and yet sensibly receptive — which indicates that Kant’s 
account of experience and cognition takes place within this fundamental movement. 
The reason for this, I have argued, is that Kant’s philosophical exposition of the 
schematism is actually the exoteric transposition of an esoteric spiritual exercise and 
experience: the mind’s transfigurative recollection of its pure intelligising as the 
source of all sensible experience, followed by its return to the senses where this 
intelligising can be known only indirectly and obscurely in the appearances of 
sensibility. The truly extraordinary picture that Kant presents is that experience is the 
form in which the phenomenal subject ‘senses’ the intelligibles synthesised by (itself 
as) the noumenal subject of apperception, but now only available in the figural forms 
of time and space as appearances to a subject that is also only an appearance. Spatio-
temporal experience is thus to be regarded as a ‘monogram’ or analogy for the pure 
self-consciousness of the intelligibles. The figuralisation of the intelligibles in 
sensibility means both that they cannot be known directly, and also that experience, 
rather than being autochthonous or self-subsistent — hence capable of being fully 
known through empirical observation and experiment — is only a hermeneutic 
analogue of the pure intellection that lies beyond it. 
The view of the world that Kant was seeking to combat with this extraordinary 
picture — the view in which experience is autochthonous or based in the observation 
of self-subsistent things — is one that he ascribed to the natural sciences. In the 
understanding of the world that had arisen from the experimental work of Galileo and 
Newton, Torricelli and Boyle, space and time are not subjective schemata for pure 
intellection, but realities existing independently of human cognition. Further, the 
phenomena that could be experimentally isolated within them are not subjective 
appearances synthesised through the categories and intuition, but objective 
appearances explainable in terms of self-subsistent matter and forces. Kant presents 
his transcendental exposition of experience as if it were compatible with the natural 
sciences. All that is required to secure this compatibility, he avers, is that the 
empirical laws and objects of these sciences be treated as lower level representations 
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of regularities in the domain of appearances, hence as dependent on the a priori laws 
of transcendental philosophy ‘that make nature possible in the first place’ (A 216/B 
263). 
This is not quite ingenuous, though, as we shall now see that acceptance of space 
and time as the schematised forms in which a pure intellect senses its own 
intellections commits Kant to rejecting certain basic scientific doctrines: specifically, 
that the world is an aggregation of self-subsistent bodies causally related in ‘empty’ 
time and space, and that bodies are materially composed of ‘simples’ (atoms) 
separated by empty space. These scientific doctrines cannot be reconciled with Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy as they preclude the spatio-temporal world being treated as 
a ‘monogram’ or analogy through which the philosopher can decipher the 
spontaneous intelligence whose intellection makes nature possible in the first place. 
The analogisation of experience effected by the transcendental schematism may thus 
be regarded as a means by which Western philosophical spirituality seeks to defend 
its conception of nature — as the world of appearances in which a transcendental 
intellect encounters its own objects of intellection in analogical form — against the 
de-subjectivised and de-theologised conception of nature arising from natural 
sciences. In fact, this is an appropriate general characterisation of the place of 
Critique of Pure Reason in the history of sciences.44 
In obedience to his architectonic, Kant argues that there are exactly four sets of 
correlative schemata responsible for the experiential figuralisation of the pure 
categories. These are the schemata of magnitude or quantity (unity, plurality, totality); 
of quality (reality, negation, limitation); of relation (substance/accidents, causality, 
community); and of modality (possibility, actuality, necessity). Fearless in the face of 
prolixity and redundancy — which we can now view as an effect of the strain 
imposed by the transposition of the forms of spirituality into philosophical 
argumentation — Kant offers lengthy expositions of these schemata under the 
headings of the ‘axioms of intuition’, the ‘anticipations of perception’, the ‘analogies 
                                                
44  For a different view, that defends Kant’s claim to be recovering transcendental 
laws underlying Newton’s lower level empirical laws, see Michael Friedman, Kant 
and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). For a 
critical commentary, arguing that Kant’s philosophy of science is defined by its 
engagement with the Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics of nature rather than 
Newtonian mechanics, see Eric Watkins, ‘Kant’s Justification of the Laws of 
Mechanics’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29 (1998), 539-60.  
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of experience’, and the ‘postulates of empirical thought’. Without attempting to 
capture the detail of all of the schemata — we shall not discuss the ‘postulates’ on 
this occasion — we can steer a path through them by observing what is common to 
them. Each is intended to show how what looks like a self-subsistent domain of 
empirical experience is actually a figuralising or analogising of the pure intellectual 
operations or rules that are its condition of possibility. At the same time, these 
figuralised ‘possible experiences’ are simultaneously that which presents these a 
priori operations with intuitional objects from which their necessity or ‘objective 
reality’ can be deduced (A 155-58/B 194-97). 
With regard to the first set of schemata — the axioms of intuition — Kant’s core 
idea is that the productive imagination establishes a schema for the synthetic 
operations of the intellect the result of which is that intuitional appearances can only 
be experienced by us as the ‘extensive magnitudes’ of space and time. Extensive 
magnitudes are those where the whole can be arrived at only through the successive 
aggregation of parts. Kant’s claim is that the productive imagination determines that 
there is only one way for the otherwise timeless intellectual synthesis of presentation 
to be ‘taken up into empirical consciousness’, or experienced empirically as 
appearances. This is through the schema of temporal and spatial aggregation of parts 
(temporal instants, spatial points) into whole quanta (the time sequence, the line or 
shape in space): ‘Since what is mere intuition in all appearances is either space or 
time, every appearance is — as intuition — an extensive magnitude, inasmuch as it 
can be cognised only through successive synthesis (of part to part) in apprehension’ 
(A 163/B 204). Given that here the productive imagination produces the schema of 
time and space as the a priori forms of human intuition, and considering that Kant 
views time and space as the forms of the human sensorium — the ‘inner sense’ and 
the ‘outer sense’ — then the imagination is in effect supplying the pure intellect with 
the forms of sensibility. It thereby ensures that the only way in which this intellect 
will empirically encounter the results of its a priori intellections will be as objects 
aggregatively synthesised in time and space, while simultaneously ensuring that these 
objects will only be regarded as appearances of intelligible objects that cannot be 
given to human intuition. 
To exemplify this doctrine, Kant turns once again to Euclidean geometry, 
interpreting its axioms — that between two points only one straight line is possible, 
that two lines enclose no space, etc. — as synthetic a priori principles which are to be 
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regarded as axioms for the human capacity for spatial intuition: ‘These axioms 
express the conditions of sensible a priori intuition under which alone the schema of a 
pure concept of outer appearance can come about’ (A 163/B 204). Kant thus regards 
the axioms of geometry as supplying the schema through which the otherwise purely 
numerical operations (‘intellectual synthesis’) of the pure understanding can 
figuralised or rendered spatially intuitable, and in so doing determine a priori the 
forms of man’s empirical spatial perception. Kant’s culmination of this interpretation 
of geometry — ‘Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition (of space 
and time). Hence what geometry says about pure intuition holds incontestably for 
empirical intuition also’ (A 165/B 206) — may thus be regarded as a philosophical 
transposition of the spiritual exercise in the analogisation of experience. In other 
words, it treats the empirically experienced shapes of things as analogues of their pure 
geometric axioms or constructions, which are regarded as the pure forms of human 
spatial sensing, or ‘axioms of intuition’. 
Kant thus argues that the fact that an empirical line is not infinitely divisible 
while a geometric one is, should be regarded as indicative of the gap between the 
experiential analogue, in which perception is restricted by empirical sensibility, and 
its a priori form, where infinite divisibility is a conceivable object for a pure intellect. 
Once again, though, this interpretation of geometry should be regarded as a 
philosophical transposition of the spiritual imperative to treat empirical experience as 
the analogical product of the schematisation of pure intellection. The spiritual animus 
driving this interpretation is visible in Kant’s hostility to all those who — as 
Wittgenstein would — treat the absence of geometric infinity in spatial experience as 
indicating that geometric constructions are not in fact the pure form of spatial 
intuition: 
All objections against this are only the chicanery of a falsely instructed 
reason: a reason that erroneously means to detach objects of the senses 
from the formal condition of our sensibility, and that despite their being 
mere appearances presents them as objects in themselves, given to the 
understanding. If that were the case, however, then there could be no 
synthetic a priori cognition of them at all, and hence also no such 
cognition through pure concepts of space; and the science that determines 
these concepts, viz., geometry would itself not be possible. (A 166/B 207) 
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As we have already shown, this only holds if one is already committed to the spiritual 
view that geometry (hence space) is a schematisation permitting pure intellection to 
be figuralised and experienced as spatial intuition, hence as appearances rather than 
real things. The Kantian interpretation of geometry as supplying the pure forms of 
human spatial intuition is thus a philosophical doctrine arising from the need of 
Kantian spirituality to forestall the ‘scientific’ view of spatio-temporal objects as 
observable self-subsistent real things. 
The principle of the second transcendental schematism — the opaquely named 
anticipations of perception which are schemata of qualities — is: ‘In all appearances 
the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree’ (B 207). 
To understand this, it must be observed that Kant regards sensation or the ‘matter of 
intuition’ as that which ‘testifies to the presence’ of a thing (in itself) without 
representing it, as representation is a product of the syntheses performed by 
sensibility and understanding, which pertain only to the form of intuition not its 
matter, sensation. For its part, ‘intensive magnitude’ refers to the degrees of a 
continuum, as opposed to the aggregation of discrete parts that defines extensive 
magnitude. This results in Kant’s truly remarkable doctrine that phenomenal reality 
(realitas phaenomenon), or the reality of phenomena, is not something determined by 
the presence or absence of something absolutely real that they contain, self-subsistent 
matter. Rather, he treats reality as a question of degree, in fact of the degree of 
qualitative sensation — redness, heaviness, hardness — found in the pure forms of 
spatio-temporal intuition. 
Things thus obtain (or lose) their reality along a sliding scale, beginning at 0, or 
pure intuition, and moving up to various magnitudes of empirical sensation, which are 
degrees of reality: ‘Now from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness, i.e., to 
the point where the real of that consciousness entirely vanishes and there remains a 
merely formal (a priori) consciousness of the manifold in space and time, a stepwise 
change is possible. Hence there is likewise possible a synthesis in the production of a 
sensation’s magnitude, from the sensation’s beginning, i.e., from pure intuition, = 0, 
up to this or that magnitude of sensation’. (A 166/B 208). Despite the difficulties 
posed by the a posteriori nature of sensation, Kant nonetheless insists that this 
principle of sliding intensity can nonetheless be regarded as ‘anticipating’ experience 
in a similar manner to the a priori schema of space and time. Presumably, this is 
because their zero form points to the presence of ‘sensation as such’, even though 
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none is present; although Kant acknowledges that this is anticipation only ‘in an 
exceptional meaning of the term’ (A 167/B 209). 
In any case, it is clear what Kant wants his conception of reality as a sliding scale 
of sensation to deliver. He wants it to rule out a conception of reality in terms of the 
presence of absolute or indivisible entities occupying empty space; that is, the 
‘atomic’ conception of reality advanced by such natural scientists and Newton and 
Boyle. The notion of reality as an intensive magnitude allows Kant to do this because 
it treats sensation as a mathematical continuum, hence, like time and space, capable 
of continuous limitless subdivision. This means that one never arrives an indivisible 
or atomic reality surrounded by empty space in an empty time (A 169-71/B 211-12). 
In Kant’s doctrine, space and time are themselves forms of sensing — formal 
conditions of experience — and if the sensation that they contain is a continuum that 
never reaches zero, then empty space and time are not possible objects of experience. 
Kant acknowledges that this contradicts the view of the ‘natural scientists’ 
whereby matter is regarded as absolutely dense (indivisible). On this view, 
differences in bodies — for example, their relative mass or hardness — are ascribed 
to the amount of matter contained in a given volume or body, that is, to their atomic 
density or specific gravity. This dictates that such bodies must contain empty space to 
allow for fluctuating quantities of matter, which of course contradicts Kant’s view 
that space is only a subjective form of human intuition. In rebutting this scientific 
doctrine, which he argues is based on a ‘metaphysical’ premise of the uniformity of 
the real in space, Kant offers what he calls a ‘transcendental proof’. This is supposed 
to explain the phenomenon of relative density without having to presuppose empty 
space occupied by variable quantities of atomic matter. This ‘proof’ is neither more 
nor less than the observation that such qualities as the mass or hardness of bodies can 
be envisaged as varying not by virtue of their containing different quantities of 
matter, but by virtue of different intensities of sensation that we perceive within the 
forms of pure intuition. Kant thus ascribes differences in bodily mass or hardness not 
to varying atomic density but to different intensities of sensation experienced within 
the schematised sensorium of space and time. No matter how small they are, the weak 
sensations fill the volume of space just as completely as the more intense ones, 
obviating the need to posit the existence of atoms in empty space (A 173-76/B 215-
17). 
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Kant is understandably defensive about the status of this proof, appearing to 
acknowledge that his explanation of how bodies differ in their specific gravity might 
not displace the atomic model. Nonetheless, he claims that it does establish ‘from a 
principle of pure understanding, that the nature of our perceptions makes such a way 
of explaining possible, and that people are wrong when they assume that the real 
[component] of appearance is the same in degree and differs only in aggregation and 
the extensive magnitude thereof’ (A 175/B 216). The only reason that people might 
want this kind of alternative to the explanation offered by the natural scientists is, of 
course, that they are committed to Kant’s spiritual conception of reality, whereby 
reality is understood as the degree of intensity of sensation that a pure intellect 
encounters in its spatio-temporal sensorium. When Kant insists that the qualities of 
things — their mass, hardness, temperature etc — cannot be fundamentally 
determined on the basis of experiments assuming a self-subsistent material (atomic) 
reality, that is because his spiritual analogisation of experience requires that the 
reality of phenomena be an effect of the schematisation of our perception of them, as 
intensive magnitude.  
With the third set of schemata — those of relation that Kant calls the analogies 
of experience — we pass from the ‘mathematical’ to ‘dynamical’ schemata. Whereas 
the former are concerned with the synthesis of homogenous presentations into 
appearances, the latter pertain to temporal relations between different objects of 
appearance in the domain of possible empirical experience. Nonetheless, in being 
forms through which the transcendental imagination figuralises or schematises the 
transcendental subject’s purely intellectual synthesis of cognitions, the analogies of 
experience have the same role in analogising experience as do the axioms of intuition 
and anticipations of perception. Kant thus treats the three relational schema — 
between substance and accident, cause and thing caused, and among substances in 
‘community’ — as temporal analogues for timeless relations between cognitions 
established by the subject of apperception as a priori rules of understanding: ‘The 
general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in 
regard to all possible empirical consciousness (i.e., perception) at every time; and 
since this unity underlies [empirical consciousness] a priori, the principle rests on the 
synthetic unity of all appearances as regards their relation in time’ (A 177/B 220). 
The temporal relations contained in the analogies of experience must thus 
operate on both sides of Kant’s transcendental schematism. They must be that which 
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the unification of the mind in apperception or self-consciousness spontaneously 
produces, and that which this pure act of intellection receives from the sensibility as 
the condition of its ‘objective reality’. Again, the point of the exercise is to permit the 
philosopher to suspend the ostensibly real relations between self-subsistent things in 
‘absolute’ time. This allows him to treat them instead as schematisations of the pure 
understanding’s synthesising of categorial relations, from which time itself emerges 
as the form in which these relations appear to our sensibility: ‘Hence these principles 
will entitle us to assemble appearances only by an analogy with the logical and 
universal unity of concepts’; although here the concepts or categories are to 
apprehended only in their schematised form as rules for temporal relations between 
appearances (A 181/B 224). 
In an especially recondite discussion — so recondite perhaps that it renders all 
expositions of it provisional — Kant presents the notion of ‘substance in appearance’ 
(or phenomenal substance) as the temporal analogue of the eternal or ‘the permanent’ 
Phenomenal substance is thus presumably the experiential analogue of the timeless 
self-intelligising of the subject of apperception that produces time itself. Time as such 
is the enduring or the permanent against which sequentiality and simultaneity can 
arise as determinations or modes of time. But as the condition of all perceptions and 
appearances, time itself cannot be perceived, and for this reason the imagination 
supplies it with the analogue of phenomenal substance. As the permanent substratum 
within the domain of temporal appearance, in relation to which all the ways in which 
objects exist (as ‘accidents’ or determinations) may be regarded as mutations or 
changes, substance is the analogue of time as such, in relation to which the time 
relations of experience are determinations: ‘Hence the permanent in relation to which 
all time relations of appearances can alone be determined is substance in appearance, 
i.e., the real of appearance that as substrate of all variation remains always the same’ 
(A 182/B 225).  
In early forms of university metaphysics substances are eternal as they are that in 
which God timelessly intelligises the pure forms of things whose determinations or 
‘accidents’ are the mutable appearances of these eternal things in the temporal world. 
With the notion of phenomenal substance, Kant transfers the idea of the everlasting or 
the eternal to the temporal world of appearances itself, as its substratum — time itself 
— such that all change may be regarded as modes or determinations of a permanent 
phenomenal substance. Regardless of its recondite character, Kant clearly regards the 
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substance schemata as important for combating another scientific (and theological) 
doctrine: namely, that the world had a beginning in time. This doctrine is ruled out 
because it presumes an empty time in which substance could come into existence as a 
change. On Kant’s view, though, because change in time is a determination or mode 
of substance, which is the form of time itself, then substance must have always 
existed. ‘Empty time’ — that is a time in which nothing has yet happened — is thus 
not a possible object of experience for human beings. This means that the world of 
phenomenal substances underpinning appearances could not have begun to exist in 
time, as a self-subsisting thing and must be eternal (A 188-89/B 231-32). In this way, 
Kant can continue to treat (phenomenal) substances as the analogical form of the 
presence of the eternal in time. In so doing he spiritually distinguishes substances 
from material bodies as occurrences within time, treating substances in effect as 
objects of contemplation rather than explanation, even if this requires denying that the 
world (as object of experience) could have had a beginning in time. 
Kant formulates the principle of the second of his relational analogies of 
experience — causality — as: ‘All changes occur according to the law of the 
connection of cause and effect’ (B 232). The key to understanding Kant’s account of 
the schema of causality is that it is his means of rebutting the scientific view of 
causality. If the scientific concept derived is derived from the repeated empirical 
observation of the correlation between successive events, then Kant’s claim is that 
this empirical observation of temporal succession is itself the product of the a priori 
schema or ‘rule’ of causality. The character of Kant’s ‘proof’ of this principle is set 
by his opening claim that the succession of events given to us empirically is incapable 
of revealing causal relations. Here Kant both draws on Hume’s skeptical attack on 
empirical causality but transforms it fundamentally, by arguing that the (subjective) 
imagination only presents mutable temporal sequences of states without being able to 
show that one state necessarily follows from a preceding one: ‘But imagination can 
link those two states in two ways, so that either the one or the other state precedes in 
time. For time cannot in itself be perceived, and what precedes or follows cannot be 
determined by reference to it in the object — empirically, as it were’ (B 233). 
In a bravura move, Kant then inverts the intent of Hume’s skepticism by arguing 
that the fact that we actually do experience events following each other in strict 
temporal succession must be the result of an a priori rule of the understanding that 
orders them in this way. This is because we supposedly ‘know’ that in the multiplicity 
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of presentations given by the imagination to our inner sense, events are not 
identifiable as successive at all: ‘Therefore experience itself — i.e., empirical 
cognition of appearances — is possible only inasmuch as we subject the succession of 
appearances, hence all change, to the law of causality. Hence appearances in 
themselves, taken as objects of experience are possible only in accordance with this 
law’ (B 234). 
This ‘deduction’ of the a priori rule or schema of causality renders it necessary, 
as it can be presented as that which we must presuppose if we are to make sense of 
the fact that our experience is ordered such that one event is always succeeded by 
another. Kant thus presents the schema or rule of causality as one that ‘compels’ us to 
perform a particular a priori successive ordering between objects of appearance, 
similar to the manner in which the synthetic a priori rules of geometry compel us to 
synthesise a spatial appearance: 
Hence we must show, in the example [of an event], that even in 
experience we never attribute succession (in the case of an event — where 
something occurs that was not there before) to the object and we never 
distinguish this succession from the subjective one in our apprehension, 
except when there lies at the basis a rule that compels us to observe this 
order of perceptions rather than some other order; indeed, we must show 
that this compulsion is what in fact makes the presentation of a succession 
in the object possible in the first place. (A 196-97/B 241-42) 
The empirical experience of causal relations in time is thus treated not as a self-
subsistent observable reality but as a ‘monogram’ or analogy for the ordering of 
objects of appearance a priori by the pure understanding. In this way, the philosopher 
comes to treat his experience of causal relations as an analogue of his own 
transcendental ordering of relations between appearances that gives the world its 
causal order. 
The object of this spiritual exercise is to ensure that causality will not be viewed 
as a mechanical relation between objects taking place in (‘empty’) time, but as an a 
priori schema that establishes the successivity of time (or the ‘inner sense’) itself (A 
199-200/B 244-45). This means that the empirical experience of causally related 
events in temporal succession is the form in which the empirical subject apprehends, 
in its ‘time-sensing’ sensibility, the timeless ordering of presentations that it performs 
as transcendental subject of apperception. In other words, Kant’s proof of the a priori 
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nature of causality should be understood as a philosophical transposition of a spiritual 
exercise and experience. This is one in which the transcendental subject encounters its 
spontaneous ordering of consciousness through a sensibility that schematises this 
ordering temporally, here in the form of strict temporal succession. This is what is 
entailed in treating causality as a ‘necessary law of our sensibility’ (A 199/B 244). 
It should already be clear, though, that the supposedly a priori-schematic 
character of causality cannot be proved philosophically in the way that Kant purports; 
that is, by showing that the schema is necessary a priori in order to establish 
successivity within the a-successive temporality of the imagination. Far from having a 
‘commonsense’ experience of a-successive events, we normally view them as 
causally related; unless, that is, we engage in the self-transformative exercise of 
skeptically suspending such relations with a view to treating the multiplicity of 
sensory appearances as ‘rhapsodic’. In other words, we do not view events as a-
successive in the way that Kant’s philosophical argument requires except as part of 
the spiritual exercise in which we convert experience into an analogical ‘occasion’ for 
deciphering our (hidden) transcendental ordering of it. Outside of this spiritual 
exercise — which is designed to forestall the Newtonian view of the universe as a 
world of self-subsisting objects interacting according to empirical laws inside 
‘absolute’ time and space — there is nothing to stop us from viewing causal relations 
in the way that Newton does. 
We gain a further insight into the form of spirituality that informs Kant’s 
analogisation of experience in his third and final analogy of relation, the schema of 
‘community’. Kant calls this ‘the principle of simultaneity according to the law of 
interaction or community’ (B 257). What he has in view is the idea that the 
simultaneous existence of things or substances is only possible on the a priori basis 
that they stand in the special relation of community to each other. Once again Kant 
moves to prove this principle via a form of transcendental deduction. What is required 
for the cognition of the simultaneity of two things is that their perceptions can 
succeed each other reciprocally (rather than in irreversible succession) as, for 
example, when I switch back and forth between perceiving the moon and the earth, 
indicating that they exist at the same time, rather than successively. As with the 
perception of successive perception, so too with reciprocal perception, Kant insists 
that this relation cannot be empirically perceived, as the imagination presents 
perceptions such that when one is present the other is absent, without informing us 
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that this oscillation signifies simultaneous presence (B 257-58). Only through a 
schematisation of the a priori understanding, then, can we have a reciprocal 
perception of objects and hence cognise their simultaneous existence. 
The schematisation of community of substances that Kant now introduces, 
however, is a truly remarkable one. He stipulates that the condition of us having 
reciprocal perceptions of substances is that their ‘determinations’ or ways of 
appearing are themselves reciprocally related, which in turn means that these 
substances must stand in relations of mutual influence or reciprocal interaction: 
But the relation of substances wherein the one substance contains 
determinations [ways of appearing IH] whose basis is contained in the 
other substance is the relation of influence; and if this latter thing 
reciprocally contains the basis of the determinations in the former thing, 
then the relation is that of community or interaction. Therefore the 
simultaneity of substances in space cannot be cognised in experience 
except under the presupposition that they interact with one another. Hence 
this interaction is also the condition for the possibilities of things 
themselves as objects of experience. (B 257-58) 
Kant’s notion of communio or commercium is an analogue of the metaphysical 
conception of the community of spiritual beings or substances, understood as standing 
in immediate reciprocal relations of influence by virtue of their capacity to share in 
each other’s perceptions. In a curious set of formulations, Kant argues that it is only 
the dynamic community of ‘material’ substances — forming a plenum and sharing 
each other’s modes of appearances analogous to the way in which spiritual beings 
share their perceptions — that permits the empirical cognition of ‘locational 
community’. This means that our perception of different things simultaneously is an 
effect of the fact that we are linked to the totality of things via the community of 
substances that joins everything in the universe through reciprocal influence. 
According to Kant, experience teaches us ‘that only the continuous influences in all 
positions of space can lead our sense from one object to another’, and ‘that the light 
playing between our eye and the celestial bodies can bring about an indirect 
community between us and them and can thereby prove their simultaneity’ (A 213/B 
260). 
This means that empty space posited by the ‘natural scientists’ — the space in 
which objects exist as self-subsistent bodies whose simultaneity is measured by 
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‘absolute’ time — is not a possible object of experience for us; for space itself is only 
the empirical schema through which we receive the appearances transmitted through 
the reciprocating plenum of intelligible substances. Once again, space is presented as 
the form in which we sense our place in the community of intellectual substances 
whose interaction gives rise to the world of simultaneous appearances, such that were 
space to be a void so too would our capacity for experience (A 213-14/B 260-61). 
Similarly, the simultaneous co-existence of substances on this view is not something 
that can be measured against (absolute) time, ‘because absolute time is not an object 
of perception to which appearances could be held up’ (A 215/B 262). Rather, 
reciprocal coexistence is what makes temporal simultaneity possible, as the sensible 
analogue of pure reciprocal influence within the plenum of intelligible substances. 
Kant thus presents the community of simultaneous appearances as a temporal 
analogue for the timeless community of intelligible things or substances. This 
community is not something that the subject can cognise on the basis of experience 
— as it makes experience possible — but is something in which the subject 
‘participates’ as one of the intelligible substances (A 214-15/B 261-62). The 
empirical subject’s experience of locational or spatial community should thus be 
treated as the empirical form in which the transcendental subject of apperception 
encounters the dynamic community of substances in which it participates 
intellectually. We can thus again conclude that this schematisation of intellection, via 
the figure of community, can only be regarded as the philosophical transposition of a 
particular spiritual exercise: that in which the subject experiences its empirical 
participation in spatio-temporal experience as the analogue of its intellectual 




The Therapeutic Harmonisation of Divided Reason 
 
The spiritual doctrine and exercises underlying the Transcendental Analytic — 
the first half of the Critique of Pure Reason whose redescription we have now 
completed — are particularly demanding on Kant’s philosophical reader. In order to 
execute the transformation of outlook required for conversion to transcendental 
idealism, they require the philosopher to adopt a highly recondite comportment 
towards himself and the ‘world’. He must come to view his own empirical experience 
as if it were the form in which objects intelligised by himself as a pure ‘intelligence’ 
(the transcendental subject of apperception) were encountered by him (as phenomenal 
subject) analogically in the transcendental schemata of space and time, where the 
‘intelligibles’ are at once ‘realised and limited’ in sensibility. The philosopher must 
thus be able to restrict concepts to possible objects of experience given in sensible 
intuition, while simultaneously treating these objects as mere appearances made 
possible by pure conceptual intellection. To do this he must be able view himself as 
containing the sensibly restricted understanding of the empirical subject (homo 
phenenomenon) and the non-sensible intellection (intellectual intuition) of a pure 
intelligence free of all sensibility (homo noumenon). This requires the Kantian 
philosopher to enter into a highly ambivalent relation towards himself as subject of 
knowledge. In one regard, he must forbid himself access to the noumenal objects of 
intellectual intuition as these lie beyond human cognition; in a second regard, though, 
he must accede to such objects non-cognitively, for their intellection is what makes 
human cognition possible. Kant’s ‘two outlooks’ are not thus ‘two viewpoints’ 
adopted with regard to (supposedly) spatio-temporal things in themselves, but two 
ways of acceding to truth. 
The ambivalence of generated by containing two ways of acceding to truth 
within a single philosophical persona is reflected in Kant’s discussion of noumena 
and phenomena in the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic. Kant thus argues that: 
‘If by merely intelligible objects we mean those things that are thought through pure 
categories, without any schema of sensibility, then such objects are impossible’, as 
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without sensible intuition they cannot be connected to possible objects. At the same 
time, however, Kant insists that ‘if … by merely intelligible objects we mean merely 
objects of a nonsensible intuition — objects for which, to be sure, our categories do 
not hold and of which therefore we can never have any cognition at all (neither 
intuition nor concept) — then noumena in this merely negative signification must 
indeed be admitted’. They must be admitted because it is only the non-impossibility 
of pure objects of intellection that allows us to restrict empirical sensible intuition to 
the domain of appearances, and thereby leave ‘room for some other kind of intuition 
and therefore for things as objects of it’. At the same time, this nonsensible 
intellection and its objects must not themselves be treated as cognition, only as 
something to be thought ‘problematically’, as a thought that we must entertain in 
order to pose the limit of empirical knowledge as a problem (A 286-87/B 342-43). 
The second half of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Dialectic, 
may be regarded as a single extended spiritual exercise — albeit containing numerous 
self-transformative acts — designed to form a highly distinctive and recondite 
philosophical comportment. This is the comportment of a philosopher who will 
restrict metaphysical concepts to the domain of possible experience while 
simultaneously confining empirical experience to the domain of appearance, through 
the ‘thinking’ pure metaphysical concepts. The formation of this inner deportment — 
which constitutes the persona of the critical philosopher — is the culminating act of 
self-transformation that must be performed by the committed reader of the Critique. It 
holds the key to both the inner transfiguration of the philosopher, and the outer 
resolution of cultural crisis that the work promised to readers like Reinhold. 
Considering the extraordinary self-transformative effort involved in this inner 
balancing of ‘reason’, it is highly significant that Kant effects the transition to the 
Transcendental Dialectic in the therapeutic register, through the philosopher’s 
encounter with what Kant calls unavoidable ‘illusions of reason’. Kant presents these 
as tormenting reason from within and dividing it against itself, thereby setting the 
scene for acts of self-transformation in which the philosopher must neutralise these 
illusions and restore the unity of reason. These illusions are none other than those that 
arise when the philosopher fails to harmonise the transcendental and empirical uses of 
reason by overstepping their reciprocal borders. This occurs either when philosophers 
purport to cognise things through pure intellection independently of sensible intuition, 
thereby falling into intellectualism; or when they treat sensible knowledge as if it 
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gave access to real things (‘in themselves’), thereby falling into empiricism by 
forgetting that empirical experience is an only an appearance arising from the 
schematisation of pure intellection (A 293-96/B 349-52). 
At the same time, however, Kant also transposes this therapeutic exercise into 
the register of academic philosophy and argumentation. He does this by presenting 
the illusions of reason as if they arose from mistakes in philosophical reasoning — as 
products of ‘dialectical syllogisms’ or pseudo-reasoning — hence as capable of 
finding a resolution simply through the correction of philosophical error (A 306-10/B 
362-67). The fact that the spiritual exercise persists inside the philosophical 
exposition, however, is shown by the persistence of transcendental illusion itself, 
which Kant insists cannot be dispelled by philosophical clarification: 
Hence the transcendental dialectic will settle for uncovering the illusion 
of transcendental judgments, and for simultaneously keeping it from 
deceiving us. But that the illusion should even vanish as well (as does 
logical illusion) and cease to be an illusion — this the transcendental 
dialectic can never accomplish. For here we are dealing with a natural 
and unavoidable illusion that itself rests on subjective principles and 
foists them on us as objective ones, whereas a logical dialectic in 
resolving fallacious inferences deals only with a mistake in the 
compliance with principles … Hence there is a natural and unavoidable 
dialectic of pure reason. … It is … a dialectic that attaches to human 
reason unpreventably and that, even after we have uncovered this 
deception, still will not stop hoodwinking and thrusting reason incessantly 
into momentary aberrations that always need to be removed. (A 297-98/B 
354-55). 
The Transcendental Dialectic thus presents us with a prime exemplification of a 
discursive strategy that we have argued lies at the heart of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. This is the strategy in which a spiritual exercise designed to form a subject 
capable of acceding to truth, is presented as a philosophical argument through which a 
subject who is already truth-capable uncovers the contingent errors in reasoning that 
happen to be blocking his access to truth. 
It is this hybrid projection of spiritual self-transformation into philosophical 
argumentation that has made the Transcendental Dialectic such a difficult object for 
Kant commentators. Those commentators who have focused on the Dialectic’s 
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philosophical side have treated the illusions of reason as arising from contingent 
errors in argumentation.45 They have thus found it difficult to understand why Kant 
views these illusions and errors as ‘unavoidable’ — as illusions that will continue to 
torment the philosopher even after he has seen through them — and have tended to 
minimise this them, anachronistically, and at great cost to understanding Kant’s 
enterprise. Other commentators, taking Kant at his hybrid word, have accepted that 
the illusions of reason are indeed inevitable and threaten the unity of reason.46 In 
doing so, however, they have played the role of committed readers, engaging in the 
exercise of self-harmonisation, and cultivating for themselves the persona of the 
critical philosopher. What neither group has been able to do — the former being too 
detached from it, the latter too close — is to grasp the exercise in self-transformation 
that informs Kant’s philosophical discourse and treat it as an object of historical 
description. 
What makes Kant’s illusions of reason unavoidable is that, rather than being 
mistakes in reasoning per se, they are supposed to represent a condition of the 
subject’s being. This condition — in which the subject (the philosopher) treats his 
power of pure intellection as if it were cognitive, or treats his empirical knowledge as 
if it were of real things — is regarded as arising by from the powers of intellection 
and sensibility themselves. This is why the illusions are incapable of being dispelled 
through philosophical clarification. It is also why it is not error that constitutes the 
antonym for truth in the Dialectic, but illusion. Despite his presentation of the 
illusions in terms of erroneous arguments, it is clear that Kant regards their purgation 
as requiring a fundamental act of inner self-transformation. It is not a matter of the 
philosopher detecting error in argument and thereby grasping the truth. Rather, he 
must first make himself capable of acceding to truth by learning how to exercise his 
power of pure intellection non-cognitively — for the thinking of pure ‘ideas of 
reason’ — while simultaneously disqualifying his sensible cognition from knowledge 
of real things. It should be equally clear by now that the so-called division of reason is 
                                                
45  See, in particular, Jonathon Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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46  See, for examples, Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Victoria S. Wike, Kant’s 
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not something inherent to human reason as such, whatever that might be. It is, rather, 
something that Kant ascribes to what he calls ‘human reason’ — that is, the capacity 
for transcendental categorial self-consciousness as this is unfolded in and limited by 
sensible intuition — as a device for staging the exercise in self-clarification and self-
unification that is executed in the Dialectic. 
We have already argued that Kant’s conception of human reason is wholly 
doctrinal and historical, rooted in the long tradition of Western metaphysical 
spirituality. It is the seed-bed for a wide array of acts of inner self-transformation, 
including the acts of transcendental anamnesis, schematisation of intellection, and 
analogisation of empirical experience that we have just discussed. The motivation for 
such acts also comes from the domain of philosophical spirituality. In inducting 
apprentice philosophers across the threshold of self-transformation, this spirituality 
incites the desire for a way of knowing the truth that transfigures and ennobles the 
one who accedes to it. It also engenders disgust for ways of knowledge or personae 
that do not accede to truth in this way; for the latter are not just philosophically 
erroneous but disfigure and degrade the human soul, and are thus ‘contemptible’ in 
Kant’s eyes.47 
The cultural correlates for the illusions of reason are supposed to be entire 
philosophical or scientific movements, which Kant portrays as failing to achieve the 
dual mode of acceding to truth required by critical philosophy. Kant thus 
characterises the ‘intellectualist philosophers’ (Leibniz and Wolff) as misusing 
transcendental intellection by treating it as a source of human cognition, while he 
views the ‘empirical minds’ (Locke and Newton) as mistaking empirical knowledge 
of appearances for knowledge of real things in themselves. By transposing the 
spiritual exercise in self-clarification and self-unification into the register of 
philosophical argument Kant thus does something more than supply the philosopher 
with a pathway into acts of inner self-transformation. He also supplies a philosophic-
historical template through which philosophical and scientific movements can be read 
as if they represented corporate failures to follow this pathway, thereby eliding their 
actual historical standing as autonomous rivals or alternatives to transcendental 
philosophy. 
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The device that Kant employs to transpose the self-transformative act into the 
register of philosophical discourse is the notion that all those pursuing transcendental 
ideas in the domains of psychology, cosmology, and theology share a common error. 
This is the error of attempting to pursue the chain of conditions — through which 
(according to Kant’s doctrine) the conditioned appearance is known — right up to the 
absolute totality of such conditions, which must of course be unconditioned and thus 
amount to knowledge of the thing in itself:  
Now the transcendental concept of reason concerns only the absolute 
totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never ends except at what is 
unconditioned absolutely, i.e., in every reference. For pure reason leaves 
everything else to understanding, [the power] which initially refers to 
objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. Pure 
reason reserves for itself solely the absolute totality in the use of the 
concepts of the understanding, and seeks to take the synthetic unity 
thought in the category up to the absolutely unconditioned. (A 326/B 382-
83). 
Our contention that here Kant is applying a philosophical template to a spiritual 
act receives significant confirmation from the fact that this template — the ‘demand 
of reason for the unconditioned’ — does not fit the transcendental illusions of 
psychology.48 We shall see that Kant locates their source elsewhere, in the reification 
or ‘subreption’ of the transcendental ‘thinking I’. More significantly, though, this 
contention finds support in the fact that, despite diagnosing a common philosophical 
error underpinning the three kinds of transcendental illusion, Kant does not proceed to 
erase this supposed error. On the contrary, he argues that ascent from the conditioned 
objects of the understanding to the unconditioned ‘pure concepts of reason’ or 
‘transcendental ideas’ is not to be disparaged or extirpated, as it shows the vital 
function of reason in impelling the empirical uses of the understanding to ever higher 
forms. It thereby supplies the ‘regulative idea’ of the unity of reason — or the 
‘project’ to unify reason — which would otherwise remain a congeries of 
autonomous empirical sciences: ‘For even if no object can be determined by [the 
transcendental concepts of reason], they can yet basically — and unnoticed — serve 
the understanding for its extensive and accordant use’. Moreover, in a pregnant 
                                                
48  As is observed by Strawson, Bounds of Sense, pp. 159-60. 
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comment, Kant observes that in reminding us of the possibility of objects not 
restricted to empirical appearances and natural causality, the transcendental ideas 
‘make possible a transition from the concepts of nature to the practical concepts and 
in this way provide for the moral ideas themselves support and coherence with 
reason’s speculative cognitions’ (A 329/B 385-86). At the same time, it must not be 
imagined that this ascent ever cognitively reaches the ‘absolutely unconditioned’ — 
the thing in itself — for what that might be is unknown to a being whose cognitions 
are restricted to objects of sensible intuition. In other words, Kant’s characterisation 
of the transcendental ideas of reason is a philosophical transposition of the exercise in 
which the philosopher must affirm his own power of pure intellection while 
simultaneously acceding to it in a non-cognitive manner, as an inspirational device for 
regulating the use of his empirical understanding. This is indeed a key pointer to the 
manner in which Kant will formulate and resolve the illusions of reason in the 
Dialectic.  
According to Kant there are just three forms into which those pursuing pure 
reason have sought to pass beyond the chain of conditions and arrive at the absolutely 
unconditioned:  
Hence all transcendental ideas can presumably be brought under three 
classes, of which the first contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of 
the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of 
conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the condition of 
all objects of thought as such. … Hence pure reason provides us with the 
idea for a transcendental psychology (psychologia rationalis); for a 
transcendental cosmology (cosmologia rationalis); finally, also, for a 
transcendental theology (theologia transcendentalis). (A 334/B 391)  
Kant’s claim is thus that each of the three metaphysical disciplines just mentioned is 
grounded in a misuse of pure reason. Such are psychology’s ‘paralogisms of pure 
reason’, cosmology’s ‘antinomies of pure reason’, and theology’s use of 
ontotheological argument. It is from this triple misuse that illusions of reason 
pertaining to the soul, the world, and God have arisen, which it is the task of the 
Dialectic to purge or neutralise, through a ‘cathartic’ exercise that arrives at the 
proper non-cognitive use of transcendental ideas. 
This claim of course never approaches the borders of plausibility, as rational 
psychology, cosmology, and theology are not the three essential forms in which 
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transcendental reason overreaches itself. They are or were, rather, the three historical 
sub-disciplines of German university metaphysics, and the three standard 
subdivisions of the second part (‘Special Metaphysics’) of metaphysics text-books.49 
Moreover, those early modern metaphysicians who provided accounts of ‘separated 
souls’, spiritual community, and the Supreme Being would not have recognised their 
enterprise as entailing the confusion of subjective conditions of knowledge with 
‘things in themselves’, as they either did not use these philosophical concepts, or else 
did so in a manner quite unlike Kant.50 Kant also seeks to include various modern 
philosophies in his net, including Descartes’ psychology, Newton’s cosmology, and 
Leibniz’s ontotheology: all of which are supposedly prey either to the improper 
cognitive use of the transcendental ideas, or to the acceptance of ‘subjective’ 
empirical knowledge as knowledge of the thing in itself. But this is simply Kant’s 
strategy for incorporating a whole array of philosophical and scientific movements 
within his spiritual exercise, as corporate ciphers for the illusions that the critical 
philosopher must purge in the therapeutic unification of reason. In discussing each of 
Kant’s philosophical clarifications of the three so-called pseudo-rational misuses of 
pure reason, then, our task will be recover and describe its role in this act of 
therapeutic self-transformation. 
4.1 The Self-Clarification of the Soul 
The setting for Kant’s discussion of rational psychology comes in part from the 
tradition of Christian metaphysical pneumatology. This was a rich academic genre in 
which the doctrine of the soul as an immaterial or intellectual substance formed the 
basis for speculation regarding its ‘simplicity’ — its lack of material composition and 
organs — hence its transcendental freedom, its incorruptibility or immortality, and its 
                                                
49  For a typical and influential example, see Christoph Scheibler, Opus 
metaphysicum, duobus libris universum hujus scientiae systema comprehendens 
(Giessen: Hampel, 1617), bk. II, chs. 3, 4, and 5. 
50  For a helpful overview of the forms of reasoning that were used in early 
modern Lutheran academic metaphysics, see Walter Sparn, ‘Die Schulphilosophie in 
den lutherischen Territorien’, in H. Holzhey and W. Schmidt-Biggemann (eds.), Die 
Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, Band 4: Das heilige Römische Reich deutscher 
Nation, Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa (Basle: Schwabe, 2001), pp. 475-97.  
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singularity or identity.51 Kant’s discussion is also informed by an array of modern 
philosophers — principally Descartes, Leibniz, and Malebranche — who, having 
been exposed to post-Galielean conceptions of space and matter, proposed various 
systems for integrating the new notion of ‘extended substance’ with the earlier 
metaphysics of intellectual or ‘thinking’ substance, thereby reconciling physics and 
pneumatology.52 Kant convinced himself that his modified metaphysics of experience 
— according to which the transcendental subject of apperception intelligises 
intelligibles that the empirical subject of experience encounters in the schematised 
forms of space and time as appearances — allowed him to destroy this entire field 
(both the pneumatologists and the moderns) and to rebuild it on a new ‘critical’ basis. 
His discussion of the ‘paralogisms of pure reason’ is where this takes place. 
Kant argues that the four paralogisms or pseudo-rational doctrines of rational 
psychology arise from the ascription of a particular set of properties to the soul: 
namely, that it is a substance, is simple or non-composite, is identical across time, and 
stands in relation to real or ideal bodies in space. From this arises the pneumatological 
doctrines that the soul is (substantially) permanent; incorruptible because of its 
simplicity; forms the basis of personality because of its temporal self-identity; and 
offers a foundation for spirituality through its relation to material bodies in space (A 
344-45/B 402-3). Kant’s procedure is to subject these doctrines to a common analysis 
of their supposedly flawed reasoning, with a view to collapsing rational psychology 
as a putative science of pure reason altogether. Each of the paralogisms, Kant argues, 
is based on a ‘thinkable’ feature of the operation of the transcendental subject of 
apperception, or the ‘I think’ that is supposed to accompany all intellectual acts. The 
paralogisms and illusions of pneumatology when knowledge of these acts, which 
should be acceded to only through transcendental self-reflection (transcendental 
anamnesis), is wrongly presented as if it were cognitive knowledge of the soul as a 
pseudo-empirical object, ‘thinking being’: 
                                                
51  A characteristic example of Lutheran pneumatology is Johannes Scharf, 
Pneumatica seu Pneumatalogia (Wittenberg, 1629). For a helpful orientation, see 
Sparn, ‘Die Schulphilosophie in den lutherischen Territorien’, pp. 487-93. 
52  On the moderns, see Daniel Garber, ‘Soul and Mind: Life and Thought in the 
Seventeenth Century’, in D. Garber and M. Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 
759-95.  
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Now through no outer experience, but solely through self-consciousness, 
can I have the least presentation of a thinking being. Hence objects of that 
sort are nothing more than the transfer of this consciousness of mine to 
other things, which thereby alone are presented as thinking beings. But in 
this process the proposition I think is taken only problematically. I.e., it is 
not taken insofar as it may contain a perception of an existent (the 
Cartesian cogito, ergo sum); the proposition is taken rather, in terms of its 
mere possibility, in order to see what properties may from so simple a 
proposition flow to its subject (whether or not such a subject exists). (A 
347/B 405). 
Here we can see both how Kant proposes to destroy the doctrines of rational 
psychology, each of which will be treated as an illegitimate ‘cognitive’ reification of 
transcendental self-consciousness. We can also see, though, how he will rescue 
‘critical’ simulacra of these doctrines, in the problematic register of ‘mere possibility’, 
which turns out to crucial for Kant’s own version of spirituality. 
In the ‘A’ version, Kant purports to destroy the doctrines associated with the first 
three paralogisms very expeditiously. He argues that the three doctrines — that the 
soul is a substance, simple and incorruptible, and forms the basis of personal identity 
— are the product of a faulty or dialectical syllogism. In this syllogism, a thinkable 
feature of the transcendental subject of apperception, introduced in the major premise, 
is then treated as a pseudo-empirical object in the minor premise, leading to the 
reified psychological doctrine of the conclusion. From the fact that the ‘thinking I’ 
cannot be an accident or predicate for any other subject, the first paralogism thus 
concludes that the soul must be an enduring substance. This is mistaken, Kant argues, 
because the enduring character of the transcendental subject refers only to the fact 
that the ‘I think’ accompanies all of my cognitive acts. This means that it pertains 
only to the form of transcendental self-consciousness, while substance (in Kant’s 
analysis) is an empirical schemata for establishing an ‘image’ of a permanent 
substratum underpinning empirical appearances (A 348-51). Similarly, with regards 
to the second paralogism, it is illegitimate to conclude that the soul is simple or non-
composite (hence incorruptible). Simplicity, Kant argues, refers not to the property of 
a substance, but only to the fact that there cannot be a plurality of agents for my 
thinking. Again, on Kant’s doctrine, all of my thinking is characterised by the 
presence of a unitary and unifying ‘I think’ as the form in which I become conscious 
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of myself as the apperceptive synthetic source of all my presentations and cognitions 
(A 351-61). The pattern is then repeated for the third paralogism. In attempting to 
treat the soul as the condition for personal identity across different times, this 
paralogism reifies the persistence of the ‘I think’ in all of my cognitions. But the ‘I 
think’ does not occur across empirically different times, not least because it is 
supposed to be the transcendental condition of empirically successive time (A 361-
66). 
In purporting to destroy the paralogisms of early modern pneumatology, 
however, Kant’s demonstration encounters the difficulty that this pneumatology was 
based in a different metaphysical doctrine, giving rise to a different way of acceding 
to truth, to that presumed by his demonstration. The pneumatology elaborated by a 
representative seventeenth-century metaphysician such as Christoph Scheibler is 
based on a modified Aristotelian metaphysics. Here the doctrine of ‘immaterial 
substance’ — that is, a simple spiritual substance not composed of form and matter — 
forms the basis of a wide array of metaphysical and theological doctrines, including 
the soul’s incorruptibility, but also its capacity to engage in a transfigurative 
participation in God’s thinking of the pure forms of things, as the highest kind of 
metaphysical truth.53 Scheibler’s notion of the soul as a simple, intellectual, 
immaterial substance through which man accedes to divine truth, is not a reification 
of Kant’s ‘I’ of transcendental self-consciousness, because in Scheibler’s metaphysics 
it is God or the divine mind and not the transcendental subject who intelligises the 
pure concepts of things. Further, Scheibler’s way of thinking about the soul is not 
based on a syllogistic ‘subreption’ — or deceptive substitution — in which a quasi-
empirical object is substituted for a purely transcendental reflection. Rather it takes 
place as a practice of reflection that he calls ‘metaphysical abstraction’. Here, by 
abstracting from his own sensuously embodied perceptions, the philosopher realises 
and perfects his own intellectual soul, and in so doing undergoes a transfigurative 
participation in divine intellection.54 
In other words, Scheibler’s way of acceding to knowledge of the immaterial 
substance of the soul — through a process of abstraction by which his own soul 
realises its immateriality — is not the result of a paralogistic reification of the 
transcendental ‘I think’. It simply represents a different program of spiritual 
                                                
53  Scheibler, Opus metaphysicum, bk. II, ch. 5. 
54  Ibid., bk. I, ch 1, pp. 1-24; bk. II, ch. 3, pp. 460-63 
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transfiguration or Platonic ēros — and hence a different way of acceding to truth — 
to that found in Kant’s ‘critical’ spirituality. We have of course already encountered 
aspects of this conception of pure intellection and the conditions of man’s 
participation in it, in Kant’s own metaphysics of experience, which contains its own 
version of the transfigurative ascent to transcendental thinking. Kant’s transcendental 
intellect is of course located in the human being not God. When viewed as the support 
for this act of self-transformation, however, the immanent transposition of the divine 
intellect makes less difference to metaphysics that it first appears. 
Consider, in this regard, Kant’s observations on bodily complexity and spiritual 
simplicity in his discussion of the second paralogism. The difference between bodies 
and minds, says Kant, is only that the former are objects of the ‘outer sense’ while the 
latter belong to the ‘inner sense’. This means that neither body nor mind (qua object 
of experience) is a real thing (in itself), and that both bodies and minds must be 
regarded as schematisations of an unknown underlying intelligible object. For all we 
know, this noumenon might itself be our own thinking, which would mean that the 
differentiating attributes of bodies (composite, extended, impenetrable) and minds 
(simple, not extended, not impenetrable) might pertain only to appearances of a 
common transcendental object or noumenon: 
Nonetheless, something lies at the basis of outer appearances and affects 
our sense in such a way that this sense acquires the presentations of space, 
matter, shape, etc. And this something, considered as noumenon (or 
better, as transcendental object), might yet simultaneously also be the 
subject of our thoughts — although, because of the way in which our 
outer sense is affected by this something, we acquire no intuition of 
presentations, of the will, etc., but acquire merely intuitions of it in space 
and its determinations. … Accordingly, even if the simplicity of the soul’s 
nature is granted, such simplicity does not at all sufficiently distinguish 
the human soul from matter, with regard to matters’ substratum — if 
matter is regarded (as it ought to be) merely as appearance. (A358-9) 
All this means, though, is that Kant wishes to substitute his own metaphysical 
doctrine — according to which bodies and minds are only schematised appearances 
of transcendental intellection — for a Scheiblerian style doctrine, according to which 
they are composed of different kinds of substance. This is a clear pointer to the fact 
that Kant’s supposed destruction of traditional pneumatology — for its purported 
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reification of transcendental ‘I think’ into pseudo-cognition of the soul as a quasi-
object — is in fact a retrospective projection of his (rival) spiritual doctrine and 
regime, intended to displace an earlier form of metaphysics to which his own bears, 
nonetheless, a striking filial resemblance.  
Similar remarks apply to Kant’s treatment of the fourth paralogism, where the 
target is one of the moderns — Descartes — rather than the theological 
pneumatologists. In Kant’s view of him, Descartes attempts to establish the relation 
between spirit and body — or thinking and extended substance — by contrasting the 
certitude of the ‘I’ with the dubiety of outer appearances, thereby proving the need for 
God in harmonising mind and body. According to Kant, this is a doubly mistaken 
undertaking. On the one hand, Descartes wrongly assumes that bodies — which he 
mistakenly treats as things in themselves — give rise to doubtful appearances. Kant’s 
doctrine, though, teaches that appearances are not at all doubtful, as they indeed are 
themselves the real object of empirical experience. On the other hand, Descartes 
mistakenly argues that we can have certain knowledge of the ‘thinking I’ through the 
practice of introspection, whereas Kant’s doctrine intends that this ‘I’ given to the 
inner sense is itself only an appearance, and not in fact the ‘I think’ of the 
transcendental subject of apperception (A 370-77). Kantian minds (as inner 
appearances) and bodies (as outer appearances) are thus not linked by Descartes’ God 
or by any other harmonising agent — Leibniz’s pre-established harmony, 
Malebranche’s occasionalism — but by the cognitive structures that Kant has already 
outlined in the Transcendental Analytic: that is, by the way in which the 
transcendental schematisation of the intellect allows it to be ‘realised and limited’ in 
the intuitions of sensibility. This is because ‘the transcendental object which underlies 
outer appearances, and likewise the transcendental object which underlies inner 
intuition is in itself neither matter nor a thinking being, but is, rather, a basis — with 
which we are unacquainted — of appearances that provide us with the empirical 
concept of both the first and the second kind’ (A 379-80).  
Once again, though, Kant’s account of Descartes is simply an attempt by one 
spiritual doctrine and regimen to displace another. Descartes treatment of the 
perception of external things as dubious arises not from his assumption that they are 
(Kantian) things in themselves, but from the fact that he is engaging in a practice of 
hyperbolic doubt as in order to provide epistemological foundations for a particular 
kind of (corpscularian) natural philosophy. As Stephen Gaukroger has shown, 
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Descartes’ practice of doubt is informed not by the gap between things in themselves 
and our subjective sensing of them, but by that between a divine mind whose powers 
so radically transcend the human mind that it could change the laws of the universe 
that it wills.55 Descartes thus uses divine transcendence to program a practice of 
epistemological doubt that results in certain knowledge of the subject who doubts and 
the God whose perfection guarantees knowledge of the external world. Descartes’ 
objective is to ground his very un-Kantian natural philosophy in which phenomena do 
indeed consist in configurations of self-subsistent atoms or corpuscles. For Kant to 
argue that Descartes mistakenly reifies the transcendental ‘I think’ into an observable 
ego, thus amounts to him seeking to displace Descartes’ scientifically oriented 
epistemological metaphysics with his own theologically oriented hermeneutic 
metaphysics. Descartes does not employ the metaphysical doctrine according to 
which everything experienced is the product of an unconscious or metaconscious 
intelligence which cannot experience itself. He thus has no transcendental self-
consciousness to reify — no ‘appearance’ of the cogito to mistake for the inaccessible 
‘I think’ — which is just to say that he does not employ a metaphysical doctrine 
designed to support the exercise in transcendental anamnesis. Rather, he employs a 
metaphysical doctrine designed to support the exercise in hyperbolic doubt through 
which the thinking subject is certifies itself in doubting. Descartes thus has just as 
much philosophical right to treat outer appearances as deceptive and inner self-
perception as certain as Kant has to treat them in the opposite manner; for in both 
cases the philosophical arguments are ways of programming (different) acts of self-
transformation. 
The true character and intent of Kant’s therapy for the illusions of rational 
psychology becomes quite clear when we attend to its reflux movement — that is, its 
defence of the attributes of the soul once acceded to in the ‘critical’ register — 
because here Kant advances his own version of spirituality. In championing the 
‘negative benefit’ of his critical therapeutic, Kant thus vaunts that while rational 
psychology attempts to defeat materialism by distinguishing ‘thinking being’ from 
extended or material being, his transcendental idealism can do the job much better. 
Echoing the claim in the ‘B’ Preface that ‘solely by means of critique can we cut off, 
at the very root, materialism, fatalism, atheism, freethinking lack of faith, fanaticism, 
                                                
55  Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), pp. 309-21.  
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and superstition’, Kant claims that his doctrine goes much further in this regard than 
rational psychology. It does so by showing that matter and bodies are themselves 
mere appearances, such that ‘if I removed the thinking the subject then the whole 
corporeal world would have to go away, since this world is nothing but the 
appearance in the sensibility of, and a kind of presentations of, ourselves as subject’ 
(A 383). Further, although we can affirm nothing positively regarding the noumenal 
self or transcendental object, the fact that we can ‘think’ this transcendental idea is 
enough in itself to rescue the possibility of the soul’s pre- and post-existence of the 
corporeal world. 
According to Kant, the very fact that these questions cannot be answered 
positively on the basis of the soul’s incorruptibility as a simple substance — because 
this is not a possible object of cognition — also means that they cannot be answered 
negatively, which means that they remain thinkable possibilities. We do know, he 
argues, that the ‘thinking I’ is the transcendental basis of all cognition of the world of 
appearances, and in thus lying outside this kind of cognition, the possibility of its 
existence independent of the material body and world cannot be denied, even if this 
remains only a problematic possibility. In short, by deploying a spiritual doctrine and 
exercise in which the material world of appearances is presented as the form in which 
a pure intellect apprehends its own intellections in the schematised forms of 
sensibility, Kant defends a ‘critical’ conception of this intellect as a spiritual being or 
soul. Such is the conception according to which this intellect cannot be positively 
cognised as a soul, but in which it may be problematically conceived ‘as if’ it were a 
soul. Kant’s critical therapy for rational pneumatology is thus intended to allow 
metaphysical and spiritualist conceptions of the soul to be acceded to in the critical 
register of the ‘as if’. This turns out be pivotal to the exercise in therapeutic self-
clarification and self-unification through which the inner deportment of the critical 
philosopher is formed. 
4.2 The Harmonisation of Divided Reason 
In introducing the transcendental ideas of cosmology, Kant indicates that, unlike 
the illusion of the substantial soul in rational psychology, the cosmological illusions 
cannot be fully dispelled. This is because they arise from a way of thinking about the 
world whole through which reason suffers an inner division, falling into an 
unavoidable antithetic or antinomy. We have already seen Kant regards ‘reason’ as 
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being compelled to think illusory ideas of the world totality by the nature of human 
cognition itself; that is, by the fact that for every conditioned appearance there is a 
synthesising chain of conditions through which reason regresses, driven by the idea of 
reaching the totality of such conditions, which is the ‘unconditioned’ or the thing in 
itself. The cosmological ‘idea of reason’ is thus that if the conditioned appearance is 
given, then the complete totality of conditions, hence the absolutely unconditioned, is 
also given (A 409/B 436). Kant thus locates the genesis of the four antinomies of 
reason in a series of disputes over the nature of the cosmological thing in itself. From 
this source, he argues, arises the four antithetic viewpoints adopted with regards to 
just four cosmological questions: whether the world is bounded in space and has a 
beginning in time, or is infinite in both these regards; whether the world is composed 
of simple or indivisible parts, or is infinitely divisible; whether there is a spontaneous 
or uncaused causality in the world, or whether all events occur necessarily in 
accordance with the law of causality; finally, whether there is a necessary being, 
either outside the world or within it, or whether the world is subject to a 
thoroughgoing contingency. 
Kant’s initial presentation of the antinomy again occurs in the therapeutic 
register. As a division into which reason falls by virtue of the nature of reason itself 
— hence not as a philosophical error — the cosmological antinomies may not be 
resolved, or their illusion dispelled, through the presentation of philosophical truth. 
Rather, they are to be dealt with through the staging of a combat from which the 
(critical) philosopher himself withdraws, in order to achieve a new viewpoint once the 
contending parties have fought themselves to a standstill: ‘We, however, as impartial 
arbiters of the combat, must set aside entirely whether the cause for which the 
contestants are fighting is the good or evil one, and must let them decide their cause 
between themselves. Perhaps, after having more exhausted than harmed each other, 
they will become aware on their own of the nullity of their contest, and will part as 
good friends’ (A 423/B 451). 
This antinomic exercise, which Kant here calls the ‘skeptical method’, has a long 
history within the forms of Western philosophical spirituality. It has been used, 
particularly within the Pyrrhonian tradition, as a device for establishing the 
‘equipollence of contradictories’ (isothenia) — the balancing of mutually 
contradictory but equally compelling arguments — with a view to achieving such 
inner spiritual effects as suspension of judgment (epochē) and freedom from inner 
 79 
care (ataraxia).56 Kant of course diminishes the therapeutic significance of antinomy 
by treating the cosmological antinomies not as an act of self-transformation in which 
the philosopher voluntarily engages, but as something into which reason is driven by 
its own nature: its ineluctable pursuit of the conditions of appearances all the way up 
to the unconditioned thing in itself. We have already observed, though, that in this 
pursuit we are not confronted by reason itself (whatever that might be) but by Kant’s 
metaphysical doctrine of reason. For it is Kant himself who proposes that all 
conditioned appearances are the product of conditioning syntheses that might 
themselves be the schematisation of an unknown (but thinkable) unconditioned 
intellection. This would mean of course that in proclaiming that reason falls 
unavoidably into antinomy as a result of its own nature, Kant is engaged in spiritual 
scene-setting — providing the doctrinal means by which the philosopher comes to 
relate to himself as the bearer of a divided reason — precursory to an act of self-
unification. 
If this proves to be the case, then the cosmological antinomies may be regarded 
as voluntary means by which the philosopher induces the aporia — the state of inner 
puzzlement or intellectual stasis in the face of a conundrum — through which he must 
pass in order to transform his intellectual comportment into that the critical 
philosopher. This purposive and transformative deployment of antinomy finds some 
initial confirmation in the fact that despite declaring his neutrality as an impartial 
arbiter of the warring positions, Kant has in fact already taken sides with regard to 
some of the views presented in the antinomies. He has thus already argued that the 
world as appearance is indeed infinite in time and space (in the ‘axioms of intuition’), 
is not composed of indivisible atoms (in the ‘anticipations of perception’), and might 
contain a self-acting intelligence within its causal order (in the ‘analogies of 
experience’). In fact, we shall see that although Kant does indeed engage in the 
exercise of isothenia or equipollence of contradictories, he does so not to suspend 
judgment but to arrive at a particular way of acceding to these transcendental ideas, in 
the register of the ‘as if’. This is accompanied not by an inner relaxation or 
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imperturbability, but by an agitated commitment to this comportment as the only one 
capable of preserving spirituality within an otherwise soulless cosmos. 
Against this background it is quite understandable that the mutually opposed 
arguments presented in the four antinomies — which are supposed to be equally 
compelling — are often contrived and sometimes difficult to distinguish from 
arguments that Kant has himself already put. They are contrived in the sense that it is 
not clear who has actually advanced such arguments, because everyone is supposedly 
compelled to do so by reason. Further, they are sometimes difficult to distinguish 
from Kant’s because he has already argued in favour of a certain view of the world — 
as a spatially and temporally infinite totality of appearances subtended by a pure 
intellect — and against other views of it: especially the view of it as an aggregation of 
self-subsistent material bodies existing within empty space and time.  
With regards to the first antinomy (A 426-32/B 454-60), the arguments 
supporting the thesis that there must be a beginning of the world in time and limits to 
it in space — because an infinite regress of temporal conditions and an infinite 
synthesis of spatial conditions can by never be completed which means that the 
infinitude of the world is impossible — are in fact arguments that Kant himself had 
attacked as ‘perverse’ in his own Inaugural Dissertation of 1770.57 For their part, the 
arguments of the antithesis that the world is temporally and spatially infinite — 
because in empty time nothing can begin while in empty space nothing can be 
intuited — are quite similar to the arguments that Kant has already deployed in his 
discussion of the anticipations of perception and the axioms of intuition. There too 
space and time and treated transcendentally as the forms of human intuition which 
can never be empty. Similar remarks apply to the second antinomy, of divisibility (A 
435-43/B 463-71), where the atomistic thesis is supported by a thought experiment 
that it hard to conceive any atomist advancing: namely, imagine that the world is not 
a composite of indivisible parts, but then this means that there would be no parts at 
all, hence no substances or world. Meanwhile, the opposing anti-atomist argument 
draws directly on Kant’s own treatment of space as a mathematical quantum whose 
                                                
57  Immanuel Kant, ‘On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the 
Intelligible Worlds (Inaugural Dissertation 1770)’, in D. Walford and R. with 
Meerbote (eds.), Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 373-416, at pp. 377-80.  
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capacity for infinite division excludes the possibility of every arriving at the ‘simple’ 
or indivisible. 
The third antinomy, of freedom (A 445-51/B 473-79), comes much closer to 
presenting two contradictory but equally compelling arguments, but this is because 
the opposing arguments correspond to the transcendental and empirical sides of 
Kant’s own doctrine. The argument for transcendental freedom is thus based on our 
incapacity to carry the regress of causal conditions to the unconditioned totality of an 
exhaustively naturally determined world, and it is supported by Kant’s comments on 
the need for transcendental freedom in order to have moral imputation for actions. 
Meanwhile, the opposing argument in favour of exhaustive natural necessity draws on 
the equally Kantian argument that, outside the schema of causality, an uncaused cause 
could never give rise to an effect, ruling out the possibility of spontaneous acts. 
Finally, the arguments of the fourth antinomy — of necessary being (A 453-60/B 
481-88) — while coming closer to equipollence than those of the first two, are 
presented in a manner that clearly anticipates their resolution via Kant’s own doctrine 
of transcendental idealism. Kant will thus treat the thesis argument in favour of 
necessary being — that the chain of contingent events conceived as a totality must 
itself be absolutely necessary — as an example of the illegitimate move from 
conditioned appearances to the unconditioned totality of conditions conceived as a 
thing in itself. For their part, the antithetical arguments against the idea of necessary 
being — focused in the impossibility of something beginning a contingent time series 
without being part of it and thus itself contingent — are perfectly appropriate for the 
world of appearances, but will be vulnerable if used (as they are here) to treat this 
world as a thing in itself. 
It is understandable that some commentators have been frustrated by what they 
take to be Kant’s contrived and sloppy presentation of the antinomic arguments and 
indeed his analysis of the ‘illusions of reason’ more broadly.58 Yet this frustration is 
symptomatic of the fact that they have failed to grasp that Kant’s central concern here 
is not the philosophical demonstration of truth, but the formation of a particular 
philosophical comportment or way of acceding to truth; that is, with what we have 
called spirituality. The bulk of Kant’s commentary on the antinomies is thus 
concerned with showing his readers how to use them to modify their own stance 
                                                
58  See, for example, the incisive commentary offered in David J. Herman, ‘The 
Incoherence of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic’, Dialectic 45 (1991), 3-29.  
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towards the competing cosmological ideas, but always with a view to arriving at a 
new way of acceding to a particular set of them. In his opening comments, Kant thus 
seeks to disqualify several possible stances towards the antinomies — stances quite 
compatible with the historical uses of antinomy as a spiritual exercise — as unsuited 
to his purpose: ‘Yet because of reason’s honor and even security, neither withdrawing 
from the quarrel nor watching it indifferently as a mere mock combat is feasible, and 
even less feasible is simply commanding peace; for the object of the dispute is of 
great interest’ (A 464-B 492). 
By thus introducing ‘interest’ into the equation, Kant is able to require his 
readers to attend to their own interest in taking sides in the disputes. He is also able to 
identify the opposed cultural interests and philosophical styles informing them, for 
only interest or bias can explain why sides would be taken in arguments that have 
been introduced as philosophically equipollent. He thus identifies those supporting 
the antinomic theses — in favour of a beginning to the world, the existence of 
indivisibles (souls) within it, a transcendentally free moral agent, and a necessary 
being lying outside it — as the ‘dogmatic’ idealist philosophers, locating them under 
the banner of Plato. Those supporting the antithetical positions — favouring an 
infinite universe exhaustively ordered by natural causation — are then identified with 
the ‘empiricist’ philosophers, standing under the aegis of Epicurus. According to 
Kant, the idealists adhere to their cosmological theses as a result of their practical 
interest in defending morality and religion and as a result of their speculative interest 
in achieving theoretical knowledge of the soul and a supreme being. For their part, the 
empiricists champion the antitheses because they share no such practical interests and 
have a speculative interest in extending the conditions of possible experience to cover 
the entire field of reason (A 466-74/B 494-502).  
This way of schematising opposed cultural interests is not terribly clarifying for 
Kant’s exposition. This is in part because it does not work properly in its own terms: 
for example, it requires the indivisibles to be souls, whereas in the second antinomy 
Kant treats them as material atoms. It is also because the exemplary opposition 
between idealism and empiricism presented in the antinomies section does not fully 
align with the division of interests presented in the paralogisms discussion, where the 
opposition is between spiritualism and materialism. Finally, his presentation of the 
flawed thesis arguments as Platonic also muddies Kant’s positive invocation of Plato, 
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whom he treats as a source for his notion of transcendental ideas and the 
transcendental ideal. 
Setting this group of problems aside for the moment, we can concentrate on 
Kant’s objective in making these rival cultural interests decisive for the taking of 
sides in the antinomies. Through this strategy, Kant is once again able to treat entire 
(if somewhat vaguely specified) cultural and intellectual movements not as 
autonomous and possible rival enterprises to his own transcendental philosophy, but 
merely as exemplifications of the illusion-plagued and divided reason that his 
philosophy will reconcile. At the same time, this strategy also enables him to take a 
key step towards this harmonisation, by proposing that if it is interest — driven by the 
need to act — that has compelled the partisan idealists and empiricists to take sides in 
these illusory battles, then it is possible that by adopting a contemplative or 
meditative stance towards the disputes, the philosopher will find the impartiality 
required for their resolution:  
But it is nonetheless fitting for a meditating and investigating being to 
devote certain times solely to the examination of his own reason, but — 
in doing so — to divest himself entirely of all partiality and thus to 
communicate his observations publicly to others for their judgment. 
Therefore no one can be blamed for, still less barred from, letting the 
propositions and counterpropositions come forward to defend themselves, 
as best they can when not frightened by any threat, before a jury of his 
own rank (viz., the rank of feeble human beings). (A 475-76/B 503-4) 
In other words, Kant motivates a specific act of self-transformation — the withdrawal 
from ‘dogmatic’ idealism and empiricism through the adoption of a contemplative 
inner stance — by treating it as the condition of resolving a spiritual crisis whose 
symptom is the antinomy itself.  
Kant’s next move is to argue that because these problems arise from the misuse 
of our reason — specifically from the extension of the domain of conditioned 
appearances up to the level of an unconditioned totality or thing in itself — then they 
can be resolved through the inner modification of our reason itself. Their resolution 
therefore does not require the philosopher to acquire new knowledge, to perform 
experiments or to wait on results, as the natural scientists must. As they are not based 
in possible experience, so the cosmological transcendental ideas cannot be used to 
explain experiences, which means that they cannot be judged on the basis of their 
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explanatory power, or ‘dogmatically’, as Kant insists on characterising empirical 
judgments. Hence the solution to cosmological questions — regarding whether the 
world is spatially and temporally infinite, is composed of indivisible atoms, contains 
within it a self-caused cause, or whether a necessary being lies beneath its 
contingency — cannot be arrived at through any external knowledge, but only by 
transforming the inner use of reason that gives rise to them, through a fundamental act 
of self-unification: 
Since, therefore, the solution of these problems can itself never occur in 
experience, you cannot say that what is to be attributed herein to the 
object is uncertain. For your object is merely in your brain and cannot be 
given outside it at all. Consequently, you need only take care to be at one 
with yourselves, and to prevent the amphiboly [ambiguity IH] that turns 
your idea into a supposed presentation of an object that is empirically 
given and that hence can also be cognised according to laws of 
experience. The dogmatic solution, therefore, is no means uncertain, but 
impossible. The critical solution, however, which is completely certain, 
considers the question not objectively at all, but in terms of the foundation 
of cognition on which the question is based. (A 484/B 512) 
The ‘critical’ solution to the cosmological problems is thus to withdraw them from the 
domain of the natural sciences altogether, to transfer them to the inner world of 
(transcendental) philosophy, where they can be resolved through the self-
transformation of reason because they are only illusions of this same reason.  
This move is a particularly clear instance of Kant’s strategy for displacing the 
natural sciences through the metaphysical elevation of philosophy and the 
philosopher, solely on the grounds of his metaphysical doctrine of experience and the 
exercise in self-transformation that it programs. We can see this strategy at work in 
the example he gives of why it is improper to choose between competing 
cosmological ideas on the basis of their explanatory adequacy. It makes no difference 
to our explanation of the appearances of bodies, Kant claims, whether we treat them 
as composed of indivisible atoms or regard their parts as infinitely divisible such that 
atoms are ruled out, ‘for you can never encounter either a simple appearance or an 
infinite composition’ (A 483/B 511). But we have already seen in Kant’s discussion 
of the anticipations of perception that these alternatives do make a difference in this 
regard; for the use of the atomic hypothesis in a variety of experiments in mechanics, 
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chemistry, and hydrostatics allows for the explanation of the differential mass of 
same-size bodies in terms of the differences in their specific gravity and atomic 
density (see above pp. ). Kant’s attempt to account for the same ‘appearances’ — in 
terms of varying intensities of sensation present in the subjective forms of space and 
time — might indeed pertain only to his own brain, where it forms part of a complex 
act of self-transformation. This does not mean, though, that the objects of the natural 
sciences are also matters of internal philosophical self-transformation, unless of 
course one has already declared that their phenomena are, like Kant’s appearances, 
also mere schematisations of an underlying pure intellect. 
The cosmological antinomies may thus be regarded as programming a spiritual 
exercise in which the Kantian philosopher locates an array of philosophies and natural 
sciences within the topography of Kant’s metaphysical doctrine of experience. Here 
they function as ciphers for complementary failures to integrate pure reason and 
sensibility, and can thus be reconciled through a specific act of self-transformation in 
which the ‘critical’ philosopher detaches himself from their ‘dogmatic’ affirmation 
and accedes to cosmological truth in a new way. In exemplifying this act of 
detachment, Kant thus argues that we should treat the arguments of the antinomic 
theses — that world as a beginning in time, is bounded in space, contains atoms — as 
‘too small’ for reason; for reason is compelled for any conditioned appearance it 
arrives at to seek a further set of conditions, and hence may never come to rest in 
something finite. Conversely, we should simultaneously treat the complementary 
arguments of the antitheses — that the world is infinite in space and time, and 
infinitely composite — as ‘too big’ for reason; for in order to be cognitive, reason 
must be able to take objects of appearance as ‘given’ to it in the form of possible 
experience, and the infinite is never given in this way (A 485-90/B 513-18). Kant 
characterises this act of reciprocal detachment as the ‘true cathartic’ that will permit 
the philosopher to reconcile the divisions of cosmological reason by declaring that the 
world (as thing in itself) is neither finite nor infinite, neither composed of atoms nor 
infinitely divisible, and so on. 
This act of inner self-transformation of course takes place entirely within the 
parameters established by Kant’s metaphysical doctrine of experience. It is only by 
viewing observable phenomena in accordance with this doctrine — as the 
schematised appearances of his own acts of pure intellection — that the philosopher 
can deal with the cosmological antinomies in the required way. For it is only within 
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this inner theatre that the philosopher can be required to go beyond any given 
synthesis of appearances in pursuit of the unconditioned ‘transcendental object’, 
thereby passing beyond all of the finitist limits imposed in the theses in search of an 
every higher unity of reason. But it is also only within this performantial space that 
the philosopher will refuse to accept that the spatio-temporal world is composed of 
real things (‘in themselves’), thereby treating the infinitude of its mathematical 
schematisation as pertaining only to the domain of subjective appearances, and 
enabling him to declare that the world as a thing in itself is not infinite (or finite) (A 
491-97B/ 519-25). Kant’s comment, echoing the claim he makes in the ‘B’ Preface, 
that his reconciliation of the antinomies may be regarded as an ‘indirect proof’ of the 
validity of transcendental idealism, is thus heroically wishful (A 506-7/B 534-35). For 
the reconciliation of the antinomies is neither more nor less than a spiritual exercise 
that is programmed by the metaphysical doctrine of experience advanced as 
transcendental idealism. 
Kant’s formal resolution of the antinomies may thus be regarded as the 
philosophical transposition of the results of this spiritual exercise. In the case of first 
and second (‘mathematical’) antinomies, Kant can thus deal expeditiously with the 
finitist theses: that the world begins in time, is spatially finite, and contains indivisible 
atoms. He can declare that, by accepting a given appearance as a thing in itself, these 
theses represent nothing more than the failure to pursue successively higher syntheses 
of the conditions of empirical experience. (Note that in dealing with them in this way, 
Kant effectively treats the theses as instances of empiricism, rather than idealism, as 
he proposes in his discussion of the ‘interest’ that they serve). At the same time, in an 
apparent display of even-handedness, he can deal with the antithetical claims that the 
world is spatially, temporally, and compositionally infinite by proclaiming that they 
mistake the fact that no synthesis of appearances is ever complete for the supposed 
fact that the world in itself is infinite. Both sides thus mistake the conditions of 
appearance of the world for knowledge of the world as a thing in itself, and once this 
is understood then reason can rest easy by declaring with regards to the mathematical 
antinomies that the world is not infinite and that it is infinite only as appearance (A 
517-23/B 545-51; A 523-27/B 551-55). 
This resolution is not at all even-handed, however, because it requires us to 
positively deny the finitude of the world as appearance — as this is governed by the 
infinite schemata of space, time, and composition — and, after all, appearances are all 
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that we are supposed to have cognition of. Similarly, while Kant proclaims that the 
world is infinite ‘only’ in the domain of appearances — so that we should not treat its 
infinitude ‘dogmatically’ — he nonetheless regards this domain as ‘actual’ for human 
beings: ‘our transcendental idealism … allows that the objects of outer intuition, just 
as they are intuited in space, are also actual’ (A 491/B 520). This means, though, that 
for Kant the world is actually infinite in the relevant aspects. In other words, despite 
Kant’s eschewal of a ‘dogmatic’ resolution to the cosmological antinomies, his 
‘critical’ resolution brings with it a powerful positive doctrine. The Kantian resolution 
requires us to affirm that the world is not composed of finite self-subsisting entities in 
empty space and time but is an infinite synthesis of spatio-temporal appearances 
produced by a transcendental intellect. Moreover, despite Kant’s claims to have 
reached this point of impartial arbitration through a contemplative suspension of all 
practical and speculative interest, there can be little doubt that the critical resolution is 
driven by powerful moral and metaphysical interest, as we shall see in the resolution 
of the crucial third antinomy, of freedom. 
Kant’s treatment of the third cosmological antinomy — that the world contains 
an uncaused cause or transcendentally free agent, and that no such agent exists as the 
world is causally governed by a natural necessity — differs from that of the first two, 
as here both sides of the antinomy arise from his own metaphysics of experience. The 
possible existence of transcendental freedom is required by Kant’s conception of the 
transcendental subject of apperception. This subject synthesises the pure concepts of 
things in spontaneous acts of self-consciousness, which take place quite outside the 
causal schematisation of appearances that rules the receptive domain of sensibility. 
As this self-acting subject is not subject to the causal law of sensible appearances, 
Kant characterises it as the ‘intelligible cause’ or the ‘causality of reason’. At the 
same time, Kant’s ‘man’ can only have cognitive access to pure concepts insofar as 
they can be applied to the domain of possible experience, one of whose central 
schematising principles is that of causality: every event must be preceded by a prior 
event that necessitates it. This ‘causality of nature’ applies exhaustively in the world 
understood as a totality of appearances. The problem that Kant poses for resolution in 
the third antinomy is whether the ‘same event’ can spontaneously result from the 
uncaused ‘causality of freedom’ while being fully determined by the necessary 
‘causality of nature’. The required resolution is thus not that both sides of the 
antinomy are false, but that both are true. 
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It would appear that such a resolution is out of reach, as it contradicts a basic 
premise of Kant’s metaphysics of experience: namely, that events cannot be 
experienced unless they are schematised by the forms of sensibility. Given that the 
principle of causality is one of the central schemata, then a spontaneous or uncaused 
event is not a possible object of human experience. This would seem to mean that it 
can neither ‘appear’ (to humans) within the causal sequence, nor be the ‘same’ as any 
event within that sequence. It is quite understandable, then, that some commentators 
have treated the required resolution as a philosophical impossibility.59 In doing so, 
however, they again fail to grasp that Kant’s philosophical argument here is the 
transposition of a spiritual exercise. At the centre of this exercise — through which 
the philosopher will reconcile the antinomy between freedom and determinism, spirit 
and nature — lies the spiritual doctrine that an event experienced as causally 
determined by the empirical subject in time, might be thinkable as the schematised 
appearance of a spontaneous act performed by the transcendental subject of 
apperception. The ‘same event’ might thus be both causally determined and 
transcendentally spontaneous if it is regarded as the nexus for two different modes of 
existence of the subject — as homo phenomenon and homo noumenon — within a 
spiritual exercise in which the philosopher is required to transform himself from the 
former to the latter. What might not be coherent at the level of Kantian philosophy, 
can thus find coherence within the self-understanding of Kantian spirituality, although 
not of course independently of this self-understanding. 
It is thus highly significant that Kant supplies a spiritual motivation for the 
resolution. This comes in the form of his stipulation that the subject’s spontaneous 
causality or transcendental freedom — its capacity to act independently of the world 
of sensible determination — is necessary in order to account for (a certain 
metaphysical conception of) moral freedom and responsibility: 
Extremely noteworthy is the fact that this transcendental idea of freedom 
is the basis of the practical concept of freedom, and that transcendental 
freedom is what in practical freedom amounts to the proper moment of 
the difficulties that have all along surrounded the question of practical 
freedom’s possibility. Freedom in the practical meaning of the term is 
independence of our power of choice from coercion by impulses of 
                                                
59  Add citations 
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sensibility. … The human power of choice, although an arbitrium 
sensitivum [sensory or sensible power of choice], is an arbitrium not 
brutum but liberum [not animal but free]; for its action is not made 
necessary by sensibility, but the human being has a power to determine 
himself on his own, independently of coercion by sensible impulses. (A 
533-34/B 561-62) 
Driven by this moral imperative, the antinomy of freedom can be resolved if the same 
event be treated as free with regard to the transcendental subject as intelligible cause, 
and determined with regard to the empirical subject as known according to the natural 
laws of causation:  
Only the human being, who otherwise is acquainted with all of nature 
solely through his senses cognises himself also through mere 
apperception — viz., in actions and inner determinations that he cannot 
class at all with any impression of the senses. And thus he is to himself, 
indeed, on the one hand, phenomenon, but on the other hand — viz., in 
regard to certain powers — a merely intelligible object, because his action 
cannot be classed at all with the receptivity of sensibility. We call these 
[specifically human] powers understanding and reason. Reason, above all, 
is quite particularly and primarily distinguished from all empirically 
conditioned abilities, because it examines its objects merely according to 
ideas and according to these ideas determines the understanding, which 
then makes an empirical use of its own (although likewise pure) concepts. 
(A 546-47/B 574-75) 
Some modern commentators have argued that this formulation indeed resolves 
the antinomy, as it shows that the same event/act can be both determined and free on 
account of the fact that the same subject can experience it in accordance with ‘two 
viewpoints’, the phenomenal and the noumenal.60 This is not at all the resolution 
envisaged by Kant, however. True to his own metaphysics of experience, Kant insists 
that because the experience of an event — what he calls its ‘empirical character’ — is 
                                                
60  For various versions of the ‘two viewpoints’ interpretation, see Lewis White 
Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1960), pp. 191-4; Terence Irwin, ‘Morality and Personality: Kant 
and Green’, in A. W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 31-56; and Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 47-53, 71-82.  
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indeed determined by the principle of causality, then it is impossible to experience the 
intelligible or spontaneous causality of the transcendental subject, as all acts observed 
in time and space will indeed appear as determined (A 549-50/B 577-78). Kant thus 
does not treat the noumenal subject and its intelligible causality as one of two ways of 
viewing or experiencing a ‘commonsense’ subject’s moral conduct. The agency of the 
noumenal subject is known not according to the schematising principles of experience 
— where it is only an appearance subject to causality — but according to two quite 
different principles: namely those of transcendental apperception, and practical or 
moral reason. According to the principle of practical reason, which determines not 
what happens but what ought to happen, the noumenal subject produces the object or 
event that it intelligises and wills, which means that this event cannot be experienced 
by the phenomenal subject (A 550/B 578).61 According to the principle of 
transcendental apperception, homo noumenon cannot be a ‘viewpoint’ through which 
a commonsense subject experiences its own acts within the temporal sequence of 
causal events, as the spontaneous self-unifying acts of the transcendental subject are 
supposed to be the source of time and causality (A 551-52/B 579-80).62 This means 
that homo noumenon can only be known in the act through which the empirical 
subject (homo phenomenon) ‘recollects’ its transcendental prototype by ‘becoming’ 
homo noumenon, thereby realising the capacity for spontaneous moral action that it 
has as a pure intelligence.63  
                                                
61  This interpretation finds stong historical confirmation in the fact that many of 
Kant’s early critics — particularly theologians adhering to an Aristotelian moral 
anthropology in which man’s moral and sensible nature were joined in the cultivation 
of virtue — regarded Kant’s characterisation of transcendental freedom and empirical 
determination as grounded in two irreconcilably different kinds of subject. See, for 
example, Hermann Andreas Pistorius, ‘Rezension der Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft’, in R. Bittner and K. Cramer (eds.), Materialien zu Kants ‘Krititk der 
praktischen Vernunft’ (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1975), pp. 161-78, at 173-78; and 
August Wilhelm Rehberg, ‘Rezension der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, in Ibid., 
pp. 179-96.  
62  The timelessness of intelligible causality cannot therefore be reduced to that 
associated with the a-temporal character of logical laws and inferences — as is argued 
in different ways by Allison and Irwin who seek to treat the noumenal subject as a 
kind of logical presuppsosition for empirical knowledge and conduct — as for Kant 
intelligible causality is not a rule of thought but an act of transcendental self-
consciousness. 
63  As Heimsoeth pointed out to no avail so long ago, in his 
‘Persönlichkeitsbewußtsein und Ding an sich in der Kantischen Philosophie’.  
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The solution to the third antinomy thus takes place in the form of an act of self-
transformation through which the philosopher undergoes an ‘ascent’ from his own 
causal determination as homo phenomenon, realising ‘his’ practical capacity for 
transcendental freedom through transfiguration into homo noumenon. This means, of 
course, that this act of timeless self-determination cannot be ascribed as a universal 
power (of practical reason) to ‘man’, and can only be regarded as the imaginal telos 
or ēros of those voluntarily engaged in the act of self-transformation.64 In other 
words, one of the crucial spiritual objectives of the Critique of Pure Reason — to 
demonstrate the presence of a spontaneously acting timeless intelligible being within 
the causally determined temporal events of the world of nature — is achieved through 
this act of spiritual self-transformation programmed by the third antinomy. 
4.3 Ascent to Supreme Being in Reason 
Having dealt with rational psychology and rational cosmology, Kant’s third and 
final unavoidable ‘illusion of reason’ is drawn from the domain of rational theology. 
This takes the form of the ‘transcendental ideal’ of a supreme or maximal being; that 
is, the notion of single being whose own reality is such as to contain the reality of all 
other beings, which are only limitations of it. Such a being is thus supreme in the 
sense of being the ‘most real’ being or ens realissimum. Once again, Kant’s strategy 
is to treat this ‘ideal of pure reason’ as something that reason itself compels us to 
think in its drive towards ever higher unification of its own operations. His objective 
is to show the philosopher how to cultivate an inner relation to the ideal that both 
denies it reality as an object of empirical cognition, while simultaneously acceding to 
it in the ‘critical’ register as a permissible idea capable of regulating the use of our 
empirical understanding. In this way, Kant seeks to treat rational theology in the same 
way that he as treated rational psychology and cosmology: that is, to deny the 
autonomous or ‘dogmatic’ form of the science — based on a claimed knowledge of 
its object (the soul, the world, the supreme being) as a thing in itself — and to 
                                                
64  Compare this with Wood’s discussion, who acknowledges that Kant’s 
conception of transcendental freedom does require an act of self-transformation on the 
part of those adopting the ‘standpoint’, but then insists that this conception applies 
universally, as if man were really divided into noumenal and phenomenal aspects in 
the manner that Kantian spirituality prescribes for its program. See Allen W. Wood, 
‘Kant’s Compatibilism’, in Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, pp. 73-
101.  
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reconstitute a ‘critical’ version of the discipline as a sub-branch of transcendental 
philosophy. In other words, Kant will again deploy the exercise in inner self-
transformation programmed by his metaphysics of experience as a means of imbuing 
the philosopher with a particular way of acceding to truth. 
The point of this exercise in the case of rational psychology was to form a 
philosophical subject who would both deny the cognitive pretensions of the 
transcendental concept of the soul while acceding to a critical version of this concept 
as a means of thinking the simplicity and unity of the ‘thinking I’. In the case of 
rational cosmology it was to form a subject who could accept the causal 
determination of the natural world while simultaneously acceding to the idea of a 
transcendentally free agent spontaneously causing events within this world. Now, in 
the case of rational theology, Kant’s objective is to form a comportment in which the 
philosopher will both deny all cognitive claims regarding the supreme being as the 
ideal of pure reason, while simultaneously conducting his intellect ‘as if’ this being 
exists, in accordance with the moral and speculative ‘interest’ of reason itself. Once 
again, we are dealing not with a philosophically demonstrable truth, but with the 
spiritual formation of a subject shaped to accede to truth in a specialised and 
particular manner. 
Kant prepares his philosophical reader for this exercise via his treatment of the 
fourth cosmological antinomy — of necessary being — which we have not yet 
discussed. This antinomy forms a bridge between the cosmological ideas and the 
theological ideal of pure reason. Kant’s treatment of the fourth antinomy — that there 
is a necessary being lying outside the contingent world, that the world as a totality is 
completely contingent leaving no room for a necessary being — follows the 
established pattern. Kant’s metaphysics of experience makes it possible for the 
philosopher to both accept cosmic contingency while restricting it to the domain of 
appearance, thereby leaving room to think the possibility of a necessary being on 
which the entire conditioned totality of contingent existences might depend (A 559-
62/B 587-90). Kant observes that this means the idea of a necessary being pertains 
only to the noumenal or intelligible sphere, as it is thought of as existing entirely 
outside the phenomenal world of possible experiences. In fact he comments that in 
this regard it differs from the idea of a transcendentally free agent in the third 
antinomy, as that agent is supposed to act within the phenomenal world; although we 
have argued that the only way Kant can achieve this immanence of the noumenal 
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subject in the phenomenal world is by envisaging the noumenal transfiguration of the 
phenomenal subject. 
Kant acknowledges that in using the critical attitude to posit a necessary being 
underpinning the entire world of appearances, he is pushing the domain of the 
noumenal or intelligible much closer to the surface of his philosophy. At one of those 
points where Kantian spirituality breaks the surface of Kantian philosophy, Kant 
allows himself to say that the world of appearances might itself be seen as the 
analogical form in which a transcendental intelligence encounters its own 
intellections: 
However, once we have given ourselves permission to assume a self-
subsistent actuality outside the realm of sensibility as a whole, 
appearances can be regarded only as contingent ways in which beings that 
are themselves intelligences present intelligible objects. And hence we are 
left with nothing but analogy: according to it we use experiential concepts 
in order that regarding intelligible things, of which they are in themselves 
we have not the least cognition, we can yet frame some sort of concept. 
(A 566/B 594) 
This means, says Kant, that we shall have to frame our concept of the pure 
intelligences not from contingent experience but from that which is necessary — 
namely pure concepts — and it is the task of his discussion of the ‘ideal of pure 
reason’ to show how this is possible. 
The ‘transcendental ideal’ is like the transcendental ideas of psychology and 
cosmology in that it cannot be given to sensible intuition as a possible object of 
experience, and pertains instead to the successively higher synthesis of empirical 
experience carried out in the name of the unity of reason. The transcendental ideal, 
though, is even further removed from empirical cognition as it pertains to a 
transcendental idea not in the form of rules of reason, but as given in an individual 
thing — or exemplar — determined by reason alone. Kant once again turns to Plato to 
explicate this notion, commenting that the transcendental ideal is similar to Plato’s 
conception of the idea. The Platonic idea is regarded as the act of a divine intelligence 
that creates the noumenal objects (archetypes) of which actual objects are the 
phenomenal approximations (ectypes). Kant will not go as far as Plato by attributing 
creative power to the transcendental ideal, but he will ascribe it moral and speculative 
power as a kind of exemplar or ‘original image’ — an image that brings forth the 
 94 
action it requires — that we are somehow compelled to use as a regulative principle 
to govern our moral and intellectual conduct (A 567-71/B 595-99). This image — that 
of a divine intelligence that intelligises the pure forms of things received by man as 
intelligence possessed of sensibility — had long been the pivotal doctrine of Western 
university metaphysics.65 It is the task of Kant’s therapeutic of rational theology to 
preserve this theistic metaphysics in the critical register, as an ideal for governing the 
conduct of the philosophical intellect or persona. 
Kant provides a philosophical simulacrum for the theological ideal via the notion 
of an absolutely or maximally real being. Such a being is envisaged as containing the 
transcendental material for all possible beings, in the form of the entirety of possible 
predicates for things, which makes it possible to cognise a thing absolutely, or in 
every possible predication of it. A thing cognised in this way — that is as a limitation 
on the limitless cognitive power of a divine intellect — is a thing in itself, as it is 
known in relation to all possible manifestations of it, and not just as it appears to a 
being possessed of human sensibility and understanding. This conception of a 
‘thoroughgoing determination’ of a thing, based on the image of a transcendental 
substratum of our reason, is also the conception of a maximal or supreme reality 
(being); as in containing the intelligible forms of all possible things, the divine 
intellect underlying ours must also contain the totality of reality (A 571-76/B 599-
604). 
The idea of the divine intellect is thus simultaneously the idea of the maximal or 
supreme being — the most real being or ens realissimum. Moreover it is singular, 
hence the ‘ideal’, as it is the ‘transcendental prototype’ or absolute being in relation to 
which all contingent beings can be regarded as ‘ectypes’ or ‘deficient copies’: 
And the concept of an ens realissimum is the concept of a single being 
[Wesen], because of all possible predicates one predicate, viz., what 
belongs to being [Sein] absolutely, is found in this concept’s 
determination. Hence a transcendental ideal is what underlies the 
thoroughgoing determination found necessarily with everything that 
exists, and this ideal is what amounts to the supreme and complete 
material condition of the possibility of everything that exists — and the 
                                                
65  See notes 00 and 00 above. 
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condition to which all thinking of objects as such as regards their content 
must be traced back. (A 576/B 604) 
In relation to this ‘original being’ other beings and their cognitions can only be 
regarded as emerging as limit forms of the ‘consequences’ or unfolding of the 
supreme being. This permits Kant to formulate explicitly a doctrine trailed throughout 
the Critique of Pure Reason. This is the doctrine that the experience of objects in 
space and time by human beings is a sensible schemata for the intellectual intuition of 
a being whose intellection of all possible things means that it intelligises sensible man 
too: ‘And the manifoldness [multiplicity IH] of those things would rest not on the 
limitation of the original being itself, but on that of its complete consequence. And to 
this consequence there would belong also our entire sensibility, along with all reality 
in [the realm of] appearance’ (A 579/B 607). 
In order to determine the manner in which this extraordinary idea — drawn 
straight from the heartlands of Christian theistic metaphysics — might be assented 
and acceded to within an ostensibly secular philosophy by an apparently secular 
philosopher, Kant goes directly to the question of this philosopher’s intellectual and 
moral comportment. He begins in the customary way by observing that this ideal of 
the supreme being and intellect may not be treated as an object of cognition for the 
human understanding, which is Leibniz presumes to do in his metaphysics and 
‘monadology’. To attempt this would be to treat reason’s regulative pursuit of the 
ideal of supreme being — the being that summates and unifies all of the lower-level 
domains of being — as if it could arrive at cognition of the thing in itself; whereas 
reason’s self-unifying pursuit should instead be treated as the regulative ‘project’ of 
philosophical systematisation. Kant then comments that were we to stand in a purely 
contemplative relation to the ideal then we might well not assent to it, as there is an 
alternative viewpoint that, in purely empirical-cognitive terms, might be regarded as 
no less valid. This is the viewpoint that regards the plurality of beings given in the 
various domains of empirical cognition as autonomous — rather than as ectypes or 
‘deficient copies’ of the archetypes contained in supreme being — and as irreducible 
in their plurality by virtue of the empirical diversity of the world (A 584-88/B 612-
16). Such a viewpoint, for example, could be properly ascribed to the tradition of 
eclectic philosophy in Germany, but also to the differentiated array of scientific 
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domains that had been emerging from the experimental natural sciences, and whose 
autonomy eclectic philosophy proclaimed.66 
Signaling the role of spirituality in tipping the contemplative balance, Kant then 
argues that there is nonetheless something that can incline us to decide against this 
epistemic pluralism and in favour of the unificatory transcendental ideal: namely, if 
there are obligations dictated by reason, but that lack sufficient incentive or 
motivation unless we posit a supreme being capable of enforcing the relevant laws or 
norms. In a bravura inversion, Kant then proclaims that not just the philosopher but 
even the ‘commonest human mind’ is aware of this moral ‘interest of reason’ and 
that, ‘once led to the argument’, this mind feels the need to pass beyond the 
contingent world of appearances to a single necessary being as their cause. In other 
words, the philosopher should assent to the ideal of the supreme being on the grounds 
that such an ideal is the condition of a moral comportment shared by all human 
beings. Kant gives symptomatic expression to the spiritual significance of this 
comportment in his comment that ‘ascent’ to a ‘supreme cause’ from the domain of 
empirical pluralism can be aligned with the transition from poly- to monotheism: 
This supreme cause we then regard as absolutely necessary, because we 
find our ascending to it absolutely necessary and also find no basis for 
going further and beyond this cause. With all peoples, therefore, we see 
shining through their blindest polytheism some sparks of monotheism, to 
which they have been led not by meditation and deep speculation, but 
only by the common understanding’s natural course that has gradually 
become understandable to them. (A 590/B 618) 
In other words, to motivate the exercise in comportment formation that will result in 
critical assent to the transcendental ideal, Kant invokes the spiritual ēros and telos that 
governs it: the transfigurative ascent from the plurality of empirical appearances to 
the image of a divine intelligence incessantly intelligising the pure forms from which 
the appearances descend. 
                                                
66  On this, see Horst Dreitzel, ‘Zur Entwicklung und Eigenart der “Eklektischen 
Philosophie”’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 18 (1991), 281-343; and Ulrich 
Johannes Schneider, ‘Eclecticism and the History of Philosophy’, in D. R. Kelley 
(ed.), History and the Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early 
Modern Europe (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1997), pp. 83-101. For a 
more extensive but less reliable account, see Michael Albrecht, Eklektik. Eine 
Begriffsgeschichte mit Hinweisen auf die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994).  
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It is this spiritual exercise that then governs Kant’s philosophical treatment of the 
three arguments for the existence of the supreme being that are found in rational 
theology: the ontological, cosmological, and physicotheological arguments. We will 
confine our attention to Kant’s discussion of the ontological argument, as it displays 
the common pattern for the other two, both of which, Kant argues, contain disguised 
versions of the ontological argument. All versions of the ontological argument 
attempt to argue from the concept of an ens realissimum or most real being to its 
actual existence; as were this being not to exist then it would not be the most real 
being as is posited in its concept. This is easy meat for Kant, of course, who sets the 
scene for a yet-to-be-ended series of introductory philosophy courses by arguing that 
if this argument treated as an empirical (synthetic) one, then the predication of 
existence must be something that can be confirmed by a possible experience; yet this 
is not something that the proponents attempt as their argument is that God’s existence 
can be determined by the concept alone. According to Kant’s celebrated formula, 
existence is thus not a predicate but merely the copula that joins a predicate to a 
subject, God, whose existence is yet to be determined. This means that the ontological 
argument collapses, as a prime example of the attempt to derive cognition of the ideal 
from concepts alone (A 592-602/B 620-30). 
At the same time, however, Kant insists that the existence of the supreme being 
in a sphere outside the domain of experience remains ‘thinkable’. After all, this 
domain is only that of appearances, and these appearances might well be simply be 
the form in which human beings receive the pure intellection of things arising from 
the divine intelligence. In this regard, the ‘thinkability’ of the ideal of the supreme 
being might yet turn out to be some kind of way of acceding to its existence. In order 
to determine the kind of assent possible for this ideal, Kant returns to the moral or 
spiritual motivation for it, arguing that only a moral (as opposed to a rational) 
theology can supply the ground for assent to the concepts of the ens realissimum and 
divine intelligence formulated in transcendental theology. This is in part because only 
through the idea of transcendental freedom required by morality can the notion of 
pure intelligence be connected to the domain of empirical experience. In this setting, 
the idea of transcendental freedom demonstrates the independence of this intelligence 
from sensible determination, including moral determination by the sensuous 
inclinations arising from its own phenomenal embodiment (A 636-40/B 664-68). 
Kant also argues, though, that because it is a transcendental ideal — that is, a 
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transcendental archetype that brings forth the actions required to realise it — the ideal 
of the supreme being may be regarded as self-motivating. It provides us with the pure 
exemplar of intellectual self-determination that permits us to overcome the sensible 
inclinations of homo phenomenon and thus ‘become’ self-determining beings.  
It is for this reason that Kant treats the transcendental ideal of transcendental 
theology remains as indispensable for critical philosophy. If the existence of the 
supreme being can be motivated on non-speculative moral grounds, then the 
transcendental ideal can supply moral theology with the only image of this being 
capable of serving its objective:  
Hence the supreme being remains for the merely speculative use of reason 
a mere ideal — but yet a faultless ideal, a concept that concludes and 
crowns the whole of human cognition. Although the concept’s objective 
reality cannot be proved by this speculative path, it also cannot be refuted 
by it. And if there were to be a moral theology that can compensate for 
this deficiency, then transcendental theology — previously only 
problematic — proves itself indispensable: by determination of its 
concept [i.e., of a supreme being IH], and by the unceasing appraisal of a 
reason that is deluded often enough by sensibility and is not always in 
harmony with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside 
the world (rather than as world soul), eternity without conditions of time, 
omnipresence without conditions of space, etc.: all of these are 
transcendental predicates; and hence the purified concept of them, which 
any theology needs so very much, can be obtained only from 
transcendental theology. (A 641-42/B 670-71) 
Kant thus views his transcendental philosophy as playing a dual role in 
facilitating assent to faith in the supreme being, and thereby functioning as the link 
between moral philosophy and philosophical theology. First, through its restriction of 
sensible causality to the domain of appearances, transcendental philosophy makes 
room for the presence of spiritual freedom in the natural world, and thereby for the 
idea of a noumenal world beyond the natural one. Second, by supplying a non-
cognitive and non-ontological exemplar of the supreme being — as the divine 
intelligence timeless intelligising the forms of the spatio-temporal world — 
transcendental philosophy supplies the archetype for the transformation through 
which the philosopher can realise this freedom: the transfiguration of homo 
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phenomenon into homo noumenon. Such is the image of a divine intelligence in 
whose intellection of the pure forms of things the human intelligence must strive to 
participate and, in doing so, achieve its own purity and unity. We may thus regard 
Kant’s ‘critical’ assent to the transcendental ideal of the supreme being as the product 
of the act of self-transformation through which the philosopher withdraws from 
theoretical cognition of this being in order to accede to its idea as the practical 
exemplar for his own intellectual conduct. 
In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant returns to the opening 
theme of the illusions of reason. If reason is driven to go beyond the limits of possible 
experience — to seek a substantial soul, an infinite world whole, and a supreme being 
— that is because there is indeed something beyond these limits: namely, the 
intellectual acts of a pure intelligence that may not be empirically refuted precisely 
because they are beyond the bounds of empirical experience. The Transcendental 
Dialectic has shown that these transcendental illusions are not to be dispelled as 
philosophical errors because they ‘arise from reason itself’ — that is, they concern the 
subject’s condition or mode of being — and can only be neutralised if the subject 
learns to accede to them in a new way: non-cognitively (A 642-46/B 670-74). The 
three parts of the Transcendental Dialectic may thus be regarded as three therapeutic 
discourses through which the philosopher is presented with a series of related 
exercises in self-transformation, the outcome of which is the critical mode of 
acceding to the ideas of transcendental psychology, cosmology, and theology. These 
are to be acceded not cognitively or ‘dogmatically’ as things in themselves but 
problematically or ‘critically’, as devices for governing the conduct of the intellect. 
Under the regulatory transcendental ideas, the philosopher takes up the ‘project’ of 
seeking ever higher unities for the empirical domains of knowledge (A 646-48/B 674-
77). Here the conduct of his intellect is to be governed by the ideas of a soul in which 
all thought is unified, an infinite world of appearances given to man by his a priori 
acts of cognition, and a supreme intelligence as the singular source of all such acts of 
cognition. 
To remind us of the spiritual imperatives motivating the philosopher’s self-
transformation, Kant returns one last time to the negative examples of the 
‘intellectualist philosophers’ and the ‘empirical minds’ whose complementary vices 
display the spiritual consequences of failing to achieve the required change of inner 
comportment. The intellectualist philosophers like Leibniz over-unify the 
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understanding by treating the transcendental ideal of a supreme intellectual being as if 
it were a cognitive reality. This leads the intellectualists to attempt to derive the 
objects of empirical experience themselves from an impossible power of intellectual 
intuition. Conversely, and even more harmfully to the ‘interests of reason’, the 
empirical philosophers and ‘investigators of nature’ refuse to seek higher grounds of 
unity for the various objects of empirical experience — the objects of their several 
sciences — and thus threaten the unity of reason and nature as such. Kant proposes a 
philosophical mediation between these two positions, whereby he argues for a ‘law of 
affinity’ that compels continuous transition between adjacent forms of knowledge (A 
654-64/B 682-92). This, however, is simply a philosophical projection of the spiritual 
exercise in which the philosopher seeks to keep the centrifugal empirical sciences 
within the orbit of a theistic metaphysics by acceding to the transcendental ideas as 
norms of intellectual conduct. 
Kant’s solution to the illusory mode of adhering to the transcendental ideas of the 
soul, world, and supreme being is to treat them as non-cognitive schemata for the 
unification of the empirical uses of reason. The key to treating them in this way lies in 
the manner in which the philosopher must accede to them. He must accede to the 
world of appearances ‘as if’ it received its character and existence from its intellection 
by a supreme being. This will permit him to think the possibility of a systematic unity 
of all empirical uses of reason, and thus to continuously expand experiential cognition 
as if it were the ‘faint copy’ of divine intellection. The psychological idea allows the 
philosopher to regard himself ‘as if’ he were a soul or thinking substance, thereby 
permitting him to unite all cognitive powers within a single nature, and thence all 
appearances within this single intellectual nature. For its part, the cosmological idea 
permits the philosopher to accede to the spatio-temporal world whole ‘as if’ it were 
the expression of an infinite series of synthetic acts, thereby refuting the view of it as 
self-subsistent matter in empty space and time; although he should not treat this 
infinity as a thing in itself or object of cognition (A 669-89/B 697-717). In other 
words, it is through the act of self-transformation in which the philosopher shapes a 
subjectivity capable of acceding to the psychological, cosmological, and theological 
ideas in the critical register of ‘as if’, that the Critique of Pure Reason fulfils its self-
appointed historical spiritual task. In permitting the philosopher to transfigure himself 
‘as if’ in accordance with the image of a pure intelligence capable of participating in 
the divine intellection of the world, the Critique seeks to overcome the threat to 
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metaphysics posed by the plurality and autonomy of the empirical sciences, by 





We began this essay by observing that a good deal of twentieth-century Anglo-
American commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason was designed to process it for 
consumption within modern analytic philosophy departments. It thus tended to isolate 
one part of Kant’s central formula — that concepts must be restricted to possible 
objects of experience given in sensibility — while eliding the other part: that objects 
of experience are not the only ones that the intellect is capable of acceding to, as 
sensible experience is an analogical schematisation of non-sensible or pure 
intellection. It is significant that some more recent commentary has begun to reinstate 
Kant’s metaphysical doctrines and commitments, yet it remains constrained by the 
self-understanding of philosophy as reflection on the cognitive and moral disposition 
of a universal subject. It thus treats the timeless subject of transcendental 
apperception and transcendental moral freedom as the specification of a metaphysical 
‘essence’, capable of being philosophically defended in terms of the transcendental 
structures supposedly required by both the sciences and ‘commonsense’ experience.67  
When confronted by the central formula of Kant’s metaphysics of experience — 
his image of experience as the form in which intelligibles synthesised in the 
transcendental subject’s timeless acts of self-consciousness are received by an 
empirical subject in the form of spatio-temporal appearances — neither of the above 
approaches is capable of approaching this formula as a program for a specific spiritual 
exercise or act of self-transformation to be performed by the philosopher. As the 
means of forming a philosophical subject or persona imbued with a special way of 
acceding to philosophical truth, Kant’s dramaturgical doctrine of the transcendental 
and empirical subject (homo noumenon and phenomenon) is not itself capable of 
being true of a philosophical self (or ‘essence’), as this self results from the acts of 
self-transformation programmed by the doctrine. For just this reason, however, 
neither can the doctrine be false, or require radical reconstruction to make it fit the 
canons of truth prescribed by modern analytic philosophy. It is not the task of 
intellectual history or the history of philosophy to validate or invalidate this doctrine: 
to show how it can reconstructed as a viable empirical epistemology or else made to 
                                                
67  Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, pp. 4-18, 37-77. 
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square with a metaphysical account of man’s rational essence. Rather the task of 
historiography is to describe the inherited role of this doctrine in structuring a 
particular kind of activity: the acts of self-transformation responsible for forming a 
particular philosophical comportment or mode of standing in relation to truth. Seen 
historically, what the Critique of Pure Reason offers is not a demonstrable 
philosophical theory of human cognition, but a program for forming a philosopher 
who will cognise things in a certain way. 
It is true that Kant offers philosophical arguments defending his conception of 
experience and cognition, and Kant of course was a professional academic 
philosopher. In the preceding account, however, I have shown how these arguments 
can be redescribed as philosophical transpositions of the underlying acts of self-
transformation, thereby offering an explanation en passant for the widely held and 
intermittently expressed suspicion that Kant’s arguments are hard to reconcile with 
standard models of conceptual analysis or reasoning — whether syllogistic, deductive 
or inductive. The transcendental deduction of the categories is thus best understood as 
an exercise in transcendental anamnesis in which the philosopher learns to treat 
experience as an ‘occasion’ on which he recollects the timeless forms of self-
consciousness from which all experience unfolds and, in doing so, ‘becomes’ that 
transcendental subject of apperception. Kant’s recovery of a priori principles may 
thus be regarded as a philosophical simulacrum of the transcendental recollection of 
timeless intellection, prior to its schematised ‘descent’ into ‘analogical’ temporal 
experience. In the case of Kant’s philosophical therapy for the ‘illusions of reason’, 
we have shown that the reason this looks so unlike a standard philosophical argument 
is that the illusions are not regarded as philosophical mistakes made by a truth-
capable subject. Rather, as ‘unavoidable illusions’, they reflect the condition of a 
subject who is not presently qualified to accede to truth, because of the interests that 
drive him to treat concepts (qua intellectualist) or experience (qua empiricist) as 
things in themselves. Such a subject must thus be taken through the act of self-
transformation that makes him capable of acceding to transcendental ideas in a new 
way, in the modality of the ‘as if’, which is the therapeutic task that Transcendental 
Dialectic is intended to perform. 
This in turn is a pointer to the spiritual or cultural interests driving Kant’s 
renovation of metaphysics as a particular way of acceding to truth. Kant’s ‘conversion 
of outlook’ — in which cognition is to be understood in terms of objects conforming 
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themselves to our understanding rather than the other way around — is primarily 
impelled by (what he takes to be) the spiritual consequences of the natural sciences 
and empiricist philosophy, and secondarily by (what he argues is) the failure of 
Leibnizian metaphysical rationalism to deal with these consequences. Kant’s hostility 
to empiricism and the natural sciences is deeply rooted in the intellectual ethos of 
Protestant university metaphysics, where it is manifest in the view that these ways of 
knowing deny the mediating presence of a spiritual being within the sensory world, 
and hence rob the latter of moral meaning and spiritual significance. The core 
doctrines of the Critique of Pure Reason — the subjectivity of space and time, the 
conception of the sensory world as the form in which a pure intelligence experiences 
its own intellection — are intended to defend this presence through the new way of 
acceding to transcendental ideas. 
This is why the Critique culminates in an act of self-transformation that allows 
the philosopher think of cognition ‘as if’ all acts of understanding originate in a 
substantial intelligible nature or soul (rather than in dispersed ‘arts of thinking’); to 
think of the world ‘as if’ it is an infinite totality of appearances synthesised a priori 
within the subject’s spatio-temporal sensibility and understanding (rather than a 
collection of self-subsistent material bodies existing in real space and time); and to 
think of this totality of appearing things ‘as if’ it were the product of the timeless 
intellection of a supreme being guaranteeing the unity of reason and nature (rather 
than treating nature as a congeries of empirical object-domains divided among the 
various sciences). At the centre of this defence sits the figure of the subject of 
transcendental freedom, whose self-determination via a noumenal ‘ought’ is supposed 
to subject the world to moral intentionality while testifying to the ‘autonomy’ of the 
spontaneous ‘intelligence’ from sensuous coercion. Through its purported capacity to 
spontaneously cause the same events that are necessitated by the causal laws of 
nature, this subject is required to guarantee the presence of spiritual freedom and 
meaning within the otherwise soulless natural world. 
At this juncture it is vital to recall that Kantian spirituality was not the only 
cultural strategy available in Protestant Germany for responding to this set of issues. 
Already by the late seventeenth century a loose-knit intellectual movement — made 
up of historians of philosophy or ‘erudition’ and ‘civil’ philosophers who combined 
anti-metaphysical (‘Hobbesian’) political science with anti-metaphysical ‘fideist’ 
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Protestantism — had elaborated a quite different strategy.68 Despite the fact that their 
familiarity with the emerging natural sciences was often rudimentary, the members of 
this movement self-consciouslessly sought to displace metaphysics with ‘history’ in 
its early modern sense, as synonym for ‘empirical’ knowledge, as knowledge given in 
time.69 States could thus be viewed as the product of civil history and the world as the 
product of natural history.70 In treating the world as composed of wholly historical or 
temporal phenomena, knowledge of which can only be acceded to through the 
testimony of others or the performance of experiments, this group of thinkers sought 
to destroy the core formula of university metaphysics: namely, that the world is the 
form in which divine intellection of the pure forms of things is encountered by man 
through his own (sensitively affected) pure intelligence.71 If the experimentalism and 
mechanism of the new natural sciences lent welcome support to this group — by 
supplying the model of a form of knowledge in which phenomena and natural laws 
were not tied to higher-order metaphysical concepts — then it was their own civil 
historiography that drove their attack on metaphysics. It did so by treating 
metaphysics’ claim to transcendental knowledge of nature as the product of the 
historical miscegenation of Greek philosophy and Christian theology (reason and 
faith) in scholasticism.72 It was this hybridisation, they argued, that had produced the 
monstrous idea that God could be known philosophically, through the transcendental 
forms contained in natural appearances, and that had thus given rise to a ‘sectarian’ 
philosophy — instead of a irenic ‘eclectic’ one — as the metaphysicians sought to 
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combined critical philolology and a Protestant fideist rejection of transcendental 
concepts, see Ralph Häfner, ‘Jacob Thomasius und die Geschichte der Häresien’, in 
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impose what was in fact a ‘metaphysical faith’ as if it were a demonstrable 
knowledge.73 
In this historical regard, then, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason should be seen as a 
weapon in the war of position surrounding the role of metaphysics in academic 
culture and learned culture more broadly, even if Kant had only encountered his 
eclectic enemy at one remove, in Jacob Brucker’s historiography of philosophy.74 
Where the Critique did come into conflict with other sciences and disciplines was not 
at the level of rival philosophical hypotheses, however, but at that of rival ways of 
knowing. What Kant’s metaphysics of experience offered eighteenth-century 
metaphysicians was a way of outflanking the pluralisation of empirical knowledge 
effected by the natural scientists and championed by the eclectic civil philosophers. It 
permitted experience and ‘nature’ to be seen as something other than a heteroclite 
array of object-domains and conduct-domains arising from a dispersed array of 
empirical sciences and ethical practices. It allowed metaphysicians to relate 
themselves to experience or nature as if it formed a single ‘world’ arising from the 
subject’s own spontaneous acts of transcendental intellection and moral freedom. The 
Critique continues to perform this role, although only by continuing to program the 
act of self-transformation in which the philosopher seeks to shape himself into the 
subject capable of acceding to truth in this way. Hence, despite the fact that Kant 
insists on calling all knowledge claiming to be based on real things (in themselves) 
‘dogmatic’ — including the experimental knowledge of the natural sciences — there 
something intensely dogmatic or sectarian about ‘critical’ philosophy. This is because 
in order to engage in the act of self-transformation that makes it possible to accede to 
transcendental ideas in the critical register of ‘as if’, the philosopher must first have 
                                                
73  See Thomasius, Cautelen zur Erlernung der Rechtsgelehrtheit, pp. 108-36. 
For commentary, see Ian Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State: The 
Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 51-83. On eclectic philosophy, see Horst Dreitzel, ‘Zur Entwicklung und 
Eigenart der “Eklektischen Philosophie”’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 18 
(1991), 281-343; and Ulrich Johannes Schneider, ‘Eclecticism and the History of 
Philosophy’, in D. R. Kelley (ed.), History and the Disciplines: The Reclassification 
of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 
1997), pp. 83-101.  
74  It is significant in this regard that Kant should have taken exception to 
Brucker’s criticism that the Platonic idea of the pure republic lacks experiential 
utility, arguing against Brucker that it is through adherence to the pure idea that 
political experience can be brought into alignment with the ideal. See Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason, A 316/B 372. 
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assented without question to the metaphysical image of man: as the empirical subject 
whose experience presents him with the occasion to transfigure himself into the 
transcendental subject of that experience. 
 
